

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637-Sub A)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

DATE: 11/3/67

Remylet, 10/5/67.

The records of the New York Office indicate the following transactions regarding SOLO Funds from 10/1/67 - 10/31/67.

10/1/67 On hand as of 9/30/67. \$659,282.98

Credits

None during October, 1967.

Debits

10/3/67 To CG 5824-S for HELEN WINTER. This money to be used for the CP leadership school, and expenses for "The Worker". \$25,000.00

10/4/67 To CG 5824-S. Transferred to Chicago SOLO account). \$3,000.00

Total: \$ 28,000.00

- 1-904, 9+D
- EX-115
- REC-321
- 100-428091-6570
- (2) - Bureau (RM)
 - 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub F) (AMERM)
 - 1 - New York (134-91) (INV)
 - 1 - New York (100-128861-Sub B) (CP, USA - RESERVE FUND) (41)
 - 1 - New York (41)

JFL:rmp
(6)

6 NOV 7 1967



79 NOV 14 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637-Sub A

Balance

Sum of Amount on Hand	\$659,282.98
Less Debit	28,000.00

Total On Hand As of 10/31/67: \$631,282.98

Location of SOL Funds
New York Office Territory

Safe deposit box Chemical Bank - New York Trust Company, 67 Broad Street, New York, New York.	\$10,000.00
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Jack Brooks Regular Checking Accounts, Chemical Bank - NY Trust Company, 20 Pine Street, New York, New York.

Account No. 1 (001-228919)	\$13,259.28
Account No. 2 (001-232835)	\$32,345.92
Account No. 3 (001-237942)	\$48,677.78

NY 694-S* Personal Checking Account, Chemical Bank - New York Trust Company, 67 Broad Street, NY, NY.	\$4,000.00
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Maintained by NYC - FBI

Safe Deposit Boxes Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, 69th Street and Third Ave., NY, NY.	\$523,000.00
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Total as of 10/31/67: \$631,282.98

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE 10 ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 11/3/67

S. R. [Signature]

ReCGlet dated October 5, 1967.

Set forth below is an accounting of Solo Funds and Reserve Funds transactions during October, 1967:

Balance of funds on hand,
October 1, 1967

Solo Funds

\$125,766.55

Reserve Funds

1,643.61

Total

\$127,410.16

Additions

Solo Funds

Transferred to Chicago Office from
New York Office on 10/13/67 by
CG 5824-S*

REC-32

100-428091-6571
\$3,000.00

Total Solo Funds

\$128,766.55

Reserve Funds

None

6 NOV 7 1967

Total Reserve Funds

\$ 1,643.61

Total All Funds

\$130,410.16

②-Bureau (RM)

2-New York (RM)

(1-100-128861 (CP, USA - Reserve Funds)

(1-100-134637 (SOLO)

1-Chicago

WAB:MDW

(5)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

79 NOV 14 1967



CG 134-46 Sub F

Disbursements

Solo Funds

During period 9/26-10/13/67 for purchase by CG 5824-S* of incidental items for GUS HALL and family \$ 112.00

On 10/13/67 to JAMES JACKSON for purchase of tape recorder and playback machine for TIMUR TIMOFEYEV (\$150) plus luggage, etc. (\$50) 200.00

On 10/17/67 to MAX WEINSTEIN for salary and expenses of business activities on behalf of CP, USA 2,900.00

On 10/18/67 to CG 5824-S* for a portion of the expenses of Solo Mission 24 500.00

On 10/18/67 as reimbursement to CG 5824-S* for out-of-pocket expenditure for books sent to CPSU 43.20

On 10/28/67 to CG 6653-S for expenses of travel to join CG 5824-S* on Solo Mission 24 1,300.00

Total \$ 5,055.20

Reserve Funds

On 10/3/67 to MAX WEINSTEIN for salary and expenses of business activities on behalf of CP, USA \$ 500.00

Total \$ 500.00

Balance on hand as of
November 1, 1967

Solo Funds

\$123,711.35

CG 134-46 Sub F

Reserve Funds

\$ 1,143.61

Total Funds on Hand \$124,854.96

Location of Funds - Chicago Office Territory

Solo Funds

Maintained by Chicago Office in safety deposit box #C1362, LaSalle National Bank, Chicago, Illinois, with access limited to SAC and ASAC \$110,766.55

Maintained by CG 5824-S* in safe in his office at Arisco Associates, Inc., Suite 918, 25 East Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois 2,944.80

Maintained in Arisco Associates, Inc., checking account at Michigan Avenue National Bank, Chicago, Illinois, with access by CS CG 6651-S and CG 5824-S* 5,000.00

Maintained in Arisco Associates, Inc., checking account at First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Lincolnwood, Illinois, with access by CS CG 6651-S and CG 5824-S* 5,000.00

Reserve Funds

Maintained in safety deposit box #1349 at Mid-America National Bank, Chicago, Illinois, in the name of HAROLD M. JULES (CG 5824-S*) and JACK BROOKS (NY 694-S*) with power of attorney to enter box in name of GENKA JULES (CG 6653-S) 1,143.61

Total Funds on Hand \$124,854.96

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 10/26/67

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReBulet dated October 18, 1967, concerning the development of additional informants for insertion into the Solo apparatus. ReBulet requested Chicago to submit observations and recommendations regarding the above. In addition, Chicago should consider the potential need for a leg man for CG 5824-S* and comment upon it, and consider developing individuals with potential to be utilized as leg men for CG 5824-S* in the event it is deemed desirable.

The Chicago Office is in total accord with the Bureau relative to the urgent need to fill out the Solo apparatus with live bodies. Aside from the fact that we may someday be called by the CP, USA or by the KGB to produce the additional members of the apparatus who thus far exist only in fiction, the strains upon the apparatus to continue functioning effectively under adverse circumstances have been amply demonstrated by the recent accident resulting in the partial incapacitation of NY 694-S*.

This office for a period of many months has been heartened by the admirable success of the New York Office in developing exceptional candidates for the apparatus functions of NY 694-S*, as was discussed at length during the last Solo conference held at the SOG. Furthermore, the excellent progress in the development by the New York Office of NY 4309-S* toward the ultimate objective of his total insertion into the Solo apparatus is most encouraging. In addition, the New York Office has groomed [redacted] to play a significant role in the Solo operation. While we realize that the New York Office has not relaxed its efforts to develop additional candidates for insertion into the Solo apparatus, it is our opinion that the New York Office has made notable progress in this direction.

②-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

ST-116 REC 46

6 NOV 8 1967

WAB:MDW
(4)



NOV 14 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

We are essentially in agreement with the position set forth in reBulet that additions for the Solo apparatus will most logically be found in the New York area. Nevertheless, Chicago is not content to allow the matter to rest at that and has been continually striving to identify individuals who could constitute valuable additions to the apparatus. In this connection, we have been searching for individuals who are suited for or can be developed into leg men for CG 5824-S*. It is our belief that depending upon the qualifications of such individuals selected, such leg men for CG 5824-S* may in time be developed into full-fledged additions to the Solo apparatus and, in fact, may be transferred to New York if deemed desirable or necessary.

It will be recalled that during the past summer, owing to the absence of the prime Soviet contact of the Solo apparatus and to what appeared to be the stupidity of his replacement, contact between the CP, USA and the CPSU was temporarily disrupted. Concurrently, there was a pressing need to transmit certain messages from the American Party to the Party in the Soviet Union. Following a series of abortive attempts to pass these messages through the apparatus, we came to a tentative decision that the messages would have to be taken by courier to the other side and since CG 5824-S* would be unable to travel, the only alternative was CG 6653-S. Rather than proceed with this rather lame alternative, a last ditch effort was made in New York to effect a successful transfer of messages and fortunately the Soviet contact performed acceptably for a change. The point of recounting this particular incident is merely to demonstrate the desirability, yes, even the need for a leg man or an assistant for CG 5824-S* who would have been available to perform such a courier service in the above circumstances.

While the above is certainly an extreme example, there are numerous other areas in which a leg man can function for CG 5824-S*, not only to alleviate his heavy workload or merely for his convenience, but also to protect the very security of the informant and the operation. For example, on his frequent visits to Chicago, GUS HALL desires to be met at the airport and chauffeured around Chicago to whatever meetings he desires to attend. High level Party functionaries in the Chicago area are not always available on short notice to be given this assignment by CG 5824-S* and, thus, exercising as much caution as possible, CG 5824-S* and/or CG 6653-S must undertake such responsibilities themselves. From the standpoint

CG 134-46 Sub B

of security of this supposedly covert Party official, this constitutes a jeopardy to our operation. The availability of leg men to perform such tasks would contribute in large measure to the security of the informant.

Chicago has been developing a young informant, [redacted] with the eventual purpose of his activation as just such a leg man for CG 5824-S*. The Bureau has been advised in the past of our intentions in this respect. [redacted] has recently been transferred into the Professional Section of the Illinois District, CP, USA, which is the same section to which CG 5824-S* belongs. [redacted] is a [redacted] who has made a number of trips to Europe and maintains international contacts throughout Europe. This man's cover for trips to Europe is well established. This informant is acquainted with GUS HALL who has indicated that he is impressed with him. [redacted] is acquainted with a large number of people who are also acquainted with CG 5824-S*. [redacted] has been a particular [redacted] of LOU DISKIN, member of the National Committee, CP, USA, who has demonstrated complete faith in this informant. b7D

[redacted] has recently returned from a honeymoon abroad, and it is our intention to press his development to the point where he will be accepted by CG 5824-S* as a leg man. We are confident that this can be accomplished and that [redacted] will be most willing to undertake this assignment. [redacted] has indicated his desire to undertake any assignment which we may request of him, including moving his business to the New York area should that be necessary. Therefore, we consider [redacted] a prime example of an informant who can be developed as a leg man for CG 5824-S* with the eventual possibility of transfer to New York for insertion into the Solo apparatus should that become necessary. b7D

A second individual currently under consideration in this program is a young [redacted] at Presbyterian-St. Luke's Hospital, Chicago, Illinois. He is 29 years of age and single, born of [redacted] parents, holding a Bachelor Degree in Political Science, a Master's Degree in Human Development, and expects to receive his Doctorate in [redacted] in December of this year. This individual is very knowledgeable in the field of political science and international affairs

CG 134-46 Sub B

b7D

and has extensive background in social science and related fields. He has been working in the area of community organizations and is accepted by the activists in the new left movement. Many of these individuals have [redacted] problems and engage in frank interviews with this [redacted] for whom they have developed a great deal of respect. This young man received his undergraduate and graduate degrees at [redacted] University and the [redacted] of Chicago, both of which are considered liberal institutions and which have had extensive new left and communist front activity over the past years. While in the early stages of development, we believe this young [redacted] has outstanding potential for development into a valuable adjunct to the Solo operation. He has expressed his desire to cooperate with the FBI to the fullest extent and has stated he is ready to go all the way with us.

As the Bureau is aware, this office has been devoting considerable attention to efforts to defect [redacted] [redacted] Illinois District, CP, USA, for eventual use in the Solo operation. Our efforts in regard to [redacted] will be the subject of a separate communication to the Bureau.

As agreed at the Solo conference at the SOG, the entire Solo operation, with particular emphasis upon the Solo apparatus, is the most important investigative effort by this office. In order to insure that the maximum effort is devoted to this project looking toward the earliest possible success of our efforts to locate additional personnel for the apparatus, leg men for CG 5824-S*, and replacement for the two Solo informants, the following action has been initiated by this office:

Commencing forthwith, two agents have been assigned to the case of [redacted] two agents have been assigned to the development of [redacted] and two agents have been assigned to the development of the young [redacted] all of whom have been instructed that their primary responsibility is to bring these individuals into the Solo operation at the earliest possible date. This program is receiving my close personal attention and the efforts of this office will continue to be pressed aggressively toward the successful accomplishment of the goals of this program.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *Jul*

DATE: November 6, 1967

FROM : G. F. Downing

SUBJECT: *SOLO*
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 11/6/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

5- Putnam
Q

ST-116
REC 46 100- 428091-6573

6 NOV 8 1967

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:ccb

(7) *ccb*

59 NOV 14 1967 288

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE 21 ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 11/7/67

On November 2, 1967, the Chicago Office received an envelope which had been transmitted to a Solo mail drop box maintained by the Chicago Office in the name of John Shoulders, Modern Books Store, 6624 N. Sheridan Road, Chicago, Ill. 60626. The envelope bore no return address and was postmarked Roma, 9/28/67.

Contained in the envelope was a 14-page pamphlet in the French language entitled, "Voix Du Peuple," the organ of the Party of the Popular Entente of Haiti.

Enclosed herewith are two positive photostat copies for the Bureau and one copy for New York of the above pamphlet.

The original copy is being maintained in Chicago and will be furnished to CG 5824-S* at a later date for transmittal to GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA.

VOIX DU PEUPLE
ORGAN OF PARTI D'ENTENTE POPULAIRE
(CP OF HAITI)

Rec'd
CIA
11/9/67
PCN
ET
Rec'd

REC-21

100-428091-6575

NOV 13 1967

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

RAV:MDW
(4)



79 NOV 21 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ENCLOSURES (2) TO BUREAU FROM CHICAGO

2 positive photostat copies of "Voix
Du Paupla"

RE: SOLO
IS-C

Bufile 100-428091
CGfile 134-46 Sub B

Transmitted via CGlet to Bureau 11/7/67



ENCLOSURE

100-428091-6575

VOIX DU Peuple

PROLÉTAIRES ET PEUPLES OPPRIMÉS
DE TOUS LES PAYS, UNISSEZ-VOUS !



sommaire

organe
du parti
d'entente populaire
d'haïti

n°
cinquante

DECLARATION DU BUREAU POLITIQUE DU
PARTI D'ENTENTE POPULAIRE D'HAÏTI p. 1

LE PARTI DE L'ESPERANCE POPULAIRE
Editorial d'"Avant-garde".
Antoine Levantin. p. 4

DUVALIER DANS UN CERCLE VICIEUX.
El Flaco. p. 6.

OU EN EST LA LUNE DE MIEL
DUVALIER-BALAGUER ?
Félix Tipigéon. p. 7.

L'AMERIQUE LATINE SE POSE
DES QUESTIONS.
Papito. p. 9

LES CONGOS DE LA CANNE-A-SUCRE.
Ti Congo. p. 11

DUVALIER CONTRE LES PEUPLES ARABES.
Roger Tilandingue. p. 12

LA RESPONSABILITE.
Antoine Levantin. p. 14

FAIRE DE CHAQUE HAITIEN UN MARRON DE LA NOUVELLE INDEPENDANCE!
Déclaration du Bureau Politique du Parti d'Entente Populaire.

La mise à mort des 19 officiers et de nombreux civils, le jugement par contumace de plusieurs autres militaires et civils, la répression contre leurs parents, les nombreuses arrestations opérées à la capitale et en province, la révocation de trois députés, celles de plusieurs ministres, la détention de l'homme d'affaires du gouvernement Clémard Joseph Charles, la saisie de ses biens, la démission retentissante de quelques ambassadeurs de la tyrannie sont des faits qui alimentent l'activité politique haïtienne et entretiennent la tension et la perplexité générale. Les commentateurs vont bon train et les rumeurs contradictoires circulent annonçant soit un complot, soit une invasion soit un débarquement américain. Dans le peuple se réveille l'espoir de la chute imminente du dictateur.

La crise interne ronge le pouvoir duvaliériste qui se décompose. Se sentant traqué, le dictateur cherche des complots et voit des ennemis partout. Il élimine physiquement ou révoque des hommes qui l'ont fidèlement servi pendant dix ans, les accusant d'ingratitude, de trahison, de mollesse ou même de dilapidations de fonds publics. Pris de panique, Duvalier profère des menaces, adopte des mesures précipitées qu'il retire rapidement. Perdant la tête, vexé que des complices d'hier puissent échapper à sa furie, il dénonce les conventions interaméricaines sur le droit d'asile, contribuant ainsi à son isolement. Sa fureur n'épargne même pas des membres de sa propre famille.

Ces événements se situent dans le contexte d'une année prévue pour être l'apothéose de dix années de pouvoir duvaliériste et qui au contraire apporte au gouvernement de multiples problèmes. Il est indéniable que la confusion qui a suivi la réalisation de différentes actions par notre Parti a servi de détonateur à la crise interne et aussi de prétexte à Duvalier pour écraser ceux dont il se sent menacé. Les explosions de faible puissance contre la mascarade électorale du 22 janvier, celles du "carnaval du printemps", du Casino International et du 22 juin, l'attaque d'un de nos commandos contre le domicile de l'assistant-commandant des macoutes du Palais National Jacques Lysius, l'accentuation du climat de mécontentement populaire, la tentative d'enlèvement de Mme Max Adolphe, l'incendie allumé sous notre direction par les paysans dans les champs de canne appartenant à la compagnie yankee HASCO et des tontons macoutes, l'exécution du macoute Ti Bobo par un soldat et la grande joie que cet acte a provoqué dans la population, la rapidité avec laquelle les masses du Cap ont saccagé la maison des macoutes en disgrâce, sont des faits politiques dont la signification profonde n'échappe nullement à Duvalier, à l'impérialisme et aux politiciens réactionnaires de l'opposition. Ils ont contribué à créer les conditions pour l'éclosion de la crise interne du gouvernement. Cette crise est une marque du pourrissement du régime, de sa faiblesse et de ses multiples contradictions. Aucune mesure de consolidation provisoire ne saurait l'éliminer totalement. C'est un phénomène irréversible qui continuera à se manifester sous différentes formes tant que Duvalier demeure au pouvoir.

Le tyran ne pourra jamais parvenir ni à un renouvellement complet ni à un "rajeunissement" de ses cadres. Certaines des mesures adoptées actuellement revêtent un profond caractère démagogique. Duvalier veut faire accroire qu'il n'était pas au courant des exactions de ses macoutes et attribuer à certains d'entre eux toute la responsabilité du désastre de dix ans de dictature duvaliériste. Toutes les propriétés d'anciens fonctionnaires dont on a annoncé la saisie pour cause de vol et de malversations n'ont pas été vraiment séquestrées. Aucune redistribution des terres volées aux paysans n'a été réalisée. Les seuls qui ont lieu l'ont été en faveur de nouveaux clans macoutes.

La presse internationale aux ordres des yankees a délibérément grossi les faits de l'actualité haïtienne et développe le mythe d'un soit-disant antiaméricanisme de Duvalier et d'une prétendue participation de communistes à son gouvernement. Cette attitude a pour but de conditionner l'opinion continentale et internationale pour préparer à une quelconque manœuvre de l'impérialisme américain. Washington met déjà en oeuvre le mécanisme de substitution de Duvalier au cas où un événement quelconque survient. Sa politique de double-jeu, consistant à appuyer et à aider simultanément Duvalier et la fraction réactionnaire de l'opposition à son gouvernement connaît de ces fluctuations coutumières aux périodes de crise. Elle est marquée ces jours-ci par un raidissement: raidissement qui mécontente Duvalier et lui donne la frousse, le faisant craindre un coup d'état militaire, un assassinat ou un débarquement. C'est pour cette raison que Duvalier frappe même les cadres militaires-macoutes, qu'il s'est fait représenter par Balaguer à la conférence de Punta del Este, qu'il ne manque aucune occasion de signifier au gouvernement américain son désir d'une collaboration franche et qu'il alterne à son égard flatteries, bassesses et chantages.

L'issue yankee au pouvoir duvaliériste ne peut être autre qu'un coup d'état, un assassinat, une invasion d'exilés haïtiens seuls ou combinés avec des contre révolutionnaires cubains ou un débarquement de troupes américaines. Bien que ne partageant pas toutes les positions de Duvalier, Washington est heureux qu'il fasse réprimer avec la dernière rigueur le mouvement populaire. Il craint que sa disparition de la scène politique haïtienne ne soit le point de départ d'une libération d'énergies populaires comme cela s'est produit en République Dominicaine après la mort de Trujillo. C'est pourquoi, la peur de l'initiative indépendante des masses révolutionnaires, s'est vite transformée en frénésie de l'intervention préventive. L'impérialisme américain craint aussi la réalisation d'une action armée prolongée qui échapperait à son contrôle par l'intégration des masses populaires faisant réclamer leurs revendications par les armes. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi il a facilité à Duvalier la tâche d'écrasement de certains mouvements armés passés, bien que ces mouvements n'eurent rien à voir avec la libération nationale effective. L'impérialisme américain penche davantage pour un coup d'état ou l'assassinat de Duvalier avec comme épée de Damocles sur la tête du peuple haïtien, la présence de troupes américaines dans nos eaux territoriales prêtes à débarquer pour assurer l'existence d'un nouveau gouver-

nement non moins réactionnaire que celui de Duvalier qu'il soit dirigé par Déjoie, par Jean David, par le Père Georges, Paul Cassagnol, Luc Fouché ou par n'importe quel autre politicien réactionnaire.

En adoptant les "VOIES TACTIQUES VERS LA NOUVELLE INDEPENDANCE D'HAITI", le Comité Central du Parti d'Entente Populaire d'Haïti (P.E.P.) a défini les termes généraux de l'issue populaire à la situation actuelle et du comportement à adopter en cas d'actions armées indépendantes de notre volonté. En cas d'intervention américaine, le peuple haïtien doit combattre pour sa souveraineté nationale contre les troupes yankees et contre le pouvoir duvaliériste. Car, la défense de notre souveraineté nationale même exige le renversement de Duvalier. Si l'opposition traditionnelle déclenche des actions armées du même style que celles déjà réalisées, la tactique juste sera non seulement d'infiltrer ses rangs, de travailler à sa base même et de gagner par la lutte la direction du mouvement, mais de développer simultanément notre propre action indépendante, d'être aux premières lignes de combat. Face à de possibles soulèvements massifs et spontanés dans certaines localités, nous devons chercher à canaliser cette juste flamme populaire, à l'organiser de manière à imprimer à ces actions armées des formes viables et continues.

Le mouvement populaire ne doit pas se reposer sur les contradictions internes du gouvernement ou celles l'opposant à l'impérialisme pour l'écrasement de Duvalier. Car, si une fraction quelconque des classes réactionnaires renverse le tyran, elle n'aura d'autre alternative que d'instaurer une nouvelle dictature réactionnaire. C'est une exigence même du régime semi-colonial et semi-féodal. Renverser Duvalier n'est qu'une des tâches du mouvement révolutionnaire. Si le tyran tombe indépendamment de nous, notre devoir c'est d'exploiter la conjoncture pour développer l'action indépendante populaire en vue de la prise du pouvoir et de l'instauration du pouvoir de la Nouvelle Indépendance.

Tout en restant attentif à toutes les particularités de la crise du pouvoir duvaliériste, notre Parti appelle ses militants et sympathisants à intensifier le labeur politique et la préparation des bases matérielles techniques, opératives POUR FAIRE DE CHAQUE HAÏTIEN UN MARRON DE LA NOUVELLE INDEPENDANCE !

L'issue révolutionnaire passe par l'établissement des nègres marrons, des foyers de guerillas, le développement d'actions armées dans les villes, la création de l'Armée d'Entente Populaire. Le mot d'ordre est à la lutte immédiate par tous les moyens à notre portée pour l'écrasement de la dictature duvaliériste, l'éviction de la domination impérialiste pour la nouvelle Indépendance et le Socialisme !

Bureau Politique
du Parti d'Entente Populaire d'Haïti.
4 Août 1967.

LE PARTI DE L'ESPERANCE POPULAIRE

Editorial extrait d'"Avant-garde", Juin-Juillet 1967.

Définir la voie qui mène à la victoire, indiquer ce qu'il faut faire et comment le faire, ébaucher une ligne militaire, critiquer ses conceptions antérieures erronées, montrer combien la lutte sera difficile, évoquer les situations militaires auxquelles on peut avoir à faire face et comment les affronter, situer notre lutte dans le contexte continental et international actuel avec tout ce que cette situation apporte d'avantages et d'inconvénients et marquer des pas concrets en vue de l'application de cette ligne nouvelle, tels sont pour le moins les objectifs que s'est tracé le Comité Central de notre Parti à sa session plénière de Mai 1967.

Après discussion, on a adopté le document définissant les "Voies tactiques vers la Nouvelle Indépendance d'Haiti", en quelque sorte le deuxième Manifeste de notre Parti un document dont l'étude est indispensable pour tout militant et tout postulant.

Par ce document le Parti définit la véritable nouvelle orientation qui au contraire de celle proposée par des opportunistes fait justice de toutes les confusions, de toutes les acrobaties sur la stratégie et la tactique, sur la question de la lutte antidictatoriale, des alliances politiques, de la lutte antiféodale et antiimpérialiste, du double jeu yankee, de l'opposition traditionnelle etc... Désormais sans renier son passé mais tirant leçon de ses expériences, notre Parti pose tous les problèmes dans une optique dynamique, refusant les lieux communs, et les sentiers battus qui ne conduisent nulle part, sinon à la routine qui est aussi une forme d'attentisme. Ces vues adoptées par la direction du Parti, il nous reste à les faire pénétrer dans tous les pores du Parti, à les faire partager et appliquer par tout le monde. C'est dans ce but que le Comité Central encourage l'étude approfondie dans tous les organismes, les cercles de base et les cercles d'études et qu'il insiste pour que chaque unité du Parti en envisage l'application dans sa sphère d'action.

Cette ligne nouvelle n'est certes pas née du jour au lendemain. L'évolution constante de la situation haïtienne et de nos conceptions de la lutte y conduisaient fatalement. Notre attitude critique envers nous-mêmes, envers nos points de vue, annonçaient déjà les "Voies tactiques..." Ce texte marque une étape de notre lutte, étape sonnant le glas d'un certain dogmatisme qui voulait établir à tout prix un équilibre dans les formes de lutte en dépit des impératifs de la réalité. Un équilibre qui repoussait les nécessités les plus pressantes. Un dogmatisme qui confondait parfois stratégie et tactique, voie de la révolution et formes de lutte, qui tendait à établir une cloison entre formes de lutte politique et formes de lutte armée, qui voulait à tout prix que les luttes revendicatives ne prennent que des formes "pacifiques" alors que l'ennemi ne connaît que le langage de la violence, qui sur le plan d'organisation, envisageait le travail militaire du Parti comme un domaine tout à fait à part, un domaine esotérique et qui arguant de la nécessité de l'appareil spécialisé n'établissait pas la tâche comme générale.

Précisément, parvenu, au moment des définitions, le Parti s'est rendu compte qu'à tactique nouvelle correspond organisation nouvelle. Autrement dit il faut l'unité de tactique et d'organisation. Le Parti doit jouer un rôle correspondant à son choix de la voie armée vers la nouvelle indépendance. Son organisation doit être adaptée de même que ses formes de luttes. Nos efforts pour la construction du Parti doivent être directement orientés dans ce sens, de façon que l'on puisse trouver les meilleures formes de la direction du mouvement armé par le Parti.

Ce rôle dirigeant, c'est notre action qui nous le donnera et non simplement le fait d'être porteur d'une idéologie juste, scientifique et accoucheuse de cet "humanisme nouveau" qui prend corps depuis bientôt 50 ans. L'expérience a montré que les Partis Communistes n'ont pas toujours su réaliser un enseignement léniniste qu'ils prétendent trop souvent suivre: faire l'analyse concrète d'une situation concrète. La tendance générale a été d'appliquer des schémas tout en clamant que "le marxisme n'est pas un dogme, mais un guide pour l'action". Des erreurs de ce genre ont fait perdre à des Partis frères d'excellentes opportunités de s'imposer comme dirigeants du mouvement populaire. De ces expériences, aussi, notre parti tente de tirer leçon. Car il est sûr qu'il est la force la plus capable de mettre sur pied un puissant mouvement populaire, mais aussi de le diriger jusqu'à la victoire de la révolution socialiste et la construction du Communisme.

Sa nouvelle ligne tactique trace non seulement la meilleure voie vers l'entente populaire pour la nouvelle indépendance, mais aussi donne corps à l'espérance populaire qui dort dans l'attentisme, dans cet "équilibre entre la peur et la révolte" dont parle le tyran. C'est son application effective qui concrétisera l'alliance ouvrière-paysanne et assurera l'hégémonie du Parti des communistes haïtiens dans la bataille pour la Libération Nationale et Sociale de notre peuple.

La juste ligne est tracée. Sa concrétisation relève du travail de chaque dirigeant, de chaque militant, de chaque patriote, de nos efforts incessants, de notre abnégation, de notre dévouement, de notre clairvoyance. Faisons du PEP, le véritable Parti de l'Espérance Populaire !

ANTOINE LEVANTIN.

INFORMATIONS .- Dans un message adressé au Comité de rédaction de JUSTICE, notre Parti a présenté ses vœux à l'organe du Parti Communiste Martiniquais, le plus ancien des organes communistes de l'Amérique Latine qui fête ce mois de juillet son 47^{ème} anniversaire.

Depuis les événements des 2^{ème} et 2^{ème} mai dernier à Pointe-à-Pitre (Guadeloupe) où plus de 50 personnes trouvèrent la mort et plus d'une vingtaine furent blessés, le gouvernement colonialiste de Charles De Gaulle a déclenché une répression systématique contre les secteurs anticolonialistes guadeloupéens tant en France qu'en Guadeloupe. une grande vague d'incarcérations et d'inculpations est déclenchée. De partout, les protestations parviennent au gouvernement de de Gaulle.

DUVALIER DANS UN CERCLE VICIEUX

Ce n'est pas par un pur hasard que nous avons assisté et assistons ces jours-ci à une série d'événements qui mettent en cause la survie même du pouvoir duvalérien. Qu'on le veuille ou non, les événements de ces jours ne sont la preuve ni de la force du pouvoir actuel ni d'un changement de ligne visant à amoindrir les exactions de ses criminels et voleurs, mais l'aveu d'une faiblesse, d'une impuissance.

D'une faiblesse. La constitution du pouvoir duvaliériste repose sur une faiblesse fondamentale qui est le produit simultané du régime féodal haïtien et de la violence malade de Doc. A savoir que les cadres du pouvoir viennent premièrement de la classe des féodaux qui veulent demeurer dans la "ligne des habitudes politiques de leur classe"; se servir de la violence pour agrandir leurs propriétés. Deuxièmement, ce pouvoir se compose des parvenus issus des classes moyennes, élèves politiques à la fois des féodaux et des impérialistes qui usent de la violence non seulement pour devenir eux-mêmes propriétaires fonciers mais surtout pour constituer une nouvelle rame de la grande bourgeoisie compradore. Il n'y a pas eu de soudure entre ces deux sous-produits sociaux.

Si, sous Magloire, orientées dans les divers échelons de l'armée, la petite couche de parvenus pouvait se prévaloir d'être le corps principal de la violence réactionnaire, avec Duvalier, elle a vu face à elle son image déformée: le macoutisme.

Et c'est justement le macoutisme qui a constitué la force et la faiblesse du gouvernement de Duvalier. La force du duvaliérisme par le caractère aveugle de sa violence et sa composition hétéroclite, deux raisons qui engendreront l'attentisme et la démission de ses adversaires, tout au plus, de ceux qui n'ont pas pu, n'ont pas su, ou n'ont pas voulu analyser la situation actuelle pour en tirer la conclusion que Duvalier n'est fort que quand l'opposition se croise les bras. Dans le cas contraire, le gouvernement de Duvalier est faible.

Le macoutisme constitue aussi une faiblesse du gouvernement de Duvalier. Il n'ya que les borgnes politiques, ceux qui ont la moitié de leurs cerveaux dans la poche des féodaux à ne pas s'en rendre compte. Ici nous ne retenons que l'aspect fondamental de la faiblesse du macoutisme: corps spécial de répression composé en grande partie de déclassés sociaux apparus à une période de crise insoluble. Pour tel et étant tel, le macoutisme a détruit toutes les limites de l'appétit de luxe et de gabegie.

Ces 19 hommes fusillés publiquement et d'autres qui l'ont été secrètement, n'ont pas compris que le macoutisme qu'ils pratiquaient aussi dans les rangs de l'armée avait un double tranchant. Que le macoutisme n'était qu'une force de service pouvant servir pour ou contre n'importe qui y compris des assassins de leur acabit, des tueurs comme les Tassy, Thomas, Josma, Borge et le reste.

Et encore pour tel, le macoutisme qui est le produit de la décomposition d'un système et sa déraison aussi a permis à ceux qui recherchent des solutions réelles et non celles de la revue impérialiste "Sélection", des solutions réelles au drame haïtien de découvrir les "Voies tactiques vers la Nouvelle Indépendance."

Ce n'est pas par pur hasard, mais une conjonction historique le fait que la détermination des Voies Tactiques survienne au moment même où le système macoutique corrompu du féodalisme duvaliériste traverse une de ses crises les plus aiguës. L'élimination de plusieurs de ses hommes de main par le dictateur ne passe pas comme un fait normal entre tant d'autres mais révèle les contradictions internes du régime, sa faillite, son impuissance.

Pouvait-on s'imaginer l'existence du pouvoir de Doc sans Clémard, sans les Tassy, sans Borge ou Josma? Ce fait difficilement concevable est aujourd'hui plus que réel. Et il se dit qu'après Jean-Julmé et Rameau Estimé il en passera d'autres, et on cite le nom de Cambronne, de Philippeaux, André Simon etc... Cela veut dire que ce pouvoir n'est pas simplement celui des parvenus, un pouvoir sans autre racine sociale, mais le produit le plus pur du féodalisme, un produit achevé que l'impérialisme apprécie tout en formulant des doutes quand à son maintien!

A qui a-t-on restitué les terres volées par Jean-Julmé et Rameau Estimé? Aux paysans? Jamais. La mascarade de la chambre - disons mieux de la latrine législative - est un règlement de compte entre grands propriétaires fonciers, entre voleurs aux fins de conclure à leurs manières de vieux procès de famille. Les paysans? Ils n'ont eu et n'auront leurs terres que machettes tirées, que fusils brandis, que redevenus MARRONS et non des règlements de compte entre grands dons.

C'est bien dommage que Duvalier trouve en ces moments amers pour lui des hommes se prétendant de gauche pour lui décerner la palme révolutionnaire.

Car aujourd'hui, le plus valable de tout, c'est qu'armé des thèses de notre Parti, des centaines de communistes, socialistes, démocrates, patriotes se préparent à la levée d'armes. En ces moments de crise politique profonde d'un gouvernement réduit à ses ministres et à ses députés serviles et peureux, les "Voies Tactiques" trouvent la justification la plus impérieuse. Se redresser ou périr. Avancer ou périr. La grande confrontation n'est pas lointaine.

EL FLACO.

o o o

OU EN EST LA LUNE DE NIEL DUVALIER-BALAGUER ?

Les rumeurs font état d'une tension subite dans les relations entre les deux tyrans de l'île. Elles veulent que l'ambassade de Duvalier à Santo-Domingo ait été détruite, que l'ambassadeur Théard ait sollicité asile politique, que Balaguer ait fait des déclarations anti-duvalier à cause de l'exécution des 19 officiers.

Selon la MBC théard aurait à Radio Noticias qu'il partait pour l'Europe en mission. Toujours est-il qu'il a été remplacé à son poste d'ambassadeur par le député Fritz Moïse. D'autres hauts fonctionnaires de l'ambassade duvaliériste à Santo-Domingo ont été affectés par les changements. Les rumeurs disent que c'est à la suite d'un conflit avec André Simon à propos des travailleurs haïtiens en République Dominicaine que Théard rappelé par le gouvernement a jugé sage de ne pas rentrer.

De son côté l'ambassadeur de Balaguer à Port-au-Prince a jugé bon de démentir les rumeurs sur la tension dans les relations

Duvalier-Balaguer. Il a même fait état d'un fragment de discours de Balaguer "favorable à Haïti".

Il ne serait pas étonnant que certains secteurs trujillistes manifestent de l'hostilité envers Duvalier. Car, la disparition de l'ancien chef fu service d'intelligence militaire de Trujillo, Johnny Abbes Garcia, ne saurait plaire à des trujillistes. Abbes collaborait avec Duvalier et l'on ignore les raisons exactes de son enlèvement et de son assassinat probable. La mort d'un bourreau ne peut émouvoir des révolutionnaires. Notre seul regret est de ne pas avoir eu le temps de le faire nous-mêmes, en signe de solidarité avec le peuple dominicain. Mais il n'en est pas de même pour les trujillistes qui ressentent profondément la perte de l'un des leurs. En second lieu, les trujillistes voient d'un mauvais oeil l'assassinat des 19 officiers, 19 bourreaux de la pire espèce de type trujilliste qui pourraient servir n'importe quel gouvernement réactionnaire. Cette élimination collective portant un coup aux cadres de l'armée traditionnelle, instrument favori de Washington et de Santo-Domingo pour changer les gouvernements haïtiens, les trujillistes peuvent vraiment se sentir atteints.

Il n'est pas exclu non plus que Balaguer s'aligne progressivement sur la position américaine de recherche d'un "niveau minimum d'adaptation mutuelle avec Duvalier" tout en aidant parcimonieusement, de manière ouverte ou cachée certains secteurs de l'opposition traditionnelle haïtienne.

8 L'orientation exacte des relations Duvalier-Balaguer se précisera dans les semaines qui suivent. On saura alors si les liens continuent à se resserrer, si une certaine froideur se manifestera ou si Balaguer s'alignera sur les positions de Washington. Mais quoi qu'il advienne, il demeure qu'associé ou dissocié, le tandem Duvalier-Balaguer est l'ennemi des peuples haïtien et dominicain et que nous ne pouvons compter sur ces dissensions pour la Nouvelle indépendance d'Haïti. Le chemin de la libération nationale et sociale de l'île, de la solidarité de lutte des peuples dominicain et haïtien est indiqué clairement par le Comité Central du Parti d'Entente Populaire d'Haïti dans son document sur "Les Voies Tactiques vers la Nouvelle Indépendance d'Haïti".

Félix TIPIGEON.

Voix du Peuple, 24 juillet 1967

SI VOUS N'AVEZ PAS ENCORE LU LES VOIES TACTIQUES, LISEZ-LE. SI VOUS L'AVEZ DÉJÀ LU, RELISEZ-LE JUSQU'À TOUT COMPRENDRE. SI VOUS AVEZ DES DIVERGENCES, ÉCRIVEZ À VOIX DU PEUPLE POUR LES EXPOSER. LES CONCLUSIONS AVEC LESQUELLES VOUS ÊTES D'ACCORD DE CŒUR, COMMENCEZ À PRÉPARER LEUR APPLICATION AVEC NOUS.

INFORMATIONS: CHE GUEVARA EST-IL EN BOLIVIE ?

Selon les agences de presse, le jeune essayiste français Régis Debray actuellement détenu en Bolivie, aurait déclaré à sa mère que son avocat a trahi un secret en révélant ce qu'il lui aurait confié confidentiellement: à savoir qu'il a conversé avec Ché Guevara dans les maquis boliviens et qu'il lui aurait promis de ne pas révéler maintenant sa présence en Bolivie. Pour nous ce qui importe ce n'est pas tellement de savoir exactement dans quel pays Ché est en train de combattre, mais de le savoir avec nous dans la lutte quoti-

Encore une nouvelle fois le 26 juillet. C'est la date où l'objectivité prenant le pas sur l'attentisme chez l'héroïque peuple cubain, avec des hommes braves et lucides comme Fidel Castro, Camillo Cienfuegos et Juan Almeida, Abel Santamaria et des dizaines d'autres dont la plupart ont arrosé de leur sang la Patrie de José Martí et d'Antonio Maceo, l'homme latino-américain a cherché un autre chemin vers la Liberté.

L'insurrection du 26 juillet, génératrice d'un vaste mouvement populaire allait créer la brèche par laquelle passerait le mouvement révolutionnaire latino-américain.

Repensée et orientée, elle allait permettre une refonte de la Stratégie Révolutionnaire en Amérique Latine, l'ouverture réelle le vieux rêve de mettre fin aux pouvoirs oligarchiques et à la main-mise impérialiste sur le continent.

Aujourd'hui, Cuba premier pays socialiste de l'Amérique, réunira au lendemain du 11ème 26 juillet la plupart des mouvements révolutionnaires continentaux pour poser concrètement la question d'une solidarité agissante.

Plusieurs problèmes d'importance continentale feront l'objet de la prochaine Conférence de l'Organisme de Solidarité de l'Amérique Latine (OLAS).

Outre le travail d'évaluation des ressources économiques du continent et du potentiel social, humain que s'était fixé le bureau de l'OLAS comme prémisses à la conférence, il reviendra aux délégués à la Havane d'étudier des points aussi importants que la définition d'une stratégie révolutionnaire des peuples latino-américains contre la stratégie globale de l'impérialisme allié aux dictatures de droite et soutenu par le réformisme; les modalités d'une solidarité agissante et permanente entre les peuples latino-américains et cela va de soi, avec la révolution cubaine; l'adoption de statuts propres à l'OLAS.

Si ces questions sont celles qui intéressent fondamentalement les révolutionnaires latino-américains, la façon de les aborder et les solutions proposées d'un pays à l'autre et d'un mouvement à l'autre sur un même territoire. Là il ne s'agit pas d'adopter des solutions toutes faites, d'essayer d'échapper aux divergences par des conclusions générales, mais de définir des critères de généralisation et des modes d'action qui tout en laissant une large place aux particularités de tel pays ou de tel mouvement abordent le problème en son aspect fondamental qui est l'objet même de la Conférence : une solidarité effective pour la délivrance du continent.

Définir avec esprit de suite et objectivité la réalité, ne pas céder aux conclusions gauchisantes sans lien avec la vie et l'histoire des mouvements révolutionnaires, mais surtout attaquer l'opportunisme de droite dans ses fondements, livrer le dernier assaut contre le Browderisme masqué, sont des tâches ardues et en même temps préliminaires à une vraie solidarité.

C'est dans ces perspectives que notre Parti apprécie la Conférence et y participera tout en déplorant que diverses organisations révolutionnaires latino-américaines, s'arc-boutant à des positions pour le moins ambiguës, ne s'y soient pas fait représenter. C'est ainsi que l'absence du P.C. brésilien privera les participants de données importantes sur la situation dans ce pays.

D'autre part aussi des divergences arrivées au point extrême négatif empêcheront des explications détaillées et fraternelles sur l'évolution de bien de situations nationales comme il en est à propos du Vénézuéla.

L'importance du cas par exemple, rend désolante la situation intervenue entre le P.C. brésilien et le Parti Communiste Cubain, mais il va de soi qu'on ne saurait imputer au P.C. Cubain le fait qu'une dictature d'extrême droite ait pris pied au Brésil et permis une remontée de la réaction en divers endroits de l'Amérique Latine. Cela montre à quel point la lutte dans un pays intéresse tous les autres.

La question vénézuélienne n'est pas moins brûlante. Mais il ne s'agit pas de se laisser aller à des attitudes passionnées visant à nier à l'OLAS la contribution de tel ou tel mouvement à la lutte de son peuple. Il faut justement souligner ici que l'article signé d'Angèle du numéro 11 des Jeunesses Populaires ne reflète pas la position de notre Parti qui s'estime insuffisamment informé des problèmes vénézuéliens et ne saurait décerner des titres à telle ou telle fraction du mouvement révolutionnaire de ce pays.

De notre côté nous estimons que tout parti a le droit de prendre des mesures disciplinaires contre les militants à quelque échelon qu'ils soient, mais en même temps nous nous inquiétons dans le cas du PCV que des vocables inopportuns aient été utilisés à l'endroit du Commandant Douglas Bravo ex-membre de la direction du Parti, qui n'est pas passé à l'ennemi et qui continue la lutte armée révolutionnaire dans les montagnes de Falcon.

Nous nous posons des questions sérieuses sur la validité de la "Paix Démocratique" définie par le PCV dans les conditions de la dictature terroriste de Léoni, mais n'écartons pas que le PCV puisse voir dans les élections une façon de reconfirmer sa liaison avec les masses des villes sans pour cela faire de celles-là un critère d'appréciation de la situation révolutionnaire au Vénézuéla.

Qu'on le veuille ou non, ces questions internes viendront dans les débats de la Conférence de Solidarité, car elles ont cessé d'être particulières pour devenir des points d'ordre stratégique et tactique de tous les mouvements révolutionnaires d'Amérique latine.

Il ne s'agit pas de décréter des formes de lutte et d'en écarter d'autres, mais de les intégrer toutes dans le processus de libération latino-américaine.

Il va de soi que les structures économiques, physiques et sociales d'un pays concourent à établir les modes d'action révolutionnaires les plus propices. Et c'est justement pour cela que l'unité des mouvements internes est nécessaire.

Dans le cas de l'OLAS, la définition d'une Stratégie révolutionnaire d'ensemble impose une analyse plus approfondie, et c'est pourquoi le danger de systématisation précisée doit être apprécié dans toutes ses conséquences.

PAPITO.

Voix du Peuple 24juill. 1967.

LES CONGOS DE LA CANNE A SUCRE

Etre "congo" signifie être débutant dans la coupe de la canne-à-sucre. Les plus anciens ce sont les "vièjos", plus habitués à ce travail si ce mot n'est pas trop noble. Car travailler pour nous ne signifie pas gagner, de l'argent n'importe comment, mais vivre dans des conditions humaines, pas comme des cochons, ni avec des cochons, et nous en passons. On se fait donc une idée des conditions de vie et de travail de nos compatriotes en République Dominicaine et comme elles étaient à Cuba avant la Révolution.

Embarqués comme des sardines dans des camions, ils meurent en route parfois et leurs cadavres sont simplement jetés au bord du chemin, tandis que des menaces pétaradent contre ceux qui protestent. Arrivés là-bas, la vie n'est pas plus rose. C'est là que commence le véritable calvaire. On touche très peu, on travaille toute la journée avec une courte pause à midi. On habite quelques fois à plusieurs dans des trous de quelques mètres cubes, dans les quartiers boueux les plus malsains du pays, centres de syphilis, de tuberculose et de tous les grands maux. Les loisirs sont très limités et conduisent plutôt au vice et à l'abrutissement. Ce sont la guaguère, les jeux à gage tels la carte sous toutes ses formes et la prostitution. Aucune activité saine pour cette vie de chien.

A Cuba par exemple avant la révolution les haïtiens étaient appelés "pichon", c'est-à-dire, des êtres de rien, désignés pour les besognes les plus sales. Par dessus le marché c'étaient eux les fauteurs de troubles, les "cartes marquées"; au moindre signe de grève revendicative, les "congos" sont poursuivis partout sur les plantations, dans leur demeure et dans les endroits où l'on signale leur présence. Quand la situation devient plus grave, ils sont simplement arrêtés, matraqués ou tués et le gouvernement haïtien qu'il s'agisse de Magloire, Lescot ou Estimé sans parler de Duvalier, ne dit jamais mot à propos de ces "chiens" abattus: ils méritent leur sort, on a assez de leur donner à manger, à quoi bon leur laisser la vie ! 11

Qui n'a pas lu "Compère général Soleil" ou Jacques Stéphen Alexis décrit une véritable chasse-à-l'homme de ces "perros de haïtianos", ces chiens d'haïtiens poursuivis par des chiens de police et ceci nous rappelle fort bien l'époque de l'esclavage.

Rien n'a changé dans "Quisqueya la Belle". Revenus de la coupe, ils ne sont pas moins malheureux, ils rapportent leurs habits de travail et leur plus grand bien, un "coq gaguère", un "coq-bataille", un bon coq dominicain. Et voilà une situation que Duvalier a encore empiré comme toutes les situations mauvaises qu'il a trouvées en Haïti en arrivant au pouvoir. Quelle canaille !

Il a eu raison de médailler Ti Bobo. Il a été bon élève, il a suivi avec beaucoup d'intérêt les leçons de business, de vol. Maintenant en République Dominicaine, Duvalier réclame 12 \$ sur chaque tête d'homme (pour cette saison il ya 20.000 coupeurs haïtiens) et 49\$ sur l'argent de travail de chacun. Ainsi les travailleurs vivent dans un état d'autant plus lamentable. Suivant des informations données par Radio Havane, les haïtiens travaillant sur les plantations américaines reçoivent 2 pesos par semaine et sur les plantations dominicaines, ils ont une fiche pour manger "affiba et patate boucanée" à la cantine constituée pour eux. Et encore c'est une vérité de dire que Balaguer égale Duvalier et leur soutien: l'impérialisme américain.

A bas les sanguinaires ! Vive l'unité haïtiano-dominicaine !

Rien d'étonnant que Duvalier ait pris position contre les pays arabes, en faveur de l'état d'Israël. Dans le conflit du Moyen-Orient tous les réactionnaires ont pris position à côté d'Israël même ceux qui exterminaient massivement les juifs au cours de la seconde guerre mondiale. En effet, Israël est le fer de lance de l'impérialisme au Moyen-Orient contre les pays arabes, en particulier contre les gouvernements progressistes et antiimpérialistes.

Les buts propres d'Israël et ceux de l'Impérialisme au Moyen-Orient sont essentiellement réactionnaires. Israël est un état agressif, armé jusqu'aux dents qui par des attaques-surprises a détruit les moyens de défense des pays arabes, qui applique les procédés de la guerre éclair comme le faisait Hitler et qui a annexé de vastes territoires des pays arabes. Par qui Israël est-il armé ? Par l'impérialisme. Les banquiers américains financent l'économie et l'armée israéliennes. Les chefs militaires israéliens sont formés par les yanquis et par des spécialistes nazi, de ceux qui massacraient les juifs il y a un peu plus de 20 ans. Israël est l'un des pays où l'on entraînait des mercenaires et des parachutistes pour Moïse Tschombé. Israël est l'état qui a chassé des milliers d'arabes de Palestine et qui aujourd'hui après sa guerre-éclair en chasse des centaines de milliers d'autres et s'accapare de grandes étendues de terres qu'il refuse de remettre à leurs propriétaires légitimes: les pays arabes.

12

Les peuples arabes ne sauraient ne pas lutter pour la libération de la Palestine. Les gouvernements progressistes arabes ne sauraient laisser l'impérialisme perpétrer ses forfaits au Moyen-Orient par l'intermédiaire d'Israël. Mais du fait de l'existence de régimes sociaux différents dans les pays arabes, de la présence dans les gouvernements de ces pays d'éléments pro-américains notoires, des contradictions propres à ces pays qui cherchent leur voie, les pays arabes ne pouvaient offrir univraiment homogène, contre la puissante Israël. Ils se sont laissés prendre de vitesse. Et sans lui laisser le temps de combattre, Israël a anéanti en trois heures l'aviation arabe. Après il était facile à cet état réactionnaire de battre les pays arabes et de s'emparer de nouveau territoires.

Les peuples arabes ont perdu une partie de la guerre. Mais l'affaire n'est pas réglée pour autant. Ils sont entraînés de tirer des leçons de cet échec fracassant. Blessés plus que jamais dans leur orgueil national, se rendant compte de l'importance d'une préparation militaire adéquate, d'une vigilance sans faille, de la nécessité d'une unité réelle, il ne leur reste d'autre issue que la préparation à une nouvelle guerre où Israël doit être défait militairement.

Les décisions timides de l'assemblée générale de l'ONU ne sauraient résoudre le problème. Les pays arabes n'auront raison d'Israël et de l'impérialisme que par leurs armes avec l'appui de tout le camp socialiste. Déjà les pays socialistes d'Europe ont pris d'importantes mesures pour renflouer militairement et économiquement les pays arabes. Le commandant d'un bateau de guerre soviétique "en visite" dans les pays arabes a déclaré que les unités soviétiques combattraient aux côtés des peuples arabes. Tout le mouvement mondial de libération a pris position contre Israël. Dans le camp impérialiste, la France a dénoncé Israël comme l'agresseur.

Israel s'est démasqué par ses forfaits et a même perdu des sympathies. Les pays arabes doivent donc s'unir pour lui infliger la défaite militaire qu'il mérite.

La situation au moyen-Orient est grosse d'un conflit à caractère mondial. Mais les forces progressistes du monde ne doivent pas reculer et laisser le champ libre à l'impérialisme. Sinon ce dernier deviendra encore plus arrogant plus agressif et utilisera davantage le chantage à la guerre pour perpétrer ses actes de banditisme.

Nous sommes partisans du droit à l'existence de tous les pays y compris Israel. Mais pour en bénéficier Israel doit garder ses limites, restituer les territoires occupés, reconnaître et réintégrer dans ses droits le peuple arabe de Palestine, renoncer à sa politique d'annexion, d'agression, cesser d'être le fer de lance de l'impérialisme au M-O. Sinon, la tension continuera dans cette partie du monde avec le risque permanent d'une guerre mondiale et ne prendra fin qu'avec l'écrasement militaire d'Israel.

Duvalier a pris position carrément pour Israel parce que cet état défend les intérêts impérialistes et poursuit comme son gouvernement des objectifs réactionnaires. De plus, Israel est le seul pays où l'on a eu l'imbécillité de traduire le livre de Duvalier sur les "classes sociales à travers l'histoire d'Haiti" et aussi l'un de ces états de second ordre sur lesquels Duvalier compte pour se frayer une audience internationale. Duvalier l'a clairement laissé entendre à l'envoyé spécial de la République Arabe unie. L'admiration qu'il a ¹³ déclaré pour Nasser n'est que pure hypocrisie. Le fait est qu'il a pris position contre les peuples arabes, pour les réactionnaires israéliens et l'impérialisme.

Avec le peuple haïtien, nous sommes contre Duvalier, contre Israel, pour la libération de la Palestine et de tous les territoires arabes occupés pour une paix vraiment juste au Moyen-Orient.

ROGER TILANDINGUE.

N.D.R. La position du gouvernement de Duvalier contre les justes revendications du peuple arabe s'est confirmée à la suite de l'entretien qu'il a eu avec un colonel des troupes d'occupation israéliennes sur le territoire jordanien de Jérusalem, envoyé spécial du gouvernement agressif d'Israel.

LA RESPONSABILITE

Oui, nous sommes tous responsables de la situation actuelle du pays. En ce sens nous pouvons faire ce qu'il faut pour la changer. Et qu'on ne pense pas s'en tirer en faisant des riens pour se donner une bonne conscience. Il faut vraiment être d'une inconscience bestiale pour avoir une bonne conscience actuellement. C'est pourquoi nous sommes d'avis qu'on déploie des efforts pour inoculer à tout le monde, aux révolutionnaires comme aux attentistes, le virus de la mauvaise conscience.

Car tant que le pays demeure dans cet état, aucun patriote, ne doit avoir la conscience tranquille, se sentir en paix avec soi-même. Aucun effort n'est suffisant en faveur de la Révolution. Il nous faut donner le meilleur de nous-mêmes et s'il le faut notre vie même.

Cela, nous avons à en convaincre la grande masse des haïtiens qui se contentent de leur mécontentement, qui jugent plus sage de pratiquer l'attentisme, de céder à la peur. Et c'est en leur faisant sentir et comprendre leur responsabilité que nous les contaminons avec le virus de la mauvaise conscience, de façon qu'ils ne se sentent pas moralement à l'aise, qu'ils ne s'accommodent pas de la situation actuelle. Nous devons les porter à penser, à réfléchir.

14 Cette réflexion, on doit aussi la susciter au sein du mouvement révolutionnaire. Car, à chacun il revient de pouvoir penser sur les meilleurs moyens de mobiliser la population, sur la façon pratique de capter tel ou tel individu, de secouer telle ou telle communauté. Il faut combattre avec acharnement la tendance à tout attendre d'en haut, à considérer que seule la direction révolutionnaire doit penser et développer l'esprit d'initiative.

Dans son discours à la clôture du 12ème congrès de la Centrale des Travailleurs de Cuba Révolutionnaire, le camarade Fidel Castro s'en prenait fort justement à ceux qui se révèlent incapables de penser par eux-mêmes, avec leur propre tête, et qui se comportent comme des parasites de la pensée.

Ces gens qui se contentent de répéter ce que d'autres disent qui, lorsqu'ils se trompent, le font sur le compte d'autres personnes et qui, quand ces dernières reconnaissent leurs erreurs, sont obligés de dire qu'ils se sont trompés aussi.

Dans nos rangs ils sont nombreux ceux qui ne font même un effort pour comprendre nos journaux ou qui ne peuvent aller plus loin que ce que disent nos publications. Face à toute situation imprévue ou simplement à la vraie réalité quotidienne, ils sont pris au dépourvu; ils ne peuvent pas faire une réflexion créatrice et agir en conséquence. Certains ne prétendent faire preuve d'indépendance, de jugement que quand ils déraisonnent purement et simplement. Tout cela constitue des aspects du manque de sens de responsabilité, de l'irresponsabilité en un mot.

Ces gens cachent en général leurs responsabilités individuelles derrière la responsabilité collective. Pour eux, les "autres" sont toujours responsables de tout, même de leurs propres négligences et échecs individuels. Donc, "Mort aux autres"! Et ces autres sont tantôt le Parti, tantôt le Comité Central si ce n'est le peuple haïtien.

L'irresponsabilité est encore notre grand mal. La lutte révolutionnaire réclame de nous le développement de l'esprit de responsabilité.

ANTOINE LEVANTIN.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 11/7/67

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReCGairtel dated October 3, 1967, captioned as above.

On November 1 and 2, 1967, the Chicago Office received air mail communications which had been transmitted by the Brazilian Communist Party (BCP) to Solo mail drop boxes maintained by the Chicago Office in the names of Mr. Milton Adams, Box 4367, Chicago, Ill. 60680, USA, and Mr. John Shoulders, Modern Book Store, 6624 N. Sheridan Road, Chicago, Ill. 60626, USA. The communications bore no return addresses. The postmarks were illegible, but the stamps utilized on these communications were from Brazil.

Contained in each communication was a copy of "Voz Operaria," #32, October, 1967, monthly publication of the BCP, and a special supplement dated 1967, entitled, "Peia Unidade Do Partido."

Enclosed herewith are two positive photostat copies for the Bureau and one copy for the New York Office of the publication "Voz Operaria." The special supplement was previously furnished the Bureau and New York as an enclosure to reairtel.

The original copies are being maintained in Chicago and will be furnished to CG 5824-S* at a later date in order that he will be able to make them available to GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA.

- 2-Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

RAV:MDW
(4)

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

EX-108

CARD ONLY
REC-43

NOV 13 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

TRANSLATION FROM PORTUGUESE

From "Voz Operaria" (Workers' Voice), central organ of the Brazilian Communist Party, issue XXXII, October, 1967.

REC-43

Page 1, Column 1

A PLENARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (Summary)

A special meeting of the Central Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party was held in September. The agenda consisted of a single item: "Problems of Internal Life of the Party." A report was presented by comrade Antonio Almeida on behalf of the Executive Commission. After the report, a debate was held. This debate was closed by comrade Antonio Almeida's conclusive remarks.

Page 1; Column 1

WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH THE RESOLUTION (Summary)

The resolution of the Central Committee is of exceptional importance to the life of the Communist Party. It must be made known to all militants, sympathizers and friends of the Party. It must be a subject of study and practical application by all Party organizations.

Page 1, Columns 2, 3 and 4; and Page 2

An Address by Comrade Antonio Almeida* at the Plenum of the Central Committee

THE UNITY OF THE PARTY HAS TO BE DEFENDED AGAINST FRACTIONALISM AND LIQUIDATIONISM (Translation)

During the last plenary meeting of the Central Committee, after a long and democratic discussion of the single item on the agenda of the meeting ("Problems of the Internal Life of the Party"); comrade Antonio Almeida delivered a long

*Translator's Note: Due to the fact that the article contains no indication as to the position of Antonio Almeida in the Brazilian Communist Party and always refers to him as "comrade Antonio Almeida," the article has been translated in full in hopes of providing an indication as to his position through the subjects dealt with in his address.

TRANSLATED BY.

November 28, 1967

b6
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ICC of translation to
d. right, Bureau Aires for
info dated 12-5-67
WHA/bkm
captioned "CP of Brazil (PCB)
IS - Brazil

and important address in defense of the unity of the Party and its principles of organization, sharply condemning the attempts at fractionalism and divisionism which have been staged by certain members of the Central Committee and exposing the ideological and political bases of such attempts as contrary to the interests of the working class and of the Brazilian revolution.

Reasons for the Meeting

"We have already explained," comrade Antonio Almeida said, "in the report of the Executive Commission the reasons which have led us to call this special meeting of the Central Committee. Since our last meeting of the Central Committee, our efforts have been concentrated on promoting the holding of our Debate. On May 31 last, the deadline expired for the holding of conferences by the organizations responsible directly to the Central Committee and we should hold our final Debate within the deadline stipulated in our 'rules of debate.'"

"In the meantime," comrade Antonio Almeida went on to say, "it so happened that those aspects which threatened the unity of the Party became much more critical in June and July of this year. Consequently, we could not ignore them and fail to act to eliminate them."

A Rupture of Centralism

"On the part of certain State Committees, there were manifestations of rebellion and of violation of the principles and norms of structure of the internal life of the Party. Under the influence of members of none other than the Central Committee, certain State Committees openly violated the democratic centralism of our Party and gave the Party activities an orientation other than the one approved by the Central Committee. These State Committees created all kinds of difficulties for the assistance and control of the Party, at the same time, making it difficult or downright impossible to distribute Party literature and, in certain cases, as it happened in Rio State, they committed acts which can only be described as sabotage."

"The Middle East conflict which broke out in early June provided the opportunity for initiatives that were

in frontal opposition to the spirit and letter of the Resolution of the Central Committee on the international situation, as approved in March of this year. This went as far as to launch attacks against the Soviet Union. Documents were published and distributed to the rest of the Party containing statements to this effect by the State Committees of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. For this reason, they were impounded by the Executive Commission of the Central Committee."

Fractionalist Activities

Continuing his address, comrade Antonio Almeida stated:

"At the same time, an open manifestation of fractionalist activities broke out in Guanabara. This forced the Executive Commission to take a series of measures and to call the attention of the Guanabara State Committee to the need of undertaking a struggle for the defense of the unity of the Party and against the fractionalist activities of ex-members of the State Committee that were not re-elected at the last State Conference.

"In a hearing before the Secretariat of the Central Committee, comrade Paulo recognized the existence of a faction or splinter movement and proclaimed his solidarity with the dissenters. It is obvious that it was not a question of solidarity with the dissenters, but rather that he was the leader of a dissenting group. It is also obvious that in order to hold 'a conference' and send a delegation to the debate, there could not fail to be a leading group already set up beforehand. Comrade Paulo, therefore, is not telling the truth when he says that he was informed only recently as to his own election to lead the fractionalist group.

"Finally," comrade Antonio Almeida continued his address, "our Party was attacked by Menezes, prompted from abroad. These public attacks placed us in the position of taking necessary immediate measures which we cleared with the Central Committee. Repeating his old error, already criticized by the Central Committee, Menezes abandoned his post and traveled to Cuba without notifying the leadership of the Party. In Cuba, he made statements to the press and over Radio Havana where he attacked the orientation of our Party and its leadership.

*alias of
Carlos
Marighella
?*

Liquidationist Campaign

"All these developments," comrade Antonio Almeida said, "pointed to a concentrated attack on the Party aimed at disintegrating it and liquidating it and demoralizing its leadership. The Executive Commission of the Central Committee could not remain indifferent to this aggression. If it were to capitulate to these disintegrating activities under the pretext that we are in the process of holding our Debate, it would be committing a crime against the Party."

In spite of the situation in our country under the rule of an oppressive dictatorship and in spite of the harsh persecution which our Party countenances, a Debate was called and an extensive public discussion was held during which everybody was allowed to freely write out and set forth his ideas and criticisms without any restriction whatsoever. The norms of the Debate, as approved by the Central Committee, were fully respected and the delegates were freely allowed without any discrimination at all. However, we cannot admit a confusion between differences of viewpoints and divisionary ~~and/or~~ factionalist activities.

Defending the Party

"It is our duty," comrade Antonio Almeida went on to say, "as members of the Central Committee elected in 1960, to lead to the Debate a Party which is united and not an anarchical accumulation of fractions. It was certainly not the result of happenstance that after the end of the conferences and the election of the delegates, certain elements who differ with the present political line - including a number of members of the Central Committee - left the area of permissible divergencies for the area of open divisionary tactics and fractionalism engaging in patently anti-Party activities which went beyond the limits of lack of discipline."

"If they do this today, while the Debate is in progress, what will they do tomorrow if the positions that they defend should not be victorious? We have already seen what comrade Menezes did and how he engaged in anti-Party activities in spite of the commitments that he made to the State Conference of Sao Paulo when he said: 'We are and always have been against fractionalism.' It still remains to be pointed out that comrade Menezes, upon being elected to member of the State Committee declared: 'The State Conference reaffirms its decision

to struggle for the unity of the Party on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and democratic centralism.' "

What is Behind the Lies?

Continuing his address, comrade Antonio Almeida stated:

"The insinuation was made here that we took corrective measures on the basis of subjective determinations. The Executive Commission of the Central Committee acted on the basis of facts and not on the basis of assumed intentions or subjective determinations. It was also slanderously intimated that ours was a so-called 'area purge,' the purpose of which was to remove all kinds of dissidence and hold a fraudulent and artificially united Debate. It is obvious that those members of the Central Committee who expressed these views seek to monopolize for themselves the divergencies within the Party. However, hundreds, or rather, thousands of comrades who hold a different viewpoint on the present political orientation and who expressed themselves against the theses of the Central Committee continue to belong to the Party in the certainty that they can go on defending their opinions and struggling for them within the limits of the Party's by-laws. The divisionists and fractionalists are mistaken in their belief that they are the sole masters of the divergencies and the only people in a position to struggle for them.

Respect for the By-Laws

"We are no children. All of us here on this Central Committee have already had experience in the leadership of the Party and in the vicissitudes of an internal struggle. For a long time now, we have been coping with the problem of having members of the Central Committee use divergencies of opinion as a springboard for promoting divisionism and fractionalism. It was our duty to place the interests of the Party over and above anything else, to respect the leaders of the Party and to act on the assumption that our diverging comrades would also be capable of placing the interests of the Party over and above anything else and avoiding to fall into the pitfall of divisionism and fractionalism. In our capacity as old Party members and as responsible leaders, we could not ignore the fact that the first and foremost duty of a Party member

is to defend the unity of the Party which is spelled out in perfectly clear language under Article 9 of the By-Laws, which state that all fractionalist activities are inadmissible in our Party.

"These comrades of ours should be well aware that organization is the only weapon of the working class and that organization means discipline and centralism. If they know Lenin's activities when he led the Bolshevik Party, they are well aware that Lenin put the defense of the Party ahead of anything else. For example, in a 1913 article entitled 'Matters in Dispute,' Lenin wrote: 'The Party cannot exist without defending its existence, without unconditionally struggling against those who try to liquidate it or destroy it and against those who do not recognize it or deny it. This is self-evident. He who denies an existing Party in the name of a nonexistent new Party should tell himself: You are trying to create a new Party and you cannot be a member of the old Party, of the present and existing Party.' "

Tolerance Has a Limit

mp ✓ On the subject of his position of respect for the Party members, comrade Antonio Almeida said that the Central Committee would prefer to err because of an excess of tolerance rather than because of impulsiveness in judging the behavior of diverging comrades. However, when these comrades advocate an open violation of the Party's By-Laws, "it is our duty not to vacillate in the defense of the Party, in the defense of the authoritativeness of its leadership and in the taking of those measures that become necessary under Party's By-Laws.

"It is obvious that, in the best interests of the Party, we must know how to act with a cool head without heeding emotional or provocative or slanderous or insulting attitudes. It is ridiculous to speak of lack of leadership and authority on the part of the Central Committee. We represent a Party of the working class and, until our next Debate, we do know how to fulfill our duty. Those who assume the contrary are mistaken.

"Old episodes of Party life were aired and old cases of comrades unjustly expelled from the Party and later rehabilitated were cited. However, the truth is that our meetings have not been based on groundless accusations or the like. As a matter of fact, the opposite is true. We were accused of deeds and facts that our accusers could not prove and when they failed in their attempt, they resorted to insults and provocations against the majority of the Central Committee."

Let Us Struggle Within the Party

Continuing his address, comrade Antonio Almeida said:

"It is not through similar attitudes or outside the Party that comrades who think they defend more correct positions - or, as they claimed, the only correct positions - would be able to contribute to correcting the mistakes which we may be committing.

"They cited here the three conditions which, according to Lenin, are indispensable for the unity of the Party and the maintenance of discipline in its ranks. However, when Lenin wrote those words in his book about the growing pains of leftism within communism, Lenin was not trying to justify fractionalism. He was trying to show that it is indispensable to struggle within the Party for the purpose of having those three conditions effectively fulfilled. For this reason, in the same paragraph where he mentioned the three conditions, he also wrote: 'On the other hand, these conditions do not break out all of a sudden. They come about as a result of an extended activity and of a hard-won experience.'

"It is inside the Party and not outside the Party that each member of the Party can contribute to making our Party a revolutionary organization capable of leading our people to victory for national emancipation and socialism.

The Hegemony of the Working Class is to be Defended

"In defending the unity of the Party," comrade Antonio Almeida went on to say, "it is indispensable for the Central Committee to take whatever measures belong in each concrete case under the Party's By-Laws. These measures were indicated in the report of the Executive Commission. At the same time, we must confirm the measures enacted by the State Committee of Guanabara and give the Executive Commission of the Central Committee sufficient powers to normalize the life of the Party as soon as possible and to guarantee adequate distribution of Party literature. All lack of discipline shall be punished. However, the fractionalist group, which acts on its own platform and with its own discipline, ^{and} repercussions which are nation-wide in scope, has placed itself outside the Party.

Consequently, its members will have to be expelled from the Party.

"In the meantime, the fundamental task ahead is to explain these measures to all Party members and to promote the ideological struggle within our own rank and file. This ideological struggle needs to be oriented toward stressing the role of the working class in the revolutionary process and the need for the hegemony of the proletariat, the importance of the Party and of the Leninist principles of organization to continue to be the basis of democracy and discipline within Party ranks.

Let Us Struggle Against A Petty-Bourgeois Ideology.

"Along with the measures we took, we also took a giant new stride in the struggle against ideological conciliation. This struggle started in May, 1965, and marked the beginning of a new phase in the process of formation of our Party. The aggression which has been launched against our Party has caused us to undertake a self-critical process in the ideological struggle against extraneous influences among our own ranks. It is an attack of international scope against the world communist movement and bears the hallmark of a nationalistic anti-Sovietism. It is a struggle against the leadership of the working class and for the liquidation of the Communist Parties.

"However, this new wave of petty-bourgeois attacks is a consequence of the advances of socialism the world over. New social classes, in addition to the working class, are taking their positions against capitalism and join the struggle for socialism. They try, because of this, to impose their ideas and their methods upon the revolutionary movement. Our task lies in winning them over to the ideals and methods of the proletariat. Instead of kneeling demagogically before the intellectuals and students, it is our duty to orient and to defend with firmness the positions of our Party. If we do this without vacillation, we underscore the existence and role of the working class Party as a vanguard of the revolution and stress the role of the proletariat in the victorious struggle for complete national emancipation, freedom and socialism."

In conclusion, comrade Antonio Almeida stated:

"Despite the brutality of the military reaction which oppresses our people today, we, Brazilian communists, will hold our Debate and will take a new stride toward the triumph of revolution in our country."

Page 3, Columns 1, 2 and 3
COMMUNIQUE OF THE STATE COMMITTEE OF GUANABARA (Summary)

This communique lets it be known that 12 ex-members of the State Committee of Guanabara of the Brazilian Communist Party "have no authority whatsoever to speak on behalf of the Brazilian Communist Party, call meetings, raise funds and carry on any kind of Party functions."

Page 3, Column 4
BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE IV CONGRESS OF THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY "WHICH HAS JUST BEEN INITIATED."

The following agenda will be discussed:

- 1) Work situation.
- 2) National reality.
- 3) Effectiveness of the Communist Party.'

Page 3, Columns k, 2, 3 and 4
AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL CRISIS IN THE STATE OF PERNAMBUCO

Page 4 and 5
REVOLUTION AND REGIS DEBRAY'S REVOLUTION

Page 6, Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4
WORKING WITH HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS IS AN IMPORTANT TASK FOR ALL THE PARTY

Page 6, Columns 1 and 2
THEORY AND PRACTICE - THE BRAZILIAN REVOLUTION (Number three of a serialization)

Page 7, Columns 1, 2 and 3
THE OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND SOME OF ITS TEACHINGS

Page 7, Column 4
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF "DAS KAPITAL"

Page 8
ABOUT AN ARMED STRUGGLE

**Trabalhar com os estudantes secundários
É tarefa importante para todo o Partido!**

CILDQ 5.4

Distante muito tempo depois do Partido, por deliberação vária, não foi capaz de particularizar na lista política para a nome dos estudantes de grau médio.

Devido ao atual processo administrativo por que passamos, pretendo a direção do Partido, através da Comissão Executiva do Conselho Central, dar um primeiro passo na tentativa de desmistificação, elaboração de um princípio documentado relativo aos alunos, que chegue à mão dos militantes objetivando:

- 1) criar uma orientação mínima, particularizada, para os membros entre os estudantes de grau médio;
- 2) que indique criativamente, nominalmente, este setor do Movimento Estudantil;
- 3) abrir uma ampla discussão com os nossos militantes, especialmente em

A situação em que se encontrava o Partido no meio secundário disputado do golpe, é examinada no seguinte capítulo.

TEORIA E PRATICA

A Revolução Brasileira

De Caio Prado Jr. (3)

Nesse quadro, a economia colonial fundada a partir dos deprecamentos é percebida por Marx como o caso mais notável em que o capital mercantil domina o capital industrial. Mas não se trata como intermediário, mas como vendedor direto da própria produção: "Alis, a exemplo do comércio da madeira com o capital mercantil, o capital mercantil aqui não se limita a comprar e vender a produção de outros produtores, mas produz diretamente a produção de outros produtos, não pela compra, mas pela venda, e assim, em geral, que se chama, vulgarmente, *comércio*, mas

tutela, que mereço sobre os lucros das transações, que me dá o direito de fazer com que os meus interesses sejam respeitados e não os dos outros. É isso que eu quero, e não a liberdade de fazer o que quiserem os outros. Eu quero a liberdade de fazer o que eu quiser, dentro da lei.

Eu quero a liberdade de fazer o que eu quiser, dentro da lei. Eu quero a liberdade de fazer o que eu quiser, dentro da lei. Eu quero a liberdade de fazer o que eu quiser, dentro da lei.

Além do mais, o "Informe" surge numa situação em que mesmo Partido enfrenta ainda, com grande atraso, a elaboração de uma política "abstida" para toda a juventude, fato este que retira ao documento a possibilidade de extrair-se de uma melhor forma os aspectos da vida social que tem do problema a sua essência.

Feitas estas observações que julgamos necessárias a uma correcta avaliação do valor do documento, é conveniente fazer um ligeiro comentário sobre o mesmo, para que sirva de indicação ao seu estudo e aplicação.

A introdução e o primeiro capítulo dedicam-se a fazer um comentário do golpe, seu caráter e as causas que o provocaram, de uma maneira geral, segundo de uma conclusão fundamental, que indica a tarefa central dos comunistas, depois a pouco vai se aproximando das camadas menos privilegiadas da massa onerosa da população.

No segundo capítulo, procura fazer uma análise de que sejam os estudantes de gran mérito, salutarmente para peruanidades. Isto como: idade, nivel cultural, parti- cipação política, nivel e formas de organización, emancipación social, tipo de escuela e proceso administrativo;

As reivindicações impostoras políticas do NPL/ML, bem como suas lutas desde a década de 30 até nossos dias.

O terceiro capítulo faz uma análise a situação do Partido no setor, procurando ressaltar o papel decisivo de um primeiro autocrítico, realizado nos erros cometidos e apontando suas causas.

Os dois capítulos, mais científicos, mais pormenorizados, com os jovens militantes secundaristas. É preciso que as direções intermediárias sejam, de fato, autocríticas e apliquem a orientação recebida no documento, pois as direções estaduais, apesar das lutas de trabalho mais importantes que têm em seu interior, devem dominar também a política administrativa e educacional.

O quarto capítulo analisa as consequências do golpe para os setores decisivos, na geral, faremos no todo dezoito uma descrição da política educacional da ditadura no campo militar. Finalmente, ainda, apesar do caráter ideal que apresentamos, a revista "Revista de História, Estatística, Geografia e Sociologia" da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, apresentando:

**Comunicado do
Comitê Estadual da Guanabara**

Recebemos, para publicação, o seguinte comunicado:

«O Comitê Estadual da Guarnição do Partido Comunista Brasileiro, comunica às organizações partidárias, aos militantes e simpatizantes que os ex-dirigentes partidários conhecidos pelos nomes de Juca (ex-membro do Comitê Estadual do Comitê da C.T.A.), Roberto (ex-membro do Comitê dos Servidores Federais), Genário (ex-membro do CC Central e CD Mejeri), Antônio, João e Célio (ex-membros do Comitê dos Metalúrgicos), Hilda (ex-membro do Comitê Estadual) e do Comitê Sul, Silvino (ex-

membro do CD Leopoldina), Paulino (ex-membro do CD Leopoldina), Madeira: (ex-membro do CD Desodoro) e Pedro (ex-membro do CD Padre Miguel) não têm qualquer autoridade para falar em nome do Partido Comunista Brasileiro, reunir militantes e arrecadar finanças e não exercem nenhuma função partidária, em qualquer organismo do Partido no Estado.

Comunica, também, que o jornal "Esquerda" se transformou em um órgão de provocação, a serviço do fracionismo, e não tem qualquer vínculo orgânico com o Partido Comunista Brasileiro.

Crise na Agroindústria em Pernambuco

ANDRÉ SANTANA

A indústria açucareira de Pernambuco debateu temas profundamente atuais, a qual tem suas raízes no monopólio da terra, no atraso tecnológico no processo de produção e na má gestão da exportação do produto, na cultura da caça, no desenvolvimento econômico, e o próprio governo que reconheceu: "A indústria da população rural da zona da Mata, que apresentava algumas melhorias no período 1961-64, apresenta significativamente mais indicadores de solução favorável a curto ou médio prazo".

segundo foi de iniciativa dos próprios moradores, que se reuniram em comitês locais para estabelecer planos de melhoria das condições de vida. Em alguns casos, como no município de São Paulo, a iniciativa foi de uma comissão criada pelo governador, mas, em geral, os moradores foram os protagonistas. Segundo o relatório, os trabalhos foram realizados em 1973, 1974 e 1975, com o apoio financeiro do Estado e da Prefeitura Municipal de São Paulo. O relatório também menciona que os trabalhos foram realizados em outros municípios, como São José do Rio Preto, São João del-Rei, São Carlos e São João d'El Rei, mas que os dados não foram coletados.

la, que apresentem algumas melhoras no período 1961-64, apresenta-se significativamente mais indolente de solução favorável a certo ou a outra população que está dividida nos dois métodos práticos.

Certo sempre, no cotidiano e no futuro, as duas grandes colônias de mineiros de engenhos pagam sobre as suas atividades o peso da máquina, podendo fazer frente aos produtores de São Paulo, Estado do Rio e Rio Grande do Sul, e de Minas Gerais, em virtude das reduções absolutas de cultivo das raízes e de

Por aí pode-se avaliar a situação apenas das amareladas agrícolas e suas famílias, mas de uma população que está dividida indolentemente ligada a agricultura.

Em geral estas colônias de Lavras, Calor, Escada, Pámar, e tantos outros municípios, chamados zona do açúcar, a produção tende a cair. A burguesia tradicional não está ligada. Ela está ligada, no geral, a outros empre-

diária de Pernambuco. Se esta situação continuasse, não sem alegar impedir o ecloso de grandes movimentos reivindicatórios e sociais, em toda a Zona da Mata, principalmente agora quando se inicia o período da moagem. Este é o momento próprio para que os trabalhadores fizessem greve, para que se

produção do açúcar, a burguesia-
latifundiária de Pernambuco, para o
dano ao Estado, intensifica o expro-
piação dos trabalhadores urbanos e
rurais que em vastas áreas agri-
colas violam os limites, ou por-
to anterior ao golpe, foram saí-
do da vida nacional, ferindo paula-
tamente com todas as urbanas
Bancos, Companhias de Seguros,
população latifundiária, etc. Os
pequenos utilizam a miséria, a fe-
dora dos trabalhadores agrícolas para p-
stinar a indústria por dinheiro
vão ser investidos muitas vezes,
de aeroplânio.

A USAID não queria nem poder aparecer como articulista de tal plano. Então, então, que os seus laços com o governo o faziam. A indústria, era portaria ministerial na 131, de 1 de outubro de 1965 criou o Conselho Executivo para Racionalização da Agroindústria Alimentícia do Nordeste (GEI-UN) constituído pelo superintendente da SUDENE, pelo presidente do INE, do IBRA,

[illegible]

preto e reafirmação das minas e, segundo a "técnica" do governo, isso levirá ao desemprego, mais de 60 mil trabalhadores. Para fazer face a tal problema serão criadas as "parcelas". Pequenas propriedades familiares para a diversificação da economia da área. Entretanto, esta medida não aborrerà a totalidade dos desempregados. Surgiu então a ideia de criar um distrito na ENDA e do Estado do Brasil.

Os objetivos do CERIN são acionar os recursos locais, criar empregos, parcerias com as medidas sociais entre João-ão e o Uiter Co Ky Ky para fazer a "reforma agrária" no Vietnam do Sul.

Não temos dúvidas, as pretensões dos neocolonialistas laquios e dos seus agentes atualmente comestíveis no poder, terão frustradas pela ação dos próprios massas revolucioná-

(*) É oportuno lembrar a discussão corrente entre linguistas sobre o conceito de feitiço, pois ele ajuda a caracterizar essa espécie de fanatismo. Trata-se de um goliardismo, mas a expressão francesa, por sua vez, tem origem na palavra portuguesa feitiço e nas práticas religiosas de feitiçaria, nas quais se atribuem poderes mágicos a objetos ou objetos nomeados.

Assim, voltamos a três séculos atrás, quando a palavra burguês designava o habitante do largo, da cidade. Toda a teoria de diferenciação e de luta de classe na sociedade, que depois disso associou a essa palavra um conteúdo novo, val

política dos homens e grupos sociais não mais se funda em seus interesses de classe; forte é que passam a depender do fato de um indivíduo habitar a cidade ou o campo. São as raízes da guerrilha. Se buscarmos uma carnestaude ridícula de negação dialética, aí teríamos um achado de rara felicidade.

Se a guerrilha transformasse a guerrilha em revolucionária, Lampião seria o nosso Lênin: talenta, bravura e firmeza de início não lhe faltaram. A guerrilha é uma forma de luta como outra qualquer. Não é a sua utilização que determina o caráter revolucionário de um movimento social, mas, ao contrário, ela é que se torna instrumento revolucionário quando é utilizada por um movimento dotado desse caráter. Nem sempre o é.

pode criar a serviço de qualquer grupo de indivíduos. Caspary, "bandoleiro" e "bandido de todo tipo" murmurava, há meses. Mesmo quando é arma de uma luta política, não há nada de honesto e de progressista. Os "guardas brancos" cresceram a céu, durante larva por anos, e são muitos outros, na guerra civil russa de 1917/21. Também os corveteros do Sul dos Estados Unidos fizeram muitos estragos nos direitos do Norte utilizando a técnica da guerrilha, durante a guerra civil de 1861/65, não se tornaram proibidos por

Se tem alguma peculiaridade, como forma de luta, a guerrilha tem a de estar vinculada ao campo. Em 1966, se combates guerrilha: um dos lados é de: a II Guerra Mundial.

mente o caráter de luta e que ela
seria, que pode ser progressista,
reacionária, anarquista ou bendito-
ra, segundo as flutuações e contradi-
ções que sempre acompanham o
comportamento da gente do campo.
Cada há também proletários, mas
cada via de regra produzindo uma
massa pequena-burguesa atrasada,
desconfiada, temerosa e fortemente
influenciada por um pequeno nú-
mero de burgueses e latifundiários

É importante ressaltar esse aspecto, que toca em uma das inconveniências mais graves do esquema de Debray. Além de depender totalmente a necessidade de condições a ação guerrilheira à localização das áreas e setores camponeses que precisam da proteção preparada para ela, Debray reconhece o grupo guerrilheiro como um corpo completamente isolado dos camponeses mantido em relação a estes uma atitude de desconfiança e hostilidade, não de ajuda e amizade. "Várias vezes de bom senso" — diz ele — "impõem a desconfiança a respeito da população civil e forçam por isso que (a guerrilha) se mantenha distante dela".

Mao Tsé-tung gastou muita tinta e papel para mostrar que a guerrilha revolucionária depende diretamente de sua capacidade de conquistar as terras e os bens dos latifundiários e distribuí-los entre os camponeses, para conquistar a confiança destes, nas áreas onde opera. Os "ricos" multiplicam-se em milhares de audácia e coragem para garantir sua lei no interior do país — lei que distribui terra e justiça

sem isso arriscam perder o principal trunfo que lhes possibilita enfrentar com êxito a ferozidade máquina de guerra imperialista: o apoio de camponês. Mesmo Fidel Castro, que dependia menos desse concedido de apoio (recedia abundantemente por si e outras vias diretas, operava em local reconhecidamente povoado e inaceitável a um exército regular, combatia com efetivos regularmente poucos numerosos, etc.), compreendia-se em obter o apoio camponês, porque a regular sua combatentes entre os operários agrícolas, os ericais.

Debray espera naturalmente que seus guerrilheiros coexistam a sós e até a entusiasmo da maioria da população, camponeses inclusive. Mas conta chegar a isso através de obras de repressão moral dos tipos da guerrilha entre o povoprimido. A ideia é bonita, mas não vale um tostão. Para conseguir ritos gloriosos, a guerrilha precisa do apoio físico de campones, que, se evocados, informas, abastece em dinheiro, alimentos e homens. Em condições excepcionais, é possível que

vetros de glórias dificilmente igualável para um contingente de «uas propriedades. Corpos efetivamente e capazes uma parcela considerável de espírito público nas cidades. Mas teve de renunciar à luta e depor as armas. No campo militar, ele venceu sempre; venceu o isolamento face aos camponeses, entre os quais ele parecia, não como "um peixe dentro d'água", como recomendava Mo Tse-tang, mas como um corpo estranho; causa de desmoralização, sim, mas também de espanto e temor.

Além de conceber a guerrilha como uma espécie de luta satisfatória, Debyry atribui a ela um poder de cura de condições, que são fontes de vitórias ou de derrotas de um movimento revolucionário. Segundo ele, a revolução de 32 na Bolívia foi controlada e finalmente derrotada, não por ter falhado por falta de massa, direção revolucionária ou consequente e coerentes internacionalizações, mas porque os setores boliviaístas não reconheceram a guerrilha. Também na Colômbia, a ausência de uma guerrilha adaptada ao tipo de Debyry é o que explica, para este, porque os revolucionários demoram em tomar o poder. De um modo geral, na visão deste autor, toda a rica e valiosa

latino-americanos rotulados a uma sucessão de fraquezas causadas pelo inapetecimento de seus dirigentes, especialmente dos partidos comunistas. É a pré-história, a história negra da ignorância, da tuberculose e outras moléstias do estilo. A verdadeira história, segundo "A revolução na revolução", começa com Fidel Castro, seu teórico Régis Debray e o receio insalável da guerrilha.

Cre na guerrilha como garantia de vitória e infinitude. Aqui mesmo, na América Latina, temos provas dramáticas de que uma guerrilha, mesmo quando fortemente apoiada no espírito revolucionário, não atrai os camponeses, pode ser derrotada. A revolução mexicana (1911-19) foi casida e repulsa, embora sua principal força lançadora estivesse nas mesmas camponesas, organizadas em "barros" de extirpção guerrilheira e suas ações não lembradas entre as mais feroces na história desta mesma milícia. A bravura e a compaixão de comunistas de Sinaloa, foi proprio sua compaixão, não lhe bastaram para libertar o povo sucumbente da revolução estrangeira e de explorar os latifundiários, embora sua guerrilha fosse camponesa e sua força motriz fosse do amor que lhe dedicava a gente do campo.

A ideia de uma inevitabilidade inerente à guerrilha, principalmente como forma de luta principal para tomar o poder, é incompatível com a própria natureza dessa técnica militar. A guerrilha, por definição, é um tipo menor de organização militar. De acordo com a

mais forte, ganhar tempo, acumular força e, ao mesmo tempo, fustigar o inimigo. Nesse sentido, é uma tática extraordinariamente útil, mas sempre de alcance limitado". Ela não dá a vitória ao movimento revolucionário. A vitória é conquistada pelo conjunto do movimento, e finalmente se derde um agir que erige fora do alcance da guerrilha. Foi assim em Cuba, como vimos, onde a vitória contra Batista foi derrota pela ação concertada de uma ampla frente democrática e,

principalmente, pela greve geral dos trabalhadores de toda a ilha. Foi assim na Argélia, onde a decisão surgiu da confluência de luta ideológica dos apolíticos e da pressão dos trabalhadores e demais setores democráticos da França, que se tornaram uma crise institucional em Paris e, finalmente, na concretização da independência. Mesmo quando se decide no campo armado, a vitória exige que o movimento revolucionário seja lastreado forte para abandonar a luta e apurar-se em formas superiores de organização militar, de exercício regular, que lhe possibilitem passar a ofensiva, entrepostos, de uma a outra vitória, e, depois, a liberdade e o início

O íter de Debyer está em co-
lor na base de uma teoria para
o movimento revolucionário: uma
questão subordinada, secundária,
que é a da forma de luta. O ponto
de partida não é a escolha de uma
determinada forma de luta, mas o
definição do conteúdo de classe, na-
cional e social da revolução no país
dado, no momento dado. É limitan-
te ter que repisar noções tão ele-
mentares de teoria política, mas a
luta nos obriga a completo desexo
no Debyer escrito nos dias...

O estudo concreto da realidade era que afremos, e particularmente do estágio II desmontadamente econômico e social em que se encontra o Brasil, permite discernir as contradições fundamentalmente antagonistas e entorpecem esse desenvolvimento. A solução dessas contradições exige o esforço concentrado da maioria da nação, seu convencimento para definir e criar — no plano social, socialista ou nacional-desenvolvendo — as suas tarefas de desenvolvimento, na etapa dada; determina o conjunto de classes e camadas sociais que se podem aliar para a conquista desse objetivo revolucionário imediato, decisivo e programático necessário ao deslançamento das forças revolucionárias, que deve eliminar sua união; aponta a estratégia principal da revolução, contra o qual se deve desenvolver o combate da classe revolucionária; acusa quais são os seus elementos desalçados, quais os seus blocos sociais vacilantes e quais são os agrupamentos sociais que se podem neutralizar ou afastar do movimento.

da luta armada. Mas o exemplo em que se agitou — sempre a revolução cubana — é a própria negação do que se fez. A luta e a vitória dos maiores de Fidel Castro não se situam de sua habilidade em dar amplitude à frente da luta contra a ditadura, mas no quanto da ferrea disciplina que foi mais agressiva, particularmente em relação aos comunistas cubanos, na questão, mais decisiva, política, foi mais rápida, mais flexível e mais eficaz, mais capaz de aproveitar ao máximo a liderança do movimento contra Batista. Seu preceito, seu programa, suas alianças, antes de 1959, dedicadas a um único motivo, derrotar Batista. Já em seu pronunciamento de época referida, voltou à reforma agrária, mas não tão menos ao imperialismo, e a outros temas ao socialismo, e a outros temas ao socialismo. Tudo a ele foi revertido por ele ao compromisso de acabar com a corrupção política e promover eleições livres e democráticas. A vitória, finalmente, da revolução nacional e democrática — e mais democrática do que aquela — não exigiu mudança de participação das grandes massas do povo na condução dos destinos do país e possibilitou seu rápido acesso para a etapa socialista.

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Na América Latina em geral e no Brasil em particular, a questão que se coloca na ordem do dia é a de pôr de lado e derrotar os obstáculos maiores que se opõem ao desenvolvimento econômico e social de nossas nações; os imperialistas estrangeiros, seus agentes e seus intermediários e os latifundiários locais. Nossa tarefa revolucionária imediata e primordial é, portanto, combater, organizar e dirigir contra esses inimigos — e especialmente contra o principal deles, o imperialismo —

De todas as classes e camadas sociais que, de um modo ou de outro, em maior ou menor escala, são prejudicadas por elas. Nesse aspecto particular de nossa tarefa temos efetivamente algo a aprender com as

ria, e a luta contra essa dominação assume um caráter peculiar, em que o fator fundamental de unidade e de ação de todo o povo é a defesa das liberdades, o combate à ditadura.

Essa é o conteúdo de nossa luta atual, seu aspecto básico, determinante. As formas concretas, principais e secundárias, que toma essa luta — para as quais a designação de armada, pacífica, legal ou ilegal — apenas uma catalogação geral, nunca uma receita —, bem como os prazos e ritmos de seu desenvolvimento posterior, são ditados e criados pelo seu próprio desenvolvimento, em estreita dependência de suas necessidades e possibilidades reais, concretas, imediatas.

Nesse terreno, só há uma condição para a realização de uma greve: os trabalhadores devem estar conscientes de que a luta nacional e democrática, e consequentemente a profundização das vitórias alcançadas, dependem vitalmente da participação que nela tenham as amplas massas de povo trabalhador — operários, camponeses, empregados, intelectuais. A constituição da tradição socialista da burguesia nacional só há de ser acentuada a impolidez dessas condições. Exatamente porque perde, em muitos dias, a capacidade de dirigir o processo revolucionário, emborã continue a participar dele, a burguesia nacional hoje vive o seu declínio das forças básicas da frente única, a classe operária, camponesa e a pequena burguesia trabalhadora, a responsabilidade pelo futuro processo de movimento.

[illegible]

jam grupos radicais pequeno-burgueses, desesperados ou muito ambiciosos, em busca de jovens milagrosos que prescindam delas e coloquem a tarefa de "fazer a revolução" a cargo de pequenas minorias de revolucionários.

A CRISE REVOLUCIONARIA
Sem esse fator subjetivo — a
ação organizada, ofensiva e revolu-
cionariamente dirigida das amplas
massas do povo — não há revolu-
ção.

ludos de toda atividade política pelo
limpo aparta de repressão e mis-
tificação montado pelas classes de
minuantes, sejam ganhos pela lóci-
do lutar por seus interesses e, fi-
nalmente, intervenham na cena his-
tórica com a força linear que seus
números somados e organizados re-
presentam, é indispensável que se a-
presentem certas condições objeti-
vas, externas, independentes de sua
vontade ou da vontade de quem que-
re selo.

revolucionária, cujo conceito de revolução afirma que "nada tem a ver com a situação presente" na América Latina, criando com isso o sinal verde para seus "loco" guerrilheiros. A despeito das condições objetivas para o processo revolucionário é uma reflexão em que caminhamos as correções que, hoje, na América Latina, querem fazer a revolução com um "pauzão de beldê"». Em nome pai, Carlos Mariátegui, entre outros pontos de referência, há outros pontos de referência: a revolução peruana.

ele renuncia também ao conceito de crise revolucionária; "a revolução cubana já pôs por terra esse conceito tradicional", diz ele.

A compreensão do papel das condições objetivas no desenvolvimento da revolução foi um momento importante da superação, pelo marxismo, das concepções pequeno-burguesas que predominavam no movimento socialista do Século XIX, particularmente do Bismarkismo, que almejava a "transição pacífica" de uma

formar desde uma sociedade pre-
existente de pequenos grupos de co-
produtores, na palmeira de Ezequiel,
Lula delatou o texto clássico e a
seus respalço. Apresenta a revolução
como um processo em que se re-
juga, de um lado, a perda pela
classe dominante de seu poder
delegante de sociedade, face a
argumento excepcional de ideias
coerentes do regime e a sua
questão de integração de sua
luta repressiva, muitas a política,
de outro lado, a surge do descon-
tamento popular, cuja manifestação
é estimulada pelas próprias forças
que se abrem no sistema de pro-
priedade de classe. São as condições
de liberdade pela expressão: "o de
um lado não podem mais governar
como antes, de outro não querem
mais viver como tal". A intervenção
das massas populares, dirigida por
sua transição revolucionária, pe-
mite estabelecer a crise para as
transformações econômicas e sociais
reclamadas pela nação.

Naturalmente, a crise não po-
nência no jornal, dizendo que ch-
gou. Nem há qualquer fato ou con-
junto preciso de fatos que identif-
quem inequivocamente a ocorrência
da crise. Outra vez, a arte e a
ciência devem lutar-se por definir

Os revolucionários, para que eles possam equilibrar a importância e o justo significado dos sintomas objetivos de crise que se acumulam das modificações que se operam na correlação de forças de classe, devem tornar o sistema, não, mais "fictício"

terizar a chegada ou não do momento azado para levar as tropas à batalha decisiva pelo poder. Quem pouco se pode esperar que a cena e seus desfecho se deem segundo as figurinas prévia, ou se desenrola cinematograficamente, cada personagem aparecendo em cena com, ou a hora marcada.

A história tem sido muito rica e, ao mesmo tempo, muito repetitiva. Em particular, é de se prever que o crescimento do poder e da influência mundial da sociedade, paralelamente ao crescimento das forças democráticas e antipatriarcalistas, continuará sendo cada vez mais parte integrante da precipitação desse processo de transformação social, fortalecendo-se e acelerando. Desde que não se utilize o poder real das armas, pois nesse caso o "não desarmagem" as armas do governo e suas revoluções, como dizia Lenin, a política guerrilha, tal como existe, e a sua arma armada, pode prestar-se, no futuro, como instrumento de ajuste e modernização, ao espírito revolucionário do povo (através, a propósito, de um subarmamento necessário do uso da arma armada à existência de um equilíbrio democrático, e aí val o que revolução de Debray). Nada disso, entretanto, dispensa o trabalho político e social mais íntimo.

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Não estamos diante de dogma algum; Mas os que negam a concessão de União têm obrigação fundamental sua opinião. Nenhum deles o faz, porém. Nem Debruem Marighella, nem um outro. Contentam-se em dar seu palpite, pronto. Na verdade, pretendem censurar o blanquismo, voltar, sim, à pré-história do movimento revolucionário socialista e ao dogma neste das concepções pequenas.

la houe e podras repetir-se em
revolucionárias em que líderes
pequeno-burgueses assumem a di-
reção da luta do povo e conduzem-
grças ás condições novas existe-
tes no mundo, inclusive a trans-
mutação do carácter socialista no d-
gime. Mas o blanquismo só é
muito cedeia para essa figura e
mirável de combatente que foi Louis
Blanqui, — que tinha, ao contrá-
rio retardatário que querem ser
hoje a instituição de uma

Sobre a Luta Armada

VINICIUS DE ANDRADE

I

A luta armada é uma forma de ação que se coloca no ordeno do dia sempre que no espírito das massas se desenvolve um tal sentimento de insatisfação com a situação política social resultante da decadência no governo e da revolta contra as condições de vida, que contingente cada dia mais numeroso de trabalhadores, de estudantes, de populares se dispõem a reagir pela força à violência governamental, a despeito das ameaças e da tal situação das massas sociais. Situações desse gênero ocorrem geralmente quando um governo se mostra incapaz de resolver problemas que as massas consideram vitais para si mesmas, e emprega a violência autoral contra as lutas que elas realizam em busca de uma solução que lhes seja satisfatória. A ação armada do Partido no sentido de mostrar-lhes a necessidade e a possibilidade de responder com a luta armada à violência do governo, e resolver seus problemas por suas próprias mãos, desempenha um papel de primeira grandeza na tomada de consciência e no levante à ação, mas não pode por si só induzir a ação, nem a uma forma de luta se não existe uma motivação objetiva suficiente para motivar para levante e dar esse passo.

Isso quer dizer que será normal e inevitável o aparecimento de situações em que tal forma de luta passe a ter o caráter mais ou menos generalizado, dependendo da profundidade da crise político-social que a gerou, uma vez que tal crise não levanta no regime capitalista o nível em que, a cada momento, é travada a luta armada dependente sobretudo do grau de revolta e do comprometimento das massas, de sua capacidade de união e de organização, da participação maior ou menor que nela tiveram as classes operárias e os trabalhadores pobres do campo, e da capacidade do Partido de organizar e dirigir a luta. Ela passa a ser a forma principal de luta quando se cria situação revolucionária e se atinge a fase da luta armada geral e da guerra civil.

Significa também que há uma intensa luta de nível em que a luta armada de massas pode ser realizada, logo desde a simples ação de resistência, como por exemplo a de uma manifestação de rua, de um comício ou de uma reunião em recinto fechado, até a insurreição geral e a guerra civil, passando por ações de nível intermediário diversos, tais como as de campanha em defesa de suas terras e lavouras, escolas e depósitos de armas de latifundiários e de pagamento de detentamento político, resgate de presos políticos, etc.

II

Preparar o Partido para a luta armada significa sobretudo preparar para dirigir massas em ações armadas organizadas, e, portanto, despojar as ações dirigidas em que elas se preparam, a princípio, e da intervenção dos militantes, com vistas a capacitá-las, politicamente e militarmente, como combatentes e comandantes de grupos de combatentes de massas. Essa preparação do Partido revela-se já o importante papel que desempenha na preparação e na condução da luta armada de massas os simples militantes e as Organizações de Base do Partido, evidenciando a necessidade de termos fortes nesse terreno, sem o qual, não seremos fortes na luta armada. Com efeito, o Partido só poderá preparar-se eficientemente para a luta armada e imprimir a esta um curso que corresponda aos interesses da classe do proletariado e, entre outras condições, poder utilizar racionalmente as duas seções:

a) possui uma extensa rede de Organizações de Base que cubra sobretudo as frotas importantes, as ferrovias, portos, navios e navegação aérea, os balneários de recreação, os centros industriais e as concentrações fundamentais de assalariados agrícolas e camponeses;

b) ter em cada militante de base um dirigente político, um bom chefe de orientação massiva, por vezes, chamados "que" e "sejam" e "sejam" e "sejam".

III

Como é do conhecimento de todos que espelham ideologicamente diver-

gências sociais e o surgimento de situações revolucionárias, não entram e não saem a revolução como um fenômeno histórico da classe. Para essa ideologia, a revolução é um ato de livre arbítrio, pode ser realizada a qualquer momento e por qualquer classe social, não depende da realidade da condição de classe social que se pretende atingir objetivos que realmente mudem a situação social, e não de vontade de algumas personalidades desiludidas, as quais, com seus exemplos espetaculares, eletrizam as massas e as impulsionam para a luta armada sem nunca sempre reconhecerem os limites da realidade e da situação social, e não de vontade de algumas personalidades desiludidas, as quais, com seus exemplos espetaculares, eletrizam as massas e as impulsionam para a luta armada sem nunca sempre reconhecerem os limites da realidade e da situação social.

Após demonstrar, acobardada e desmoralizada, a Comissão Central aprova pela quase unanimidade dos presentes uma resolução sobre a unidade do Partido, cuja íntegra publicação nesta edição, como suplemento especial.

Os debates foram encerrados com uma intervenção do camarada Antônio Almeida. Dessa intervenção, damos nesta edição a principal síntese.

Que fazer com a Resolução?

A resolução do Comitê Central tem uma recepção importante para a vida do Partido. Ela deve ser levada ao conhecimento de todos os militantes, simpatizantes e amigos do Partido, e ser objeto de estudo e aplicação por parte de todos as organizações partidárias.

O nosso Partido, a exemplo do que acontece com outros partidos comunistas, vem sendo alvo de ataques e ataques. Essa ideologia pequeno-burguesa concebe a base social em setores radicais da intelectualidade e dos estudantes, que se arrojam em única força revolucionária e se recusam a submeter-se aos interesses permanentes da classe operária e a aceitar sua ideologia.

A defesa dos interesses da classe operária, de sua ideologia e de seu Partido tornam-se, assim, um desafio de vital importância para o movimento revolucionário mundial, para o movimento revolucionário brasileiro. Para isso, é neces-

VOZ OPERÁRIA

Número XXXII — Outubro de 1967 NGr. \$ 0,10

ORGÃO CENTRAL
DO
PARTIDO COMUNISTA
BRASILEIRO

Reunião Plenária do Comitê Central

Realizada em setembro último uma reunião extraordinária do Comitê Central do nosso Partido. Nessa reunião plenária participaram os membros efetivos e suplentes do Comitê Central. A ordem do dia continha de um único ponto: Problemas da vida interna do Partido, objeto de um Informe da Comissão Executiva, apresentado pelo camarada Antônio Almeida.

Após demonstrar, acobardada e desmoralizada, a Comissão Central aprova pela quase unanimidade dos presentes uma resolução sobre a unidade do Partido, cuja íntegra publicação nesta edição, como suplemento especial.

Os debates foram encerrados com uma intervenção do camarada Antônio Almeida. Dessa intervenção, damos nesta edição a principal síntese.

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Intervenção do camarada Antônio Almeida no Pleno do Comitê Central

Defender a unidade do Partido contra o fracionismo e o liquidacionismo

Durante a última reunião plenária em suas respectivas circunscrições do Comitê Central, encerrando uma orientação divergente da ação. É evidente, no entanto, que não se trata apenas de solidariedade de, mas de sua participação no grande frentismo, do qual é dirigente. Além disso, tornamos também evidente que para realizar uma "conferência", deve uma direção e delegados do Debate, não podia deixar de haver um grupo dirigente já organizado previamente. O camarada Paulo não dia, portanto, verdade quando afirma que se recentemente foi informado de sua eleição para a direção do grupo fracionista.

— O conflito no Oriente Médio, iniciado justamente nos primeiros dias do mês de junho, foi a oportunidade para iniciativas que ocorreriam frontalmente o espírito e a letra da Resolução do Comitê Central sobre a situação internacional, aprovada em março do corrente ano, e para ataques à União Soviética. Tal o conteúdo de documentos publicados e distribuídos no Partido pelo Comitê Estadual de São Paulo e do Rio Grande do Sul, e Comitê Central. Reclamado em erro anterior, já criticado pelo Comitê Central, Menezes abandonou seu ponto, virou para Cuba sem informar sequer à direção do Partido e, através de declarações à imprensa e pela Rádio da Havana, passou a atacar a orientação de nosso Partido e sua direção.

— Finalmente, prossegue o camarada Antônio Almeida, tivemos os ataques públicos nos colocaram diante da necessidade de tomar medidas imediatas, que não podíamos deixar de submeter à apreciação do Comitê Central. Reclamado em erro anterior, já criticado pelo Comitê Central, Menezes abandonou seu ponto, virou para Cuba sem informar sequer à direção do Partido e, através de declarações à imprensa e pela Rádio da Havana, passou a atacar a orientação de nosso Partido e sua direção.

— Entretanto, continua o camarada Antônio Almeida, justamente nesse período, nos meses de junho e julho, aconteceu um episódio que ameaçava a unidade do Partido e não podíamos deixar de enfrentá-lo.

— Semelhantemente, manifestamos abertamente a atividade fracionista na Guanabara, o que exigiu da Comissão Executiva tomar uma série de medidas, inclusive chamar a atenção do Comitê Estadual da Guanabara para a necessidade de trazer a luta em defesa da unidade do Partido, contra a atividade fracionista realizada por antigos membros do Comitê Estadual no âmbito da última Conferência Estadual.

— De parte de alguns Comitês Estaduais aconteceu uma manifestação de rebelião, de violação dos princípios e normas da estrutura da vida interna do Partido. Sob a

— Entretanto, continua o camarada Antônio Almeida, justamente nesse período, nos meses de junho e julho, aconteceu um episódio que ameaçava a unidade do Partido e não podíamos deixar de enfrentá-lo.

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(Concluded 2d p. 48)

RESPECTO A LOS
ESTADISTOS

— Foram aqui lembrados velhos eptidos da vida partidária e todos casos de camaradas que foram

**LUTAR DENTRO DO
PARTIDO**

Foram aqui citadas as três condições: a que se refere, Liala, como imprescindível à validade de

que aquelas três condições sejam efectivamente satisfeitas. Por isso, no momento parágrafo em que se refere a aquelas três condições, escrevi:

— E' dentro de Partido e não de fora, respeitando o contributo democrático e não violando a disci-

**DEFENDER A HEGEMONIA
DA CLASSE OPERÁRIA**

o Comitê Central tome as medidas — Apesar da brutalidade da repressão militar que corresponde a esse período, hoje optamos a favor da repressão indicada, pois se trata de comunistas brasileiros.

**Cem anos
de
"O Capital"**

ANDRADA DE SOUZA

As pesquisas e análises de estrutura econômica, política e social capituladas: **Leões descobertos** — a lei do desenvolvimento desigual do capitalismo. Esse descoberto teve grande significação na história da humanidade. Marx e Engels admitiram

Linia previu que a cadelas, do imperialismo seria rompida ali onde o clo, fosse mais fraco, não dependendo do grau de desenvolvimento de cada país.

— o desenvolvimento planejado da economia nacional, orientado p

A revolução proletária se define nos seguintes aspectos essenciais:

— a defesa das conquistas socialismo contra o ataque dos inimigos externos e internos;

(b): A revolução democrática burguesa vitoriosa põe em consonância a economia burguesa em

ascenso. A revolução proletária constroí uma nova economia, socialista — elimina a exploração do homem pelo homem, e a propriedade privada dos meios fundamentais de produção. Os Partidos Comunistas aplicam estas leis gerais levando em conta as condições históricas, concretas e as particularidades nacionais de cada país.

production palms

Os marxistas brasileiros sabem de seu autor. Hoje, o O CAPITAL para que a revolução antiparlativa e antifudal se processa no mundo. Milhões de exemplares e

o direito de proletariado em alcançar os seus maiores compromissos. O poder estatal emergido da revolução será considerado pelo léxico proletário como o primeiro passo para a realização das tarefas essenciais da revolução proletária e democrática passível à fase das transformações revolucionárias.

«O primeiro revolucionário em curso no Brasil foi realmente o padre pela ditadura reacionária e entreguista que amei e poder ao conseqüência do golpe militar de abril de 1964. O conseqüente dos dados autoritários e a política por um príncipe da ditadura, como os intelectuais de Nogueira, atingem

[illegible]

...o período das relações de pro-
priedade de uma sociedade determina
a sua organização determinada em
seu nascimento, em seu desenvolvi-
mento e em sua queda, tal é o co-
mum de todas as doutrinas consi-
deradas por Lênin a propósito
do CAPITAL, que objetiva fins
expressos e próprios. Mas, era
verdade a lei econômica da evolu-
ção da sociedade moderna?

... parte integrante de um todo e não como fatos isolados. Na atual etapa do desenvolvimento histórico não, existem barreiras separatistas entre a revolução de conteúdo democrático e a revolução socialista.

Memo com a filia de liberdade do Brasil, imposta pela ditadura militar, como parte a exemplo de todos os países opressores e exploradores do mundo, comecemos a passagem do 'globo' ao universo da Revolução Socialista de Outubro. Num futuro não longínquo e por isso necessário, vamos apresentar-lhe mais complexa, e que sempre poderá ao mortificante acedente a própria sociedade, que realda de suas inferiores para formas novas. Acompanhando o desenvolvimento de sociedade, puramente desenvolvido e formalizado as coisas desmormentando, Marx ilustra um retrato perfeito, de cada lado, da economia capitalista.

**TOLERANCIA
TEM LIMITE**

Proseguindo, afirmou o camarada António Almeida: — Partindo dessa posição de respeito aos membros do Partido, disse o camarada António Almeida.

— Aqui se isolam os membros da Comissão Executiva do Conselho Central, para a elaboração de um plano de trabalho, com base nos julgamentos subjetivos. A Comissão Executiva do Conselho Central, nesse estágio, diante de fatos e atos de repetidas violações ou de julgamentos subjetivos, fazemos também, essencialmente, que se trata de "champanha de área" para afastar os divergentes, e realizar um "debriefing", finalmente, oficialmente, através do "debriefing", que se realiza no Conselho Central, que não se trata de manipulação, mas de prevenção de manipulação e divergência.

1

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: November 6, 1967

FROM : C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

My memorandum 10/9/67 set forth, in detail, an accounting of funds received by the Communist Party, USA, from the Soviet Union and Red China for September, 1967. The following is an accounting of these funds for October, 1967.

TOTAL FUNDS RECEIVED AND DISBURSED 9/58 TO 9/30/67

Total received from Soviet Union.....	\$4,717,745.19
Total received from Red China (all on 2/10/60).	50,000.00
Total received 9/58 to 9/30/67.....	<u>4,767,745.19</u>
Total disbursed 9/58 to 9/30/67.....	<u>3,982,695.66</u>
Balance of Fund 9/30/67.....	\$ 785,049.53

There were no receipts during October, 1967.

DISBURSEMENTS DURING OCTOBER, 1967

- All disbursements made on specific instructions of Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA.

To Helen Winter to be used to operate Party leadership school and expenses of "The Worker," east coast communist newspaper.....\$ 25,000.00

Personal items for Gus Hall's family..... 112.00

Purchase of tape recorder for Timur Timofeyev (Timmy Dennis, son of late Eugene Dennis, former Party leader) who is now a Soviet citizen.....

REC-60
EX-113 100-428091-6577 200.00

100-428091

RCP:cst
(5)

6 NOV 9 1967

CONTINUED - OVER

67 NOV 15 1967 28

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

To Max Weinstein for salary and expenses in
locating business opportunities for the
Party.....\$ 2,900.00

For Party share of expenses of Solo Mission 24,
including all expenses of CG 6653-S (wife of
CG 5824-S*)..... 1,843.20
Total disbursed October, 1967.....\$ 30,055.20

BALANCE OF FUND 10/31/67.....\$ 754,994.33

In New York.....\$ 631,282.98
In Chicago..... 123,711.35
\$ 754,994.33

ACTION:

None. This memorandum is submitted for your
information. An up-to-date accounting of Party funds
received from the Soviets will be brought to your attention
each month. Details of the accounting of these funds are
not to be disseminated.

[Handwritten initials and marks: a large 'O' on the left, 'WCS' in the center, and a series of marks including 'P', a checkmark, 'ds', and 'nmz' on the right.]

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York

11/6/67

Director, FBI (100-428091)

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ReBulet 9/19/67, New York letter 10/3/67, and Chicago letter 10/23/67 regarding conversion of special savings accounts maintained for NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S*.

You should institute a program to convert those accounts to U. S. savings bonds in a way which will not jeopardize the informants' security. Maintain bonds in safe-deposit box under your control. No further deposits are to be made in the special accounts and U. S. savings bonds are to be purchased in place of the deposits.

Advise Bureau when conversion to bonds has been completed.


2 - Chicago

RCP:cst
(10)

NOTE:

See cover memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated November 1, 1967, same caption, prepared by RCP:cst.

Tolson _____
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Conrad _____
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Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____



EX-113

REC-60

100-428091-6578

6 NOV 9 1967

6 NOV 15 1967 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

RECEIVED
NOV 13 1967
FBI
SECTION 2
JACOBSON

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: November 3, 1967

1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants for the Communist Party, USA, with other communist parties of the world.

My memorandum 11/1/67 (attached) recommended conversion of special savings accounts maintained for NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S* to U. S. savings bonds. Mr. Tolson inquired "How much do savings accounts amount to?"

Monthly deposits of \$100 from 1/1/56 and compound interest in account for NY 694-S* amounts to \$17,881.17. The account for CG 5824-S*, including deposits since 2/9/56 and compound interest, amounts to \$17,618.05. Of these amounts, approximately \$14,000 of each represents payments by the Bureau, while the balance represents compound interest.

These accounts were part of our original agreement with these informants to allay their fears that their families would be in a financial crisis if something happened to the informants while traveling behind the Iron Curtain developing information for us, as CG 5824-S* is doing at this moment.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

100-428091

RCP:cst
(6)

EX-113

REC-37

NOV 13 1967

67 NOV 20 1967

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : C. D. Brennan *6*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: November 1, 1967

1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants for the Communist Party, USA, with other communist parties of the world.

PURPOSE:

As an economy measure, this memorandum recommends conversion of the special savings accounts maintained for NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S* for payment at time of discontinuance to U. S. savings bonds.

BACKGROUND:

Our original agreement with these top level informants called for payment of \$100 per month into special savings accounts for each informant to be made available to them at the time they are discontinued. To protect security of the informants, interest earned on these accounts is recorded as income by the Special Agents in Charge of our New York and Chicago Offices on their personal income tax forms--federal, state, and local. They are, subsequently, reimbursed by the Bureau.

Conversion to U. S. savings bonds can be effected without jeopardizing security of the informants and will eliminate the necessity of continuing the current procedure which in addition to costing money has an element of risk. Since interest earned on the bonds will not be taxable until they are redeemed, the informants will pay all future taxes.

Enclosure *sent* 11-6-67

100-428091

H21 RCP:cst
(6) 5

REC 37

EX-113

CONTINUED - OVER

100-428091-6581

NOV 13 1967

67 NOV 20 1967

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

Attached is a letter to New York and Chicago instructing these offices to convert present savings accounts maintained for each informant to U. S. savings bonds and to purchase such bonds in the future in the amounts originally agreed upon with the informants. Bonds will be maintained under our control until informants are discontinued. Informants concur with change from cash to bonds.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended attached letter be approved and sent.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: JH, JMB, WCL, L, V, MM, GH, and others]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *Downing*

DATE: November 7, 1967

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

On 11/7/67, the New York Office furnished the text of a message which the informant desired to send and requested that it be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on the same day.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

EX-113

REC 37

100-428091-6582

6 NOV 13 1967

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:ccb
(7) ccb

5-RC Putnam

67 NOV 16 1967 288

11/7/67

53751 88171 19274 41388 34180 76664 65510 33127 37170 98514
65265 74992 29231 85087 27767 37005 29027 71226 28718 56326
61070 08542 07338 03436 52935 60674 85126 31749 38630 02118
61570 65010 48913 11220 53052 64538 33830 59553 50656 53783
98456 28378 25376 44237 33928 83887 80939 05605 50409 31667
99085 97067 73847 00853 48089 13890 95015 08366 16271 11671
18378 35827 98911 78421 32085 36470

ABLE KIT THIS WILL INFORM YOU THAT I AM BACK ON MY FEET AGAIN
FTER RECENT AUTO ACCIDENT WHICH HUB AND IVY MAY HAVE TOLD YOU
ABOUT. AM READY FOR COLOUR PRINT RENDEVOUS AT END OF NOVEMBE
R. YOUR CHOICE CONCERNING DATE AND TIME. PLEASE REPLY DUKE.
SPRING.

100-428091-6582

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 11/3/67

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637-Sub C)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReNYlet to Bureau, 10/25/67.

On 10/24/67, the possibilities and potentialities of activating [redacted] as an operational segment of the SOLO apparatus were brought to a head with NY 694-S*. NY 694-S* is impressed with [redacted] liberal background, his appearance and CP roots; more importantly, however, in NY 694-S*'s view, is [redacted] professional capabilities. As an intelligent [redacted] student, [redacted] would be more readily acceptable to the Soviets--which ultimate acceptance is a necessary prerequisite to his full utilization in the SOLO apparatus. b7D

NY 694-S*, with the help and guidance of interested SAS in the NYO, has undertaken as an immediate project the formulation of a believable plan by which [redacted] can logically come to the attention of NY 694-S* within the Party. Hopefully, [redacted] can be introduced to NY 694-S* as one of several similarly situated recruits into NY 694-S*'s work-a-day Party operations. b7D

On 10/31/67, [redacted] responded favorably when the prospect of broader utilization of his capabilities was explored. He interposed no objection and was receptive to the eventual prospect of national, and perhaps international, utilization of his talents. b7D

ReNYlet also outlined steps being undertaken to further NY 4309-S* and GUS HALL into contact with each other and ultimately gain for NY 4309-S* that same SOLO prerequisite--acceptance by HALL and the Soviets, necessary for full SOLO utilization. The recent accidental incapacity of NY 694-S*

1-904 946
2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (41)

RJQ:msb
(3)

REC-60 100-428091-6583

6 NOV 14 1967

EX-108



5 NOV 16 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637-Sub C

served a useful purpose in that regard. It became necessary for NY 694-S* to give the Soviets some explanation regarding the operation of SOLO during his recuperation and while CG 5824-S* was in Moscow. NY 694-S*, in conference with HALL prior to HALL's departure for Moscow on 10/29/67, pointed out that as far as the Soviets were concerned, NY 4309-S* was not to be activated without prior approval by HALL. HALL thereupon gave his approval for activation and, further, stated that he would so advise the Soviets in Moscow. In further support of that tack, and with authority from NY 694-S* and HALL, CG 5824-S* while (currently) in Moscow will advise the Soviets that because of his absence and NY 694-S*'s disability, NY 4309-S* should be activated in order to continue operation of the SOLO apparatus.

The NYO is giving constant attention to the implementation of [] and NY 4309-S* as segments of the SOLO apparatus. b7D

The Bureau will be kept advised of the SOLO replacement and the neutralization effort of the NYO on a 2-week basis unless circumstances dictate more immediate communication.

UNITED STATES

MENT

Memorandum

ROUTE

ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 11/7/67

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

R. P. [Signature]

ReCGairtel to Bureau dated July 27, 1967, concerning CP, USA funds being concealed by GUS HALL at the home of one of his brothers in the vicinity of Cherry, Minnesota.

On October 18, 1967, CG 5824-S* advised that during a discussion with GUS HALL on this subject on October 8, 1967, HALL had advised that considerable thought had been given to the type of container which should be used in burying these funds. According to HALL, it had been decided that the money should be placed in a sealed steel container, probably a cyclinder. This container will then be buried in concrete inside the home of one of his brothers.

Q

REC-60

100-428091-6584

EX-108

6 NOV 14 1967

1-904 960
②-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

5-0

WAB:MDW
(4) *[Signature]*

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

62 NOV 16 1967

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *Jurew*

DATE: November 8, 1967

FROM : *C. F. Downing*

SUBJECT: *SOLO*
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

On 11/8/67, the New York Office furnished the text of two messages which the informant desired to send and requested that they be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on the same day.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:ccb
(7)

REC-60

100-428091-6585

EX-103

6 NOV 14 1967

28
55 NOV 16 1967

11/8/67

20118 39312 47606 86931 00881 12272 10775 98873 44241 15525
18209 91799 00768 83332 65218 89959 05438 49769 53752 83659
61118 84671 19950 67802 81343 58363 59502 33373 08065 96908
64518 59571 94288 60822 80064 47981 36792 36873 40022 87081
98183 11950 48430 85892 76169 73911 86087 37998 65429 82305
03790 88012 01475 76085 72493 38218 86557 97749 35742 43853
25457 01046 78582 01427 11627 50828 80480 26471 44624 93280
14049 27253 33870 21373 38621 03742 56682 96120 95911 24049
78705 79826 27701 02799 00052 75516 36770 89074 94875 43008
11533 63319 21969 92163 64945 78881 49904 29894 41648 47188
99190 51160 56861 78331 10232 58565 47615 50427 75544 83832
22383 28139 79389 85869 99844 48841 52972 78972 89162 07475
31824 50213 93314 86464 72763 20150 35764 56892 24395 55397
38464 22950 20521 07299 45482 51114 79567 66257 96384 12229
96830 35124 88351 02392 56512 53122 31080 97810 35114 82391
37336 45422 88475 69471 13303 30480 68857 43597 30315 97081
93095 79260 05383 68581 62767 14538 23661 26221 32365 93577
03069 94619 29847 84430 43875 49089 70635 92306 36666 34690
80283 08374 57921 40062 28095 58327 42274 95435 94057 47412
43181 66247 18705 62983 53378 33653 45262 75333 98260 56427
70860 13402 44757 62295 68154 23182 79245 03990 73708 74229
27250 07908 16645 86604 06462 09732 55598 16169 91037 01070
10634 61748 41960 86346 50009 39692 32874 36394 00844 46581
82788 65421 11436 53963 18493 87053 25765 86723 73674 37284

100-428091-6585

ENCLOSURE

85732 37084 59700 43654 98566 39459 30370 74791 87389 75653.

65931 21786 58980 25935 01129 26571 06230 58178 00347 85230

98006 78157 25626 42866 95688 09564 02672 58298 16456 85161

55293 35520 06690 22665 39107 17436 77692 90361 75268 45338

37894 19782 26892 65559 97319 64422 37874 97070 61336 01397

86895 29368 80117 68031 36605 98845 47647 80964

IN GENERAL, DUKE RECEPTION FOR JANUARY THROUGH NOVEMBER #1967#.

AT ASSIGNED TIMES AND FREQUENCIES, HAS BEEN GOOD, EXCEPT FOR MARCH AND APRIL WHICH WERE ONLY FAIR DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC AND

LOCAL INTERFERENCE. RECEPTION DURING MAY AND JUNE WAS POOR

BECAUSE OF CONTINUING CYCLE OF SUN, RESULTING IN HEAVY ATMOSPHERIC INTERFERENCE. THINK IT BEST #1968# GMT AND FREQUE.

NCY SCHEDULES REMAIN RELATIVELY SAME AS #1967# - JANUARY TH

ROUGH APRIL, AND NOVEMBER. DECEMBER, #1230#X#1230# TO #1330#

X#1330# GMT. USE #1130#X#1130# TO #1230#X#1230# GMT DURING

MAY THROUGH OCTOBER BECAUSE OF LOCAL TIME CHANGE. CONTINU

E USE OF FREQUENCIES BETWEEN #12#X#12# TO #15#X#15# MCS. FO

LLOWING IS PROPOSED DUKE SCHEDULE FOR #1968#. JANUARY - WED

NESDAY, FRIDAY. FEBRUARY - TUESDAY, FRIDAY. MARCH - MONDAY

FRIDAY. APRIL - TUESDAY, THURSDAY. MAY - MONDAY, FRIDAY. J

UNE - TUESDAY, THURSDAY. JULY - MONDAY, WEDNESDAY. AUGUST -

TUESDAY, THURSDAY. SEPTEMBER - TUESDAY, THURSDAY. OCTOBE

R - WEDNESDAY, FRIDAY. NOVEMBER - TUESDAY, FRIDAY. DECEMBE

R - TUESDAY, THURSDAY.

99744 33389 71658 12971 65872 57889 30121 10042 62175 60981

85911 75387 29225 93562 35475 97351 07184 89706 61448 98435

65042 20295 21028 58287 76213 13710 09613 16374 49686 23447

44833 79929 11931 11038 39733 73502 78221 72391 15866 24329

29954 71679 33842 03294 56007 59578 78954 79564 38877 23201

09808 80531 38522 66808 86809 95674 54481 12956 07904 09581

12321 76021 77284 98311 20809 91948 06003 56102 41425 21145

37460 18089 53055 17453 65748 29393 49001 97161 74476 03732

59337 83104 88309 32342 35782 43704 54483 30848 92492 78714

14623 08858 82404 04726 97917 83569 08487 24143 31577 46866

64633 14216 06064 00324 44524 23649 39662 01862 54032 38439

56106 12218 26143 17155 81557 75534 03389 33951 95990 45506

25614 85325 42133 90341 02881 83582 67282 73882 86593 59908

00706 63196 01110 87176 64109 01910 37528 66231 74779 08163

03236 55010 62465 77178 76563 05961 51700 22793 49581 41872

78243 15895 20960 65165 74790 11996 84553 54772 04848 34860

99708 05713 76084 87106 91510

THE FOLLOWING ARE POLL DAYS FOR 1968. SUGGEST CONTINUANCE WITH POLL TIME AS IN 1967 WHICH HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE CONSISTENTLY SUCCESSFUL. SIGNALS WILL BE SAME AS 1967 UNLESS DESIGNATED OTHERWISE. JANUARY - TUESDAY, THURSDAY. FEBRUARY - MONDAY, WEDNESDAY, FRIDAY. MARCH - TUESDAY, THURSDAY. APRIL - MONDAY, WEDNESDAY, FRIDAY. MAY - TUESDAY, THURSDAY. JUNE - MONDAY, WEDNESDAY. JULY - TUESDAY, THURSDAY. AUGUST - MONDAY, WEDNESDAY. SEPTEMBER - MONDAY, THURSDAY. OCTOBER - TUESDAY, THURSDAY. NOVEMBER - MONDAY, WEDNESDAY, FRIDAY. DECEMBER - MONDAY, THURSDAY.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 11/8/67

ReBulet dated September 19, 1967, and NYlet dated October 3, 1967, concerning methods of bolstering the profit-making facility of the Solo cover company.

The Chicago Office has been following the activities of the cover company on a day-to-day basis ever since its inception. On several occasions we have submitted recommendations or informed the Bureau of actions taken with the view toward increasing the profit-making potential of this company in order to bring it closer to self-sufficiency. This was true at the very inception of the company when we expanded its line to include nurses' uniforms and other accessories in addition to the original concept of a retail duty shoe outlet. In addition, on a subsequent occasion, the Bureau approved our recommendation to expand the inventory of this company in view of the fact that potential sales had been lost owing to a paucity of readily available inventory. On a later occasion, the Bureau was informed of efforts by [redacted] to tap a new source of business by adding to his line certain items used by companies engaged in space age industries. b7D

As agreed at the recent conference on the Solo operation at the SOG, the Chicago Office is remaining alert for any possibility of changes which will enhance the profit-making potential of this company. At such time as we can discern an opportunity to accomplish this purpose, the Bureau will be immediately furnished our recommendations.

1-904 94D
②-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

REC 54

100-428091-6586
6 NOV 16 1967

EX-108

55 NOV 21 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

We recognize that there well may be additional products, either related or unrelated to the current line of business, which can be added to the present line of the cover company and which can be offered for sale either on the premises or through mail order. However, we also recognize the fact that expansion by this method will require the investment of additional capital for purchase of inventory, for additional or separate advertising, etc. In view of the already large investment by the Bureau in this unprofitable business, the Chicago Office would be extremely loath to recommend any such expansion even with virtually ironclad assurances that the new line would be profitable. Therefore, the attention of this office has been confined toward exploring methods of increasing the profitability of this company through alterations or adaptations of its current operating procedures so as to increase its profit-making potential with minimum, if any additional, contribution by the Bureau.

This operation is being followed closely to insure maximum return of profits to reduce the Bureau's investment therein. At the same time, in any discussion of this cover company, we feel obliged to reiterate that from the standpoint of its primary function, that is, the security of the Solo operation, it has fulfilled its function in a most outstanding manner. The Bureau will be kept advised of any future developments and/or recommendations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum - ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 11/8/67

ReBulet dated September 19, 1967, and NYlet dated October 10, 1967, concerning proposed changes in the handling of funds given to the informants for transmittal to the CP, USA.

The Chicago Office concurs wholeheartedly with the recommendations as set forth in reBulet relative to the laborious procedures heretofore required for the reporting of serial numbers, etc., of processed money as opposed to that money directly received from the CP of the Soviet Union. Since this is primarily a function of the New York Office which bears the brunt of this burden, we are of the opinion that the New York Office is in a much better position to comment upon this facet of the operation.

Additional discussion took place at the recent Solo conference at the SOG concerning the manner in which these Solo funds should be maintained and the amounts thereof which should be placed in the hands of each informant. As discussed at the conference, both CG 5824-S* and NY 694-S* have expressed on a number of occasions their continuing apprehension that demands for substantial amounts of funds may be made by GUS HALL during night periods or on weekends and holidays when such large amounts would not be available from safety deposit boxes wherein these funds are currently maintained. We have been informed by these informants that HALL would be disturbed if he were aware that these funds are being maintained in safety deposit boxes and has stated in the past that such depositories are undesirable in view of the fact that records are kept by safety deposit corporations of every entry by an individual to boxes he has rented.

1-904 940
2-Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)

REC 54

100-428091-6587

NOV 16 1967

EX-108

CG 134-46 Sub F

As a result of extended discussion at the recent Solo conference, it was agreed that in order to allay this apprehension by the informants, the sum of \$50,000 might be furnished to each informant to retain within his sole control in order to have this sum available in the event HALL should make a demand for such a substantial amount of money outside of normal banking hours. Such an amount should serve to satisfy HALL even if the demand is for a larger amount at least until the resumption of normal banking hours. We recognize that Bureau assistance might be necessary in order to prepare secure depositories in the informants' homes in the event that is the location at which the informant intended to maintain these funds.

This subject was discussed with the informant prior to his departure on the current Solo Mission. He expressed complete agreement with this proposal of providing \$50,000 as a sufficiently large amount to satisfy HALL at any given time in the absence of prior warning of a demand for an unusually large amount. The informant arrived at no firm decision as to the manner in which he desired to maintain this fund before departing on this mission. However, he did state that his initial impression is that such an amount could be maintained securely in the safe at his office, Arisco Associates, Inc., Suite 918, 25 East Washington Street, Chicago, Illinois. This is a large three-way combination Mosler Safe located in the inner office of the cover company. Both the informant and his [redacted] have access to this office space at nights and on weekends and holidays, and it is reasonably convenient to the home of CG 5824-S* should an emergency demand be made by HALL. b7D

In the absence of advice to the contrary by the Bureau in the meantime, this matter will be pursued with CG 5824-S* upon his return to Chicago from the current Solo Mission, and firm recommendations will be submitted to the Bureau at that time.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO:

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 11/9/67

FROM:

SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT:

SOLO
IS-C
(REPLACEMENT AND
NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)

Re WFO letter to Bureau, 10/25/67, captioned,
 SM-C", Bufile 100-364081.

Relet reflects that according to CG 5824-S*, during March, 1967, GUS HALL, while having breakfast at a New York City hotel, was approached by a couple, and who engaged him in conversation. According to HALL, the Georgetown Graphic Art Gallery, Incorporated, 3207 O Street N.W., Washington, D.C. CG 5824-S* related that HALL stated this couple knew various diplomatic people in Washington, were reliable and might be the type of people the Soviets are interested in. HALL added that he had once stayed with this couple during the CP underground period and intimated that their identities should be provided to the Soviets.

b6
b7C

The NYO file on reflects that he was interviewed by Bureau agents in 1953, and appeared cooperative. He admitted membership in the Young Communist League in the early 1940's and that both he and his wife became members of the CP in Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1949. He said they resigned from the CP in 1950, since they disagreed with the Party's policy regarding the Korean conflict. He added that neither he nor his wife had any contact with any CP members since that time (1950 to 1953).

b6
b7C

An apparent discrepancy exists here in that stated he has had no contacts with the CP since 1950, while HALL stated he stayed with him during the underground days which would be 1951.

- 1-904 910
2 - Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
1 - New York (100-134637) (41REC 54 100-428091-6588)

JAH:gmd
(3)



5 NOV 21 1967

EX-108

NOV 16 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637

On 4/21/51, [redacted] contacted the NYO and advised that he and his wife had not been CP members for over a year and at that time were residing in New York City.

In any event, the [redacted] with their previous CP membership and with the acknowledgment of their reliability by GUS HALL, do possess potential as informants, particularly as contacts (again by HALL) of the Soviets. Additionally, their [redacted] presents an ideal cover.

b6
b7C

If the [redacted] could be developed as informants, it may be possible to:

1. Use them in a phase of the SOLO operation.
2. Furnish their identities through SOLO to the Soviets as persons trusted by GUS HALL who may be of use to the Soviets.

In either case, if developed, he would be of use to the Bureau.

With the thought in mind the [redacted] may be of value to the SOLO operation, Bureau is requested to review the file on the [redacted] to determine whether or not it will allow WFO to work on the [redacted]. If this is favorable as the NYO believes, the Bureau is requested to contact the WFO and instruct it to attempt to develop the [redacted] through a discreet long range program.

b6
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT **ROUTE IN ENVELOPE**
Memorandum

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 11/9/67

FROM :

SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT:

SOLO
IS-C

~~Confidential~~

Reference New York letter to the Bureau dated 10/19/67, captioned "SOLO", and concerning the neutralization of JAMES JACKSON. The letter included a proposed news release on JACKSON's early departure for attendance at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the October Revolution, and the reason therefor.

Enclosed for the Bureau and Chicago is a Xerox copy of a New York "Sunday News" item dated 11/5/67.

The NYO will await return of CG 5824-S* before recommending further action.

~~Confidential~~

Classified by **7157**
Exempt from GDS, Category **2 & 3**
Date of Declassification **Indefinite**

- 1-904 960**
- 2 - Bureau (100-428091) (Encl. 1) (RM)
 - 1 - Chicago (134-46-SUB B) (Encl. 1) (AMRM)
 - 1 - New York (100-134637) (41)
- REC 54**

RJQ:gmd
(4)

NOV 16 1967

EX-108

5 NOV 21 1967



5010-106

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Two Battle to Rule U.S. Red Party

By RICHARD MCGOWAN

Washington, Nov. 4 (NEWS Bureau)—A pitched battle for control of the dissension-riddled U.S. Communist Party will erupt when party boss Gus Hall and leading Negro Red James E. Jackson return from Moscow shortly, highly informed sources told THE NEWS today.

The rivals took their duel to Moscow under the cloak of participating in the 80th anniversary celebration of the Soviet

revolution. Jackson jumped the gun on Hall. He took off alone to Moscow, well in advance of Hall and about a dozen of the

party faithful, to rally support for his drive to take over the party here on a racist platform. Jackson, who is 53, has spent his entire adult life as a communist activist after getting a degree in pharmacy from Howard University here.

Considers Self Race Expert

He considers himself to be the American Party's leading theoretician on race relations and could be useful in fomenting civil unrest in this country, Hall, according to sources, hates his guts.

Chairman Edwin Willis (D-La.) of the House Un-American Activities Committee said last



James E. Jackson
Took their fight to Moscow



Gus Hall

week that there is no doubt that Communist elements "played a major and key role" in the 1964 Harlem race riots. The Soviets, seeking to exploit racial unrest, prefer Jackson to Hall.

Jackson, a member of the Communist secretariat and national executive board here, is the former publisher of the party's official organ, The Worker.

Actions Annoyed Hall

While editor and publisher, he was known—to Hall's annoyance—to be in frequent contact with Soviet and satellite country representatives.

"What is particularly interesting is that Jackson has now been publicly identified as the secretary of the U.S. Communists' international department and has even traveled to France as an official delegate to the French Communist party's congress," the sources said.

While throwing repeated barbs into Hall, Jackson has been making more frequent contacts than ever with the Russians and representatives of other Communist-bloc countries.

The Heir Apparent

When he returns after the Moscow celebrations, Jackson is expected to be the key liaison man between the U.S. Communist Party and Red bloc delegates at the United Nations.

Hall will be left out in the cold with Jackson the heir apparent to the shaky throne.

It is significant that Jackson's

latest book, "U.S. Negroes in Battle: From Little Rock to Watts," was published in Russia but not in the U.S.

"It could be inferred that Jackson's assignment on his return could be of even greater interest," the sources said.

But they added that the end result will probably be "greater confusion and disunion" in the U.S. Communist Party.

The Jackson-Hall feud points up the growing black power

movement in the party and the source of Jackson's new-found strength.

100-428091-6589

ENCLOSURE

SUNDAY NEWS, NOVEMBER 5, 1967

6 74

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: 11/13/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

E. R. [Signature]

On 11/13/67, there was received from the Soviets, via radio, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain text of which was as follows:

"To NY 694-S*.

"November 8 we received two signals from you on walky-talky and checked Beck Shoe Store, NYC. Next day we checked the Townhouse Restaurant, Queens; failed to see you. If you called us November 8 acknowledge this call on walky-talky November 13 at 7:50 - 8:00 PM or at Beck Shoe Store till 9:00 PM. Receiving this call we'll see you on November 16 at the Townhouse Restaurant, Queens. If we don't receive your call, we don't come. Please give your suggestions as regards radio schedule for 1968."

The above message concerns a walky-talky signal sent by NY 694-S* to the Soviets on November 8, the purpose of the signal having been to alert the Soviets to a drop operation on November 9. The Soviets were confused regarding the signal, interpreting it to call for a personal contact instead of a drop. The essential purpose of the drop was to furnish the Soviets with a proposed radio schedule for 1968, mentioned in the Soviet message.

3 - Bureau (RM)

1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM) DEC 54

1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)

1 - NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341) 44

1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

JFL:msb

(8)

6 NOV 16 1967

Approved: *[Signature]*

Sent _____ M Per _____

55 NOV 21 1967 Special Agent in Charge

NY 100-134637

To avoid further confusion on the part of the Soviets, which would result if their instructions above were followed, NY 694-S* will send a signal on 11/15/67 (the next scheduled date for a walky-talky operation) alerting the Soviets to a drop operation on 11/16/68.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: November 13, 1967

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

SE R. Putnam

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 11/13/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 723 GR 128, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

Q

Enclosure

2
ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:ccb
(7) ccb
W
7425

REC 54

100-428091-6591

8 NOV 16 1967

EX-108

55 NOV 21 1967

11/13/67

NR 723 GR 128

TO SPRING. NOVEMBER #11# (R) WE RECEIVED TWO CALLS FROM YOU
ON POLL AND CHECKED TOPSY, NEXT DAY WE CHECKED ARMSTRONG FAILED
TO SEE YOU. IF YOU CALL US NOVEMBER #11# (R) ACKNOWLEDGE THIS
CALL ON POLL NOVEMBER #16# (R) AT #7#. #50# - #8#. #00# P. M.
OR ~~FOR~~ TOPSY TILL #9#. #00# P. M. RECEIVING THIS CALL WE'LL
SEE YOU ON NOVEMBER #19# (R) AT ARMSTRONG. IF WE DON'T
RECEIVE YOUR CALL WE DIDN'T COME. PLEASE GIVE YOUR SUGGESTIONS
REGARDS DUKE SCHEDULE FOR #1968#.

NR 723 GR 128

00479	65615	16444	79703	59050	81679	71582	72323	64101	07463
63536	27964	16290	06101	07560	93867	67827	86290	86457	29461
97430	86017	46842	44422	12290	02572	03152	39729	36367	48808
19688	71611	01620	48488	69411	37959	43961	64212	85101	28077
37775	41032	90450	13898	60602	54746	13664	28764	92487	48528
82445	16022	25766	89604	40533	47966	05818	75549	03449	85096
08555	29580	98004	82756	63565	20442	99225	17279	19568	06265
93159	32115	49369	40654	86089	58016	95873	46086	93548	49094
19632	51098	31179	83195	56723	28588	66030	01222	51720	28583
11481	20538	59972	86102	17599	58621	65337	25262	05896	87105
30665	61157	16210	06196	29496	11853	06693	67517	79341	54518
59696	87413	04689	51526	87574	38244	57520	42478	55630	36689
46682	87863	61713	92728	77552	59190	81294	71451		

100-428091-6591
ENCLOSURE

VIA TELETYPE

OCT 28 1967

ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson_____
Mr. DeLoach_____
Mr. Mohr_____
Mr. Bishop_____
Mr. Casper_____
Mr. Callahan_____
Mr. Conrad_____
Mr. Felt_____
Mr. Gale_____
Mr. Rosen_____
Mr. Sullivan_____
Mr. Tavel_____
Mr. Trotter_____
Tele. Room_____
Miss Holmes_____
Miss Gandy_____

412PM URGENT 10-28-67 JLS

TO DIRECTOR (100-428091) AND NEW YORK (100-134637)

NEW YORK VIA WASHINGTON

FROM CHICAGO

SOLO. IS-C.

RE CHICAGO TELCALLS TO BUREAU OCTOBER TWO SEVEN LAST.

CG SIX SIX FIVE THREE - S WILL DEPART CHICAGO TO JOIN CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR - S ASTERISK ON SOLO MISSION TWO FOUR VIA AIR FRANCE FLIGHT ZERO THREE ZERO, FIVE PM, OCTOBER TWO NINE NEXT,

ARRIVING PARIS NINE ONE FIVE AM, OCTOBER THREE ZERO NEXT. WILL DEPART PARIS VIA CZECH AIR LINES FLIGHT FIVE ZERO EIGHT, ONE FOUR FIVE PM, OCTOBER THREE ZERO NEXT, ARRIVING PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THREE ONE FIVE PM, SAME DATE. TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FROM PRAGUE TO MOSCOW USSR, WILL BE MADE BY OFFICIALS OF CPCZ. BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED OF ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

EX-102
REC-38

RECEIVED: 5:21 PM DHH

100-428091-6592

6 NOV 22 1967

54 NOV 2, 1967

RELAYED TO NEW YORK

SAC, New York (100-134637)
(134-91)

November 16, 1967

Director, FBI (100-428091)

SOLO
IS-C

REGISTERED MAIL

a portion of

Attached is the translation which you requested by letter
dated 11/3/67. ~~xxxx~~ airtel

The contents thereof, where pertinent, must be reported
under appropriate captions and afforded whatever investigative
attention is necessary.

Disposition of the foreign language material submitted in
this connection is set forth below:

BEI ~~RE~~ Retained until completion of translation.

1 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Internal Security Section), sent direct with
enclosure.

TGM: csp
(5)

NOT RECORDED

6 NOV 20 1967

MAILED 8
NOV 15 1967
COMM - FBI

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

NOV 22 1967 TELETYPE UNIT ☐

TRANSLATION FROM FRENCH

Communique of the Chairmanship of the 11th Plenary Session
of the Greek Communist Party Central Committee

The 11th Plenary Session of the Greek Communist Party Central Committee took place at the end of June, 1967. The theme was "The Military-Fascist Putsch in Greece and the Obligations of the Party."

Apostolos Grozos, President of the Greek Communist Party Central Committee, presented the report of the B.P.

The Plenary Session has shown that the organizers and instigators of the military-fascist dictatorship imposed on our country by the Putsch of April 21, 1967, are the most reactionary and most servile circles of the plutocratic oligarchy, directly inspired and assisted by the most aggressive circles of American imperialism and NATO.

The direct benefactors from the putsch are the American intelligence agencies, NATO and the military junta of the colonels. The king and the court have covered over the coup in an effort to consolidate the dictatorship and unleash its fury against the people and the democratic movement.

The dictatorship pursues the following goals:

Internally: To attack and crush the growing democratic movement which is renewing Greek society; to provide an antipopular solution to the problems of the country; to overthrow by force the legal government of Cyprus and to provide a solution to the Cyprus question which will conform to the interests of NATO; to abandon the Greek people, without defense, to the greedy exploitation of foreign monopolists.

Internationally: To insure to a greater degree the positions of imperialists and NATO in Greece as a base of aggression for their adventurist objectives in the Balkans and the Near East; to attack the democratic movements and the liberation movements, and to impose fascist regimes on other countries as well as

TRANSLATED BY: *ms*

THOMAS MC LAUGHLIN, JR.: *csp*, *ccb*

November 14, 1967

(1)

(2-7)

100-428091-
ENCLOSURE

Europe; to shackle the extensive movement for an entente and for cooperation between governments, as well as for the organization of a collective system of European security.

The Plenary Session has underlined, furthermore, that the international situation which is the result of the aggression of American imperialism throughout the world, especially in the Near and Middle East, accelerated the establishment of the dictatorship.

The establishment of the dictatorship has been a serious blow to the democratic movement. The constitution of the country has been abolished, the political parties dissolved, the democratic conquests of the people, acquired by long struggle and sacrifice, have been suppressed. An atmosphere of violence and fascist terror has been unleashed throughout the country. Thousands of democratically-minded people, noted personalities and average citizens have been thrown into concentration camps of Nazi design. They have been tortured and murdered.

The Greek people are experiencing a new test. A savage attack has been unleashed by foreign monopolies against the living standards of the workers. The people in Greece will have to undergo harsh and difficult struggles.

Greece has been transformed into a staging area for NATO and imperialist tension and provocations in the Balkans and the eastern mediterranean.

The fascist-military dictatorship has betrayed the nation and its best interests.

The Plenary Session has shown that the Greek people are radically opposed to the dictatorship. Politicians throughout the country have opposed it. No dictatorship has been so isolated from the people and the politicians of our country.

Disagreements and disputes are already appearing within the dictatorship. World public opinion, especially that of Europe, has been raised against the dictatorship and the situation of the dictatorship is not stable.

The Plenary Session has underlined the fact that this great test of the people requires that all the parties, political leaders, noted individuals and all political forces put aside their differences and unite in a mass front against dictatorship with a common plan of attack which should be the following:

- Overthrow of the dictatorship.
- Reestablishment of constitutional and democratic freedom.
- Freedom of action for all parties and organizations.
- Freedom for all those arrested.
- A general amnesty.
- Dissolution of the Junta.
- Free elections on a simple proportion basis and organized by a government composed of all parties.

✓ d The basis for the unity of anti-dictatorship forces is the unity of the working class - the social force found in the first rank of the vanguard - which received the brunt of the attack launched by foreign monopolists and by the Junta.

The forces of the ardent Greek youth will have to play an important role in the struggle to overthrow the dictatorship.

The first step to be taken in uniting the anti-dictatorship forces into a patriotic front are now being carried out.

✓ The anti-dictatorship front will be able to assume the most diverse organization forms: committees in enterprises, villages, cities, on up to the National Committee of the Front Against Dictatorship, which will conduct the struggle on a national scale.

✓ The struggle against the dictatorship will be able to find its expression in the most diverse ways: from a simple statement and orders written on walls, street demonstrations and strikes; and so on, up to a national struggle to overthrow the dictatorship.

The Plenary Session has underlined the extreme importance of international assistance in the struggle against the dictatorship.

The 11th Plenary Session of the Greek Communist Party Central Committee appeals to all communists, all members and cadre of the Party, to organize forces of valiant fighters

in a struggle to overthrow the military-fascist tyranny and to attain victory for democracy.

The Plenary Session has also shown that the present, urgent and vital task of communists is to establish independent organizations of the Greek Communist Party.

The Plenary Session has adopted a political resolution as well as a resolution concerning the results of the Conference of European Communist Parties and Labor Parties on European Security.

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Greek Communist Party Central Committee has appealed to the Greek people and their parties to join forces and overthrow the Junta.

The resolution has been unanimously approved.

The Chairmanship of the Eleventh
Plenary Session of the
Greek Communist Party
Central Committee

June, 1967.

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO ☒ TELETYPE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan *MS* _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

7:30 PM URGENT 10-29-67 WGW

TO DIRECTOR (100-428091)

FROM CHICAGO (134-46 SUB B)

SOLO; IS-C.

RE CHICAGO TEL OCTOBER 28 LAST.

CG 6653-S DEPARTED CHICAGO 5 P.M. THIS DATE ENROUTE
MOSCOW VIA PARIS AND PRAGUE.

RECEIVED: 8:36 PM RAK

EX-104

REC-38

100-428091-6 593

NOV 22 1967

54 NOV 27 1967

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

*Memo C.D. Brennan
to W.C. Sullivan*

*RCP:car
10/30/67*

CC Putnam

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: November 20, 1967

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 11/20/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

JFL HS:csp csp
(7)
pump
W

EX-102

REC-38

100-428091-6594

NOV 22 1967

10/6
54 NOV 27 1967

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 11/17/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) (ATT: FBI LABORATORY)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

R. P. [unclear]

On 11/16/67, there were transmitted to the Soviets, at a New York City drop, several ciphered-partially coded messages on microfilm, the plain texts of which are as follows:

(1) "Three short signals were sent to you on November 8th, calling for a drop on November 9th. Probably due to local interference, signals were misunderstood. When your telephone acknowledgment was not received on November 9th, Drop Una was recontacted for clearance. Did not acknowledge your radio message of November 13th by walkie-talkie or Beck Shoe Store to avoid further confusion. The following is what was intended to be delivered to you by drop Una on November 9th. Note it contains proposed radio schedule for 1968.

"JACK BROOKS"

(Re above, see NY airtel 11/13/67)

(2)

REC-25

100-428091-6595
November 7, 1967
EX-103

"My dear Comrade:

6 NOV 22 1967

"Accept my heartfelt fraternal greetings on the glorious occasion of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution. A toast and firm handshake to the CCCPSU.

"JACK BROOKS"

1-904, 910
(3) - Bureau (RM)

1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)

1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)

1 - NY 105-14931-(Sub C) (TALANOV) (341)

1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

ACB:msb

(8)

28
60 NOV 24 1967

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

cc-Crypt-Trans
pup 11/20/67
5-72

NY 100-134637

(3) "Central Committee - CP USSR

"This will inform you I am back on my feet again after recent auto accident which CG 5824-S* and GUS HALL may have told you about. Am ready for money rendezvous at end of November. Your choice concerning date and time. Please reply by radio.

"JACK BROOKS"

(4) "In general, radio reception for January through November 1967, at assigned times and frequencies, has been good, except for March and April, which were only fair due to atmospheric and local interference. Reception during May and June was poor because of continuing cycle of sun, resulting in heavy atmospheric interference. Think it best 1968 GMT and frequency schedules remain relatively same as 1967 - January through April, and November, December, 1230 to 1330 GMT.

"Use 1130 to 1230 GMT during May through October because of local time change. Continue use of frequencies between 12 to 15 MCS.

"Following is proposed radio schedule for 1968:

"January	-	Wed., Fri.
February	-	Tues., Fri.
March	-	Mon., Fri.
April	-	Tues., Thurs.
May	-	Mon., Fri.
June	-	Tues., Thurs.
July	-	Mon., Wed.
August	-	Tues., Thurs.
September	-	Tues., Thurs.
October	-	Wed., Fri.
November	-	Tues., Fri.
December	⊙	Tues., Thurs."

NY 100-134637

(5)

"Suggest continuance in 1968 of walkie-talkie time as in 1967, which has been found to be consistently successful. Signals will be same as 1967 unless designated otherwise. Suggest walkie-talkie days as follows:

"January	-	Tuesday, Thursday
February	-	Monday, Wednesday, Friday
March	-	Tuesday, Thursday
April	-	Monday, Wednesday, Friday
May	-	Tuesday, Thursday
June	-	Monday, Wednesday
July	-	Tuesday, Thursday
August	-	Monday, Wednesday
September	-	Monday, Thursday
October	-	Tuesday, Thursday
November	-	Monday, Wednesday, Friday
December	-	Monday, Thursday"

(6)

"The following is again the beginning of a new group of additional drops which are going to be listed in alphabetical order. (Some of these drops have been used before - a long time ago - and are okay to use again.)

"Will await your okay before we agree to use these drops again.

"JACK BROOKS

"Drop AMY - Herald Square Bar and Grill,
994 6th Avenue (37th Street) - Pick up 1:30 PM -
Acknowledge 2:05 PM at 687-9615.

"Drop BONNY - Blarney Stone, 259 W. 34th St.,
Pick up 1:10 PM - acknowledge 1:50 PM at 686-9541.

"Drop CLARA - Emerald Bar and Grill, 411 Third Ave.,
(29th St.) - Pick up 1:40 PM - Acknowledge 2:30 PM
at 679-9710.

"Drop DENA - Penn Bar and Grill, 416 8th Ave.
(31st Street) - Pick up 1:15-1:30 PM - Acknowledge
2:05 PM at 247-8618.

NY 100-134637

"Drop ETTA - Rector Bar and Restaurant,
N. W. Corner Rector and Greenwich -
Pick up at 1:40-1:55 PM - Acknowledge 2:35 PM
at 962-9002.

"Drop FREDA - White Rose Bar, 42 West 34th Street -
Pick up 2:00 PM - Acknowledge 2:50 PM at 247-8730.

"Drop GALE - Walsh's Pub and Restaurant, 402 8th
Avenue (30th St.) - Pick up 1:05-1:15 PM -
Acknowledge 2:00 PM at 687-9487."

(7)

~~Drop~~
"Sister VALERY next. If unavailable,
Drop MARY."

SAC, New York (100-134637)
(134-91)

November 21, 1967

Director, FBI (100-428091)

REGISTERED MAIL

SOLO
IS - C

MAILED 12
NOV 20 1967
COMM-FBI

Attached is ^{the final portion of} the translation which you requested by ~~xxxxx~~ airtel dated 11/3/67.

The contents thereof, where pertinent, must be reported under appropriate captions and afforded whatever investigative attention is necessary.

Disposition of the foreign language material submitted in this connection is set forth below:

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Returned herewith.

100-428091-100

100-428091-100 Sullivan (Attn.: Internal Security Section), sent direct with enclosure.

TM: cpl
(5)

Enc.

(5) ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED

6 NOV 27 1967

67 NOV 28 1967

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

TRANSLATION FROM FRENCH

The Fascist Coup d' Etat
in Greece and the Tasks of the
Greek Communist Party

Resolution of the Eleventh Plenary Session
of the
Greek Communist Party Central Committee

1. The Fascist military dictatorship installed in our country by the coup of April 21, is a dictatorship of the most reactionary circles of the Greek plutocracy, subjugated to foreigners. The dictatorship was imposed with the inspiration and direct support of the most aggressive circles of American imperialism and NATO. Behind the dictatorship are foreign monopolies, especially American monopolies.

The military dictatorship is directed against the entire nation, against its best interests, its honor and its dignity. The democratic movement has received a hard blow. The democratic conquests of the Greek people, attained at great sacrifice, have been suppressed.

A new area of tension and provocation has been created in the Eastern zone of the Mediterranean and in the Balkans. The Greek people are experiencing a new and difficult test. They will have to struggle long and hard.

The goals of the dictatorship are:

Internally: to deliver a mortal blow to the growing democratic movement which is renewing Greek society; to bring an anti-popular solution to the problems besetting the country; to overthrow by force the legal government of Cyprus and to bring about a NATO-favored solution to the Cyprus question; to leave the Greek people defenseless against the cruel exploitation of foreign monopolies.

Internationally: to reinforce the positions of the imperialists and NATO in Greece so that our country might serve as a springboard for their risky maneuvers in the Balkans and the Middle East; to deal blows

TRANSLATED BY TOM
THOMAS McLAUGHLIN, Jr.: cpl
November 16, 1967

100-428091-
ENCLOSURE

against the democratic movements of liberation and to impose Fascist regimes on other European countries; to overthrow the important movement among European governments for mutual understanding, cooperation and the organization of collective security in Europe.

2. Despite the fact that after the Palace coup in July, 1965, power was exercised by conservative-backed governments and despite the fact that the reactionary forces continued to reinforce their positions in the Army and in the government during this period, this did not succeed in putting an end to the popular struggles and the democratic movement. The change in the forces over to the side of democracy continued among the people and politicians. The influence of the Greek Communist Party and Leftists in general continued to grow. Important changes toward the side of democracy were taking place daily within the Coalition Center.

✓ The anti-constitutional, anti-democratic policies and activity of the Palace - the center of the reactionists and the Conservatives - before and after the July 15th coup, opened the way for the military dictatorship.

The reactionary forces were demonstrating two different inclinations in regard to the internal problem. The first was to accomplish an electoral coup in order to attain its objectives; the second was to establish an open military dictatorship.

The constitution of the government of Canellopoulos showed an inclination to impose an anti-democratic solution under the guise of parliamentary procedure, through elections dominated by violence and fraud.

However, for the reactionary circles of the Junta and the militarists of the United States and NATO, even the Canellopoulos solution - elections under terror and fraud - was not satisfactory, because they saw quite well that even if the election results were fixed in advance, they could not subjugate the growing democratic movement and achieve without obstacles their anti-popular and anti-national goals. These were the reasons leading to the Fascist military coup.

The recent aggravation of the international situation - the results of the aggression of American imperialism on a world scale, especially the aggression in the Near and Middle East - was an important factor hastening the establishment of the military dictatorship.

3. Under the present conditions in Greece, characterized by the active interference of Americans in our internal affairs, the existence of growing militarism, the rapprochement of conservative forces, the ERE Party and the Palace, only the unified and resolute action of democratic forces can block the road to Fascism, oppose the threat of open dictatorship and pave the way for a democratic evolution.

Despite the strengthening of the reactionary positions which had taken place, the possibilities still existed to overthrow their plans and to halt the coup. It would have been sufficient for the democratic forces, when faced with the danger of immediate dictatorship, to lead the joint struggle as the Leftists had proposed.

The responsibility for the lack of unity in the democratic forces belongs to the Union Center.

The negative attitude of the leadership of the Union Center in regard to unity, its replies and its compromises with the Conservatives, its anticommunism, its fear of any popular movement, its refusal to undertake the removal of reactionary elements in the Army, the police and the administrative apparatus; these and other factors completely impeded the march toward democracy. The final demise of the Union Center government in July, 1965, at a moment when the reactionary forces began their offensive, as well as the ultimate compromise made by the leadership of the Union Center with the Conservatives in 1966-67, weakened the unity of the democratic forces and facilitated the task of the reactionary forces.

4. During all the years of offensives launched by the reactionists and the Fascists, the Greek Communist Party and the Leftists had shown themselves to be the resolute defenders of democracy and the interests of the people. Faithful to the policy of democratic cooperation, the communists and the militants of the Left lead the struggle, along with other democrats and patriots, for liberty and the democratic rights of the Greek people.

The Greek Communist Party and the Leftists adopted a just policy for trying to join together the greatest number of popular and democratic forces in the struggle for a democratic solution to the political crisis. They offered their support to the Union Center government in 1963, and supported all positive measures taken by the latter in its program. They supported the Union Center Government in 1964, in order to thwart the direct menace of a Fascist Putsch. It was due to the unifying policy of the Greek Communist Party and the Leftists that the reactionary forces found themselves more and more

isolated, and the unity of action among democratic forces contributed to the strengthening of resistance by the people to the plans of the reactionists.

In February, 1963, when the immediate danger of a dictatorship was quite clear, the Leftists, with their five-point proposal to the opposition forces, furnished a realistic platform for a joint and concerted action aimed at blocking a coup and restoring the country to the democratic road.

5. In this difficult effort to bring a solution to the problems faced by the people and the nation, and to block the plans of the reactionists and assure a democratic resolution of the crisis, the Greek Communist Party and the Leftists, it must be admitted, were guilty of certain faults, weaknesses and errors which had their effect.

The Central Committee and the Political Bureau did not follow or study with necessary attention certain new elements, such as the growth of the strategic interest of imperialists for Greece - especially following the grave crisis which took place in the Atlantic Coalition - the increase in the dependence of the Greek Army on the imperialists and NATO, and the special role of militarists in the Greek Army.

The Greek Communist Party had adequately shown that a deep political crisis had been unleashed in July of 1965, and that the people were faced with an alternative: Fascism or democracy. However, during the latter period, it was not able to make a proper estimation of all the elements which would have shown quite well that the reactionary forces were gaining ground. The Greek Communist Party did not adequately see that thanks to the resistance and struggle of the masses, opposition between the Political Center and the Conservatives was increasing and that the reactionists were increasing their attempts to establish a policy based on compromise between the Center and the Conservatives. Therefore, the forces of the most reactionary elements were gathering strength for an open Fascist coup.

Although the Greek Communist Party had denounced the danger of a Fascist coup on more than one occasion, it directed its action toward warding off an electoral move. This was an additional reason for the lack of preparation, which helps to explain how we were surprised by the coup on April 21.

Aside from the faults, weaknesses and errors of the Conservatives in their application of unity tactics, the Greek Communist Party was guilty of a narrow-mindedness which

certainly compromised the action to gather together the democratic forces.

The Greek Communist Party was not sufficiently prepared from the ideological, organizational and technical point of view to face this situation. The principal cause of this was the serious delay in the application of measures provided for by the Eighth Congress (1961) and by other party meetings held after the Sixth Plenary Session of 1956, all of which compromised the more detailed and efficient ideological, political and organizational preparation of party militants in regard to the struggles which they would eventually have to lead.

Furthermore, the legalist illusions existing in our ranks that the situation would evolve more or less normally made it even more difficult for party ideological, political and organizational preparation to face the danger of a dictatorship and, in a general way, impeded the preparation of the people.

A serious gap in the work of the Party was the fact that it did not immediately face the problem of the Army and did not undertake activity within the armed forces.

The serious responsibility for all these omissions, weaknesses and errors in Party work falls on the Political Bureau, the Secretariate and the Central Committee.

6. Despite the fact that the Junta has assumed power and enjoys the support of its foreign patrons, its power remains in a precarious position. The Greek people are radically opposed to the dictatorship, as are the politicians and a large part of the Army officers who have been humiliated by the Colonels and their foreign supporters.

Public opinion throughout the entire world has been raised against the Junta, especially the public opinion of Europe, which views in the installation of the dictatorship in Greece the danger of Fascism knocking on the door. Numerous officials of Western countries and even members of NATO governments and associated organizations have manifested their opposition to the coup.

Even within the dictatorship there are disputes arising, especially between the Junta and the Palace, as well as dif-

difficulties arising among those responsible for the carrying out of the coup. The uncertainty and great difficulties now experienced by the Greek economy have increased the contradictions within the current regime and underlined its instability.

Disputes have also risen among the foreign imperialists who either directly or indirectly support the dictatorship.

Efforts used by the dictatorship to mask its true image and to appease the rising opposition of international opinion, such as the announcement of the forming of a new constitution and a return to parliamentary rule, merely represent a sly maneuver which must be unmasked and fought. The new constitution will be nothing more than the "legal" statute of the Fascist dictatorship.

7. On the very day of the military coup, the Greek Communist Party in a proclamation appealed to the Greek people to join together in a vast national movement encompassing all parties, organizations and individuals, without distinction as to political leanings, to attain the following goals: to overthrow the dictatorship, to restore democratic government; to restore freedom of popular expression without foreign interference. Since that time, the Greek Communist Party has not spared and will not spare any effort to bring about such a front and to mobilize the people in a fight against the dictatorship.

The constitution of a patriotic front consisting of individuals from the Left, Center and the Right, is a positive step in this direction. The Greek Communist Party feels that, with this difficult test now facing the Greek people and the destiny of the country, the best interests of the nation demand that all democratic forces cast aside their political differences, unite, and concentrate all their efforts on a program of joint action, the goal of which should be the following:

Overthrow of the dictatorship.

Restablishment of constitutional and democratic freedoms.

Freedom of action for all parties and organizations.

Liberation of all those in jail.

A general political amnesty.

Dissolution of the military Junta.

Free elections based on simple proportional measures, organized by a government consisting of all parties.

Of course, there are other, equally serious problems such as the problem of revising the constitution, and the problem of the monarchy. However, the Greek Communist Party feels that the divergency of opinion on the part of the various parties concerning these questions as well as other questions should not constitute an obstacle to coordinated action and unity of all anti-dictatorial forces on the base of a joint program and an immediate objective: the overthrow of the dictatorship.

The struggle against the dictatorship should assume the most diverse forms: from the distribution of tracts and written orders on walls, on up to strikes and street demonstrations, and eventually an open struggle on a national scale for the overthrow of the dictatorship. The form which the struggle must take throughout the nation will be determined by the course of the struggle.

Even more effective will be the unity of action among the working class, the backbone of the struggle against the dictatorship. Also necessary will be a powerful patriotic front. The organization and action of the working class vanguard against the dictatorship can give strength to the entire movement and to the entire struggle against the regime. The anti-dictatorial front in the labor movement can assume the most varied forms, such as individual committees in factories, enterprises, offices and all branches of economic activity, so as to enlist the immediate support of the economy in the struggle against the dictatorship. The activity of the unions, cooperatives and all mass organizations is of utmost importance.

The Greek Communist Party recognizes the great value of international opinion and the activity of Greeks living abroad to the struggle being waged by our people against the dictatorship. However, it feels that it is the unity and action of all forces opposed to the dictatorship within the country which will decide the issue.

8. The Plenary Session feels that the immediate and most important task of our Party is the organization of communists in the Greek Communist Party into groups based on the principles of conspiracy, vigilance and strict decentralization. All communists must organize into clandestine groups within the Greek Communist Party. Recruitment of new members, especially among the youth, is vital for the Party. Party organizations must employ all their efforts in establishing illegal technical apparatus, rigorously separated from all other activity.

Our work in the Army, in the police and all other state organizations is of utmost importance. Our propaganda

activities must be organized within the Army by all methods at the Party's disposal.

Particular attention should be accorded to Party work among immigrants and students among all Greeks living abroad, as well as seafarers. We must improve our work among political refugees, especially among the youth, in order to renew their ties with the movement in Greece and strengthen their contributions to the struggle of our people. We must work among the members and the cadre of the Party in order to underline the importance of Party vigilance and protection, something absolutely necessary today.

Under the difficult conditions imposed by the dictatorship, party unity and rallying party members around the political line and resolutions of the party are particularly important.

The Plenary Session feels that, while reorganizing structures within the Greek Communist Party, communists should also assist the reorganization of the Left and all other mass organizations.

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Greek Communist Party Central Committee, aware of the existing difficulties, appeals to all communists, party members and party sympathizers, to engage in the struggle and to maintain themselves as ardent propagandists, untiring organizers and courageous fighters in the Patriotic front against the dictatorship so as to overthrow the monarchial-Fascist regime and bring about the triumph of democracy.

ROUTE 1 F.B.I. CPE
Date: 11/21/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS-C

On 11/21/67 there were received at a Solo drop address in Chicago two communications from CG 5824-S* who is currently on Solo Mission 24.

The first of these communications was a greeting card commemorating the October Revolution of the Soviet Union which was transmitted in an envelope postmarked 11/10/67 at Moscow, USSR. The greeting card was dated 11/7/67 and bore the following message:

Dear Norma:

I hope this reaches you before thanksgiving.
Happy holidays!

/S/ James

The second communication was postmarked at Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 11/13/67, and bore the return address of JAMES CARLSON, Sheraton Hotels, Toronto, Ontario. The letter was dated 11/12/67 and bore the following message:

1-904 950
③-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

REC-71

100-428091-6596

WAB:MDW
(5)

EX 104

NOV 27 1967

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

NOV 28 1967

CG 134-46 Sub B

Dear Norma:

How are you? We are still vacationing and investigating new businesses. I suppose we will be doing this for another two weeks and then may accompany Mr. Broadman to Providence.

Mr. and Mrs. Michaels are o.k. despite the work and festivities. I hope everything at home is in good shape and that you are well. The conference on the organization of the international fashion rights will not be until sometimes in February. In the meantime squabbles on rights go on.

Mr. and Mrs. Schlitz will not give their usual party in February. Some of us won't miss it. We are tired of heavy German dishes and I for one prefer Za-zhas style anyhow.

Our weather has been really nice. Some of the family have colds and others are not so well-- but the weather is not to blame.

I hope my friend does not forget to mail this note. There is no mail chute in my hotel. Please my regards to all the family.

/S/ Jim

It is believed that the above communications have the following significance:

The first item, the greeting card, is merely an effort by CG 5824-S* to inform us that he is well and has arrived in Moscow, USSR. Beyond that, there appears to be no significance.

The second communication, the note from Toronto, was apparently furnished by CG 5824-S* to either WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary, CP of Canada, or some other CP of Canada representative at the 11/7/67 celebration in the USSR to be mailed for him from Canada. In this communication

CG 134-46 Sub B

CG 5824-S* states that as of November 12, 1967, he and CG 6653-S were still in Moscow and conducting CP, USA business. Following two weeks more of such activities, he and his wife expected to accompany GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA, to Prague, Czechoslovakia.

CG 5824-S* states that he and his wife are okay despite the work and the activities connected with the 11/7 celebration. He states that the conference on the organization of the international fashion rights (which is believed to mean the international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties) will be held sometime in 2/68.

The next paragraph appears to concern the Socialist Unity Party of Germany which will not hold its usual Congress in 2/68. In the following paragraph CG 5824-S* notes that some of the CP, USA delegates to the celebration are ill which is a common occurrence on such trips. The rest of the note is self-explanatory.

F.B.I.
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
 Date: 11/22/67

Transmit the following in _____
 (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
 (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS-C

S-R. P. [Signature]
S 4/2/68

On 11/22/67, there was received from the Soviets, by way of radio, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain text of which was as follows:

"To NY 694-S*

"We are ready to use Westbury, Long Island rendezvous for delivery of money on December 2. If meeting does not take place on December 2, it will take place on December 9th. Please confirm this radio message and your agreement on money by walkie-talkie."

The above message was given to NY 694-S* and confirmation will be given by walkie-talkie this evening at 8:15 p.m.

101-904 940
 ③-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
 1-Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)
 1-NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
 1-NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341)
 1-NY 100-134637 (41)

JFL:eac
 (8)

REC-71

100-428091-6597

6 NOV 27 1967

Approved: _____

5 NOV 28 1967

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) DATE: 11/22/67

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637) (P)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C
(REPLACEMENT AND
NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)

ReNYlets to Bureau, 11/3,9/67.

On 11/21/67, NY 694-S* advised that, during the previous week, he had subtly and with security, made known to ARNOLD JOHNSON, CP Legislative Director, that an interest existed in [redacted]. In connection, therewith, NY 694-S* communicated to JOHNSON his desire that JOHNSON make intra-Party inquiries concerning the reliability of [redacted]. NY 694-S* commented that he asked JOHNSON to have the Party investigate [redacted] so that, if at some time in the future, after utilization of [redacted] by NY 694-S*, some criticism should be made regarding the utilization of [redacted] by either GUS HALL or the Soviets.

b7D

REC-71 100-428091-6598

6 NOV 27 1967

2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (SUB C) (#41)

RJQ:jal
(3)



5 NOV 28 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: November 22, 1967

FROM: C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 11/22/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 456 GR 55, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:ccb
(7) *ccb*
Amip *W*

REC-71

100-428091-6599

NOV 27 1967

EX 104

55 NOV 28 1967

56
NR 0465 GR 055

11/22/67

32728 47712 80877 23507 50283 10642 28970 77797 29415 70453
63815 86190 42361 77022 06886 29578 73620 82049 42909 96523
92598 18593 81918 70474 12205 77141 77544 89052 52761 77472
32634 91457 22963 52328 04852 15138 95739 15666 53257 78294
10421 11661 97420 61622 91636 74405 76505 82033 37624 34501
41437 30716 89491 52130 17058

56
NR 0465 GR 055

11/22/67

TO SPRING. WE ARE READY TO USE TAN TAN FOR COLOUR PRINTS ON
DECEMBER 15 - R R R - RESERVE ON DECEMBER 12 - R - PLEASE
ON FIRM THIS DUKE AND YOUR AGREEMENT OR COLOUR PRINTS
ON POLL POLL.

100-428091-6599

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad *JC*

DATE: November 22, 1967

FROM : *JC* F. Downing

SUBJECT: *SOLO*
INTERNAL SECURITY-C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

On 11/22/67, the New York Office furnished the text of a message which the informant desired to send and requested that it be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on the same day.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:11b *ell*

(7)

1 ENCLOSURE

REC-25

100-428091-6600

6 NOV 28 1967

EX-108

6 NOV 30 1967

11/22/67

86601 67162 01023 55586 37297 19941 23/08 64117 67181 77699
21894 10331 06804 80640 92414 82177 05129 30300 18617 24868
44781 49144 93155 60589 34336 96220 41966 47365 38088 93016
20703 27134 11266 53296 56539 20941 39021 35849 33019 78186
99397 44770 03002 31455 19321 64792 87515 60736 50520 68016
99337 22410 25854 41095 36786 14875 64553 25039 45286 20159
63049 91330 86903 27107 62580 83306 46471 35432 94711 32731
38806 08014 79140 34884 21464 12724 59123 43446 80874 46838
50728 00299 67604 76495 64801 61662

ABLE KITHILL AGREE WITH YOU TO MEET AT TAN TAN DECEMBER 5TH
R DECEMBER 5TH AT 8PM. 105 PM SHARP MY TR
UNK DOOR WILL BE OPEN AND PARKING LIGHTS ON. CAR NEW MODEL LIG
HT BLUE OLDS FOUR DOOR SEDAN. ALSO AGREE TO RESERVE ARRANGEM
ENTS SAME PLACE, SAME TIME, SAME CAR. LOOKED OVER TAN AGAIN.
AREA IS OK. SPRING

100-428091-6600

ENCLOSURE

F B I

Date: 11/27/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

On 11/25/67, NY 694-S* transmitted to the Soviets,
 via a NYC drop, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain
 text of which was as follows:

"CCCPSU URGENT

"Agree with you to meet at Westbury, Long Island,
 rendezvous on December 2nd at 8:05 PM sharp. My trunk
 door will be open, and my parking lights on. Car - new model,
 light blue Oldsmobile four-door sedan. Also agree to
 reserve arrangements - same place, same time, same car.
 Looked over rendezvous again. Area is O.K.

"JACK BROOKS

"Drop MARY next. If unavailable, drop RITA."

(Re above, see NY airtel 11/22/67.)

EX 101

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)
 1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
 1 - NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341)
 1 - New York (41)

JFL:msb
 (8)

REC-8

100-428091-6601
 6 NOV 30 1967

Approved: _____

Sent _____ M Per _____

67 DEC 4 1967

Special Agent in Charge

SAC, New York

b7D

11/22/67

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

1 - Mr. Rozamus

CPUSA - TOPLEV
IS - C

12-17
Bourlet dated 10/31/67 pointing out that two of your Agents assigned to the Toplev Program have been reassigned to the Solo operation. In view of this, referenced letter requests authority to recontact a Toplev subject at his residence at the discretion of the Agents on the scene if the subject is not otherwise readily available and that in selective cases, after a subject has shown a friendly attitude, that a reinterview be conducted in a secure area by one Toplev Agent alone.

Current instructions pertaining to the Toplev Program permit the SAC to approve contacts with a Toplev subject at his place of residence by surprise. Furthermore, after such a contact, the subject is not to be recontacted at his residence.

Authority is granted to recontact a Toplev subject at his residence if he is not otherwise readily available. The recontact should be made by two Agents. During the recontact, the Agents must be constantly alert to any attempts of the subject to record the conversation or to compromise the Agents in any manner. The interview should be immediately terminated if the subject acts suspiciously. Under no circumstances should a second recontact be made at a subject's residence.

Authority is also granted to have one Toplev Agent reinterview a subject in a secure area if the subject has previously shown a somewhat cooperative attitude. Under no circumstances should the subject be contacted at his residence by one Toplev Agent.

When submitting results of initial contact with a Toplev subject, set forth in your letter your observations as to whether the subject is being considered for possible recontact at his residence or interview being handled in a secure area by one Agent.

① - 100-428091 (Solo)

MJR:sss (5)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

53 NOV 30 1967

DUPLICATE YELLOW

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-3-99-2127

Letter to SAC, New York
RE: CPUSA - TOPLEV
100-3-99

NOTE:

The New York Office has been utilizing four Agents on full-time basis conducting interviews under the Toplev Program. Two of the Agents have been assigned to the Solo operation. In view of the fact that only experienced, specially-trained personnel are being used on the Toplev Program, New York Office being authorized to make recontact at a subject's home or to have only one Agent contact the subject when found in a secure area. This will make up for the loss of two Agents assigned to the Solo operation.

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99)

10/31/67

SAC, NEW YORK b7D

CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS-C

ReNYlet dated 10/25/67, captioned, "SOLO, IS-C", wherein it is recommended on page four that two Toplev agents be reassigned to the project of obtaining replacements for NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S*, thereby reducing the complement of the Toplev Program in the NYO to two agents.

In order to maintain the quality and effectiveness of the Toplev Program and also, in some measure, to continue the statistical achievements under reduced forces, it is recommended that the following modifications be allowed in the regulations of the program.

1. On certain occasions Toplev agents spend considerable time waiting for subjects, who have irregular work habits, to depart their residence so that interviews may be conducted under existing rules. This is done even though it is known subjects are in their residence alone. It is recommended on reinterviews, when it has been ascertained subject is not readily available for interview under existing regulations and conditions are secure, that contact be made at subjects residence at the discretion of the SAS on the scene.

2. In selected cases where subject has displayed a somewhat friendly attitude and it is believed that a reinterview can be conducted without causing embarrassment, such interviews be conducted by one Toplev agent alone. This will permit the second agent to either conduct a similar type interview at another location or free him to make preliminary investigation essential to set up another interview where both agents will be needed.

Under all circumstances, subjects being approached for the first time should be interviewed in strict accordance with outstanding provisions of the program, thereby assuring the security, surprise and confidential nature of the contact. The NYO is of the opinion that the modifications recommended above will accolorate interviews and, in some measure, make up for the loss of the two agents who are being reassigned to the SOLO operation.

3-Bureau (100-3-99) (RM)
(1-100-423091) (SOLO)
1-NY (41)
JPH:eac
(4)

b7D

100-423091-
NOT RECORDED
165 NOV 3 1967

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-3-99-310-1

Letter to SAC, NY
11/22/67
MJA:SSS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: November 27, 1967

FROM : G. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 11/27/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:ccb
(7)

REC 8

RECEIVED

100-428091-6602

EX 101

NOV 30 1967

67 DEC 4 - 1967

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

11/30/67

Airtel

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R.C. Putnam

To: SAC, Chicago (134-46 sub B)

From: Director, FBI (100-428091) 6603

REC 16

SOLO
IS - C

LT-102

Reurairtel 11/28/67 requesting authority for Special Agents Walter A. Boyle and Robert A. Villemure, contacting Agents for CG 5824-S*, to proceed to informant's point of arrival in the U. S. as soon as specific information is received in that regard in order that a debriefing of informant can commence without delay.

Authority is granted to send SAs Boyle and Villemure to meet informant as soon as specific date and place of arrival in U. S. is received. Debriefing of informant must be handled expeditiously and the Bureau immediately advised by teletype of pertinent intelligence data developed by informant while on 24th Solo Mission.

RCP:jav


(8)

NOTE:

See cover memorandum C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan dated 11/29/67 captioned as above as prepared by RCP:est.

1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 FB)

DS
Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____



79 DEC 6 - 1967

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 11/28/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS-C

As the Bureau is aware, CG 5824-S* has been abroad on Solo Mission 24 since 10/19/67. By airtel of 11/21/67 the Bureau was informed of the receipt of a communication from CG 5824-S* dated 11/12/67 in which he stated he expected to remain in Moscow for approximately two additional weeks at which time he might then proceed to Prague, Czechoslovakia. In light of the above and as a result of past experience, we would anticipate that CG 5824-S* may be returning to the U.S. sometime during the first week in 12/67.

During the period of CG 5824-S*'s travel, he was in company with GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA, and undoubtedly participated in numerous high level discussions concerning the international communist movement, socialist aid to Vietnam, and other subjects of interest to the U.S. As a consequence, intensive debriefing of CG 5824-S* should be initiated immediately upon his arrival in the U.S. to insure that the Bureau has first access to the information in his possession. Following such trips it has been customary for CG 5824-S* to spend some time in briefing members of the CP, USA leadership upon his return and this would probably cause an extensive delay in obtaining

1-904 940
③-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago
WAB:MDW
(5)

6 DEC 1 1967

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

Miss C.D. Sullivan & Sullivan
11/29/67
Ref per

CP
S-R
S-USA
JH

EX-102
DEC 16

100-428091-6603

CG 134-46 Sub-B

this intelligence data were we not to contact him immediately upon his arrival. In addition, in order to insure absolute completeness and accuracy of all information received from CG 5824-S* and in order to expedite the handling and dissemination of this information in a manner most advantageous to the government, it is considered essential that this debriefing be carried out by the two contacting agents.

In light of the above, the agents responsible for the handling of CG 5824-S* have been alerted and are prepared to take the necessary action for the initiation of immediate debriefing of this source. From past experience, we believe CG 5824-S* most likely will enter the U.S. at Boston, Massachusetts, and after a brief stop there will proceed probably to NYC for conferences with the CP, USA leadership and with NY 694-S*. If the contacting agents proceed to the informant's point of entry into the U.S., discreet and secure contact will be made there, thus enabling immediate debriefing and expeditious handling of the most pertinent intelligence information in his possession. This debriefing would then continue by these agents in NYC both prior and during the period the informant is conferring in NYC.

Recommendation

In light of the above, it is recommended that the contacting agents, SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and ROBERT A. VILLEMURE, be authorized to proceed to the informant's point of entry into the U.S. as soon as specific information is received as to his destination. If this travel is authorized, the estimated cost to the Bureau is as follows if the informant arrives at Boston and proceeds to NYC:

Jet coach air transportation for two from Chicago to Boston to NYC and return at \$109.79 per agent	\$219.58
Per diem at \$16 per day for two agents for approximately 4 days	128.00
Ground transportation at Chicago, Boston, and NYC for two agents	<u>15.00</u>
Total	\$362.58

FBI

Date: 11/28/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS-C5- R. P. Dwyer
J. H.

ReCGairtel dated 11/21/67.

On the evening of 11/27/67 there was received at the NORMA HANSEL Solo drop address in Chicago a communication from CG 5824-S* who is currently on Solo Mission 24. This communication was postmarked at Prague, Czechoslovakia, on both 10/23/67 and 10/25/67. The communication itself was dated "Sunday PM" (10/22/67). The text of the letter was as follows:

"Dear Norma:

"The weather is fine and clear. This means I will leave tomorrow to join my tour party and also visit Mr. Schlitz, who knows I am on the way.

"Some export agencies here changed personnel but I was informed too late to change plans and save a day of valuable time.

"Mildred and her family send their regards. I am mailing a few catalogs under separate cover. This being winter it should take a few weeks surface mail.

1-904 940
③-Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

1-Chicago

WAB:MDW

(5)

REC-10 EX-113

100-428091-6604

G DEC 1 1967

Approved: _____

Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

67 DEC 5 - 1967

CG 134-46 Sub B

"I will close with all my best as always. If the opportunity presents itself I'll raise the question of a wedding invitation with Mr. Schlitz so be well and take care of yourself Norma. Again all my love.

/S/ George"

It is noted that this communication was sent by CG 5824-S* prior to the transmission of the communications whose texts were set forth in reCGairtel. The significance of the delay in the receipt of the current communication cannot be ascertained with certainty by this office. However, as the Bureau has pointed out to this office previously, the NORMA HANSEL address is known to [redacted] which may have occasioned the delay in the forwarding of this letter. As noted by our office at that time, the fact that communications to this drop come under the scrutiny of [redacted] does not, in our opinion, affect the security of the use of this means of communication by CG 5824-S*. b7E

This office interprets this communication as follows:

CG 5824-S* was apparently leaving Prague, Czechoslovakia, to join the rest of the CP, USA delegation to the 11/7 celebration on Monday, 10/23/67. The reference to "export agencies" may have been intended by CG 5824-S* to refer to the International Department of the Central Committee, CP of Czechoslovakia. Perhaps his usual contacts in that Department have been assigned to other duties and therefore this occasioned some delay in CG 5824-S*'s travel plans.

The reference to "MILDRED and her family" and to "catalogs" is not clear to this office. We would hazard the guess that CG 5824-S* is referring to the "World Marxist Review" and to the fact that he has separately transmitted a number of books or periodicals which are not of pressing importance.

The last paragraph appears to refer to an invitation to the 11/7 celebration for CG 6653-S which CG 5824-S* would raise with the CP of the Soviet Union, which subsequently was communicated to us by radio, following which CG 6653-S departed to join CG 5824-S* on Solo Mission 24.

CG 134-46 Sub B

From the references herein, it appears that the references to "Mr. SCHLITZ", which also appeared in the communication from CG 5824-S* dated 11/12/67, were not correctly interpreted by this office.

The use of the word "SCHLITZ" is apparently intended to evoke thought of the word "Milwaukee" which is a common reference of CG 5824-S* to mean Moscow or the CP of the Soviet Union and its officials. Therefore, in the 11/12/67 communication, having informed us that the conference to organize the international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties would be held in 2/68, CG 5824-S* intended to further inform us that this conference would not be held in Moscow, USSR, but rather in Budapest, Hungary, which information has subsequently appeared in the U.S. press of 11/25/67.

It is noted that for the return address on this communication CG 5824-S* used "George Hansel, Box 7346, Chicago 60680, Illinois." For the information of the Bureau, this office does not use box 7346 either for CG 5824-S* or for any other purpose. However, it is noted that a Solo drop box in the name of MILTON ADAMS is maintained by this office which bears the number 4367 which is a major transposition of the numbers used by CG 5824-S*.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *[Signature]*

DATE: November 29, 1967

FROM : *[Signature]* G. F. Downing

SUBJECT: *[Signature]* SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

[Signature] Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 11/29/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 198 GR 54, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

ACTION:

For information.

[Handwritten signature]
5- *[Handwritten signature]*

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

[Signature] HS:ccb

(7) *[Signature]*

[Signature]
ENCLOSURE

REC-10

EX-113

100-428091-6605

DEC 4 1967

67 DEC 5 - 1967

11/29/67

NR 0198 GR 054

11/29/67

12520 71953 91110 56030 15811 25603 65065 47627 36122 69581
42016 41968 56380 30163 26118 75835 59451 98674 98988 05996
10592 49473 20846 27816 32941 16760 31881 21392 87314 46543
20036 07410 39006 97015 88734 96613 34489 36380 12144 00467
49944 97026 98046 23815 49673 75809 92655 99919 27702 07453
65013 64925 69519 11776

NR 0198 GR 054

11/29/67

^T
ZOSPRING. WE AGREE TO MEET YOU AT TAN AT 0805 P.M. OUR SI
GNAL REGARDING VALERY VALERY DROPPED WAS MADE AT THE AGREED
TIME. BUT TELEPHONE WAS OUT OF ORDER. SIGNAL WAS MADE 10 MI
NUTES LATER. ~~ASSETS~~

100-428091-6605

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 11/29/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS-C

On 11/29/67, there was received from the Soviets,
 via radio, a ciphered-partially coded message, the plain text
 of which was as follows:

"To NY 694-S*

"We agree to meet you at the Westbury, Long
 Island, rendezvous at 8:05 PM. Our confirmation signal
 regarding the VALERY drop was made at the agreed time but
 telephone was out of order. Signal was made ten minutes
 later."

(Re above, see NY airtels 11/22 and 27/67)

1 - 904, 910
 3 - Bureau (RM)
 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM) REC-10
 1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
 1 - NY 105-14931 (TALANOV) (341)
 1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

JFL:msb
 (8)

EX-113

100-428091-6606
6 DEC 4 1967

Approved: _____

67 DEC 5 - 1967

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

FBI NEW YORK 1

244AM URGENT 12-5-67 WMS

TO DIRECTOR 100-428091 AND CHICAGO 134-46 SUB B

FROM NEW YORK 100-134637

--ENCODED--

VIA TELETYPE

DEC 5 1967

ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

SOLO, IS-C.

CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR DASH S ASTERICK AND CG SIX SIX FIVE
THREE DASH S ASTERICK RETURNED TO UNITED STATES AT NYC DECEMBER
FOUR LAST FROM TWENTY FOURTH SOLO MISSION WHICH BEGAN OCTOBER
NINETEENTH LAST. CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR DASH S ASTERICK TOTALLY
EXHAUSTED AND IN VERY POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION. AS RESULT, SOURCE
UNABLE TO FURNISH SUMMARY OF HIGHLIGHT OF MISSION AT THIS TIME.

ON THIS MISSION SOURCE ADVISITED MOSCOW, USSR, AND PRAGUE,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. WAS MEMBER OF CPUSA DELIGATION TO CELEBRATION
OF FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF OCTOBER REVOLUTION IN
MOSCOW. PARTICIPATED IN MEETINGS WITH NUMEROUS LEADERS OF WORLD
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, INCLUDING MIKHAIL A. SUSLOV, MEMBER OF
POLITICAL BUREAU (PB) AND SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC),
COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION (CPSU); BORIS N. PONOMAREV,
SECRETARY OF CC, CPSU; MIKHAIL S. SOLOMENTSEV, SECRETARY OF CC,
CPSU; MIKHAIL K. POLONIK, KGB OFFICER WHO HEADS SOLO
OPERATION FOR CPSU; LE DUAN, FIRST SECRETARY OF WORKING PEOPLES PARTY
OF VIETNAM; GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP, DEFENSE MINISTER OF DEMONCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM; DELEGATION FROM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF
SOUTH VIETNAM; AND NUMEROUS OTHER COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS.

END PAGE ONE

XEROX

67 DEC 8 1967

REC-49

EX 101

6 DEC 7 1967

PAGE TWO

DETAILS CONCERNING ABOVE AND OTHER MEETINGS WILL BE OBTAINED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE COMMENSURATE WITH PHYSICAL CONDITION OF SOURCE. HE EXPECTS TO REMAIN IN NYC FOR SEVERAL DAYS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH GUS HALL, GENERAL SECRETARY, CPUSA, AND NY SIX NINE FOUR DASH S ASTERICK. SUMMARY OF MISSION WILL BE OBTAINED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND FURNISHED TO BUREAU BY TELETYPE FOLLOWED BY LHM.
END

DHH FBI WASH DC

JCM-FTB-048

113.
1127
1127
cc-Mr. Putnam

~~I WANT TO CHECK ON A NAME ON THE FIRST PAGE ON LINE 6 FROM~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637)

12/8/67

Director, FBI (100-428091) — 66081 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

REC-25

EX 101

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet 12/1/67, which set forth contemplated procedure to purchase U. S. savings bonds for NY 694-S*.

Procedure set forth in relet is acceptable.

1 - Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

NOTE:

As a result of the recent Solo conference, it was proposed that the savings accounts maintained for NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S*, which were each augmented by \$100 per month, were to be converted to U. S. savings bonds. This change, made to avoid complicated interest-tax problems, was approved by the Director. ReNYlet advised of conversion of savings account for NY 694-S* to savings bonds and stated that in the future \$100 monthly payment would be held up until \$300 was accumulated and one \$400 bond would be purchased with this sum each quarter. This approach is reasonable.

RCP:cst cat
(6)

MAILED 12

DEC 8 1967

COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

67 DEC 12 1967

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 12/1/67

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

5- R. B. Butner

ReBulet 11/6/67 instructing New York and Chicago to convert savings accounts maintained for NY 694-S* and CG 5824-S* into U. S. Savings Bonds.

Savings accounts maintained for NY 694-S* at the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank and at the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company have been closed, total deposits in these banks having been \$18,105.38. With this money, the NYO has purchased, in the names of NY 694-S* and his wife, Series E, U. S. Savings Bonds with a face value of \$24,125.00, the cost thereof being \$18,093.75. To avoid bookkeeping complications, the balance of \$11.63 will be given in cash to NY 694-S*, UACB. *2*

In future, to simplify the administrative handling of the purchase of bonds, the NYO, at three month intervals, and with the \$300.00 owing to the informant at such intervals, will purchase for him and his wife bonds with a face value of \$400.00. It is therefore contemplated that for the period November 1, 1967, to January 31, 1968, \$300.00 which will be then owing to the informant, will be invested in E Bonds of the face value of \$400.00.

It is requested that the Bureau advise whether the above-described contemplated procedure is approved.

- 1- 904, 9+D*
2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (RM)
1 - New York (41)

EX 101

100-428091-6608

ACB:msb
(4)

REC-25

6 DEC 8 1967

*Let to SAC, NY
1-cc
ACB:msb
12/8/67*



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

DATE: 12/1/67

ReCGlet dated November 3, 1967.

In view of the fact that CG 5824-S* has been absent from the Chicago Division during the entire month of November, 1967, no transactions have taken place involving Solo funds or reserve funds located in this territory. Therefore, totals on hand remain as before:

Balance of funds on hand,
December 1, 1967

Solo Funds

\$123,711.35

Reserve Funds

1,143.61

Total funds on hand \$124,854.96

- ②-Bureau (RM)
- 2-New York (RM)
 - (1 - 100-128861 (CP, USA - Reserve Funds)
 - (1 - 100-134637 (SOLO)
- 1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(5)

REC-25

EX 101

DEC 8 1967



67 DEC 12 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 12/4/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS-C

On 12/2/67, pursuant to previously made arrangements (see NY airtel 11/27/67), NY 694-S* met his Soviet contact, NIKOLAI TALANOV, at a Westbury, Long Island, rendezvous. TALANOV was accompanied by an unidentified Soviet, who drove the Soviet automobile.

TALANOV delivered to NY 694-S* two bundles containing \$500,000.00 -- \$150,000.00 in \$50. bills, \$300,000.00 in \$20. bills, and \$50,000.00 in \$10. bills.

NY 694-S* gave to TALANOV a small "squeaky" doll for the latter to use in sending signals via walky-talky. NY 694-S* uses a similar doll in sending signals to the Soviets via walky-talky.

There was no conversation between TALANOV and NY 694-S*, but when the transfer of the money had been completed, TALANOV gave NY 694-S* a piece of paper containing messages to the following effect:

1-904, 9+D

- (3) Bureau (RM)
 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)
 1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
 1 - NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341)
 1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

ACB:msb
 (8)

EX-101

REC-25
 DEC 11 1967

6 DEC 8 1967

Approved: _____

Sent _____ M Per _____

67 DEC 12 1967

Special Agent in Charge

NY 100-134637

\$500,000.00 was being delivered to NY 694-S*, and the said informant was to acknowledge by telephone signal call to either telephone #752-9388 or 752-9360, at 11:00 PM on 12/2/67, or at 11:00 AM on 12/3/67, that the transfer had been concluded without incident.

To acknowledge the Soviet signal that a drop was to be made, NY 694-S* was to make signal phone calls as follows:

January and February, 1968:	473-8751 or 473-8707
March and April, 1968:	695-8358
May and June, 1968:	563-8183

Soviet drops, and the hours for pickups at possible drops, were to be in accordance with a drop schedule previously agreed upon by TALANOV and NY 694-S* with respect to drops made by NY 694-S*.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO:

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 12/4/67

FROM:

SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637-SUB A)

SUBJECT:

SOLO
IS-C

Remylet, 11/3/67.

The records of the New York Office reflect the following information regarding the SOLO Fund during the period 11/1/67-11/30/67.

11/1/67 On hand as of 10/31/67 \$631,282.98

Credits

None during November, 1967.

Debits

None during November, 1967.

Balance

Total on Hand as of 11/30/67 \$631,282.98

Location of SOLO Funds
New York Office Territory

REC-25

Safe deposit box Chemical Bank -
New York Trust Company, 67 Broad
Street, New York, New York \$ 10,000.00

Jack Brooks Regular Checking
Accounts Chemical Bank - New York
Trust Company, 20 Pine Street,
New York, New York
Account No. 1 (001-228919) \$ 13,259.28
Account No. 2 (001-232835) 32,345.92
Account No. 3 (001-237942) 48,677.78

1-704, 9-8

- 2 - Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
- 1 - Chicago (134-46-SUB F) (AM RM)
- 1 - New York (100-128861-SUB B) (CPUSA-RESERVE FUND) (41)
- 1 - New York (134-91) (INV) (41)
- 1 - New York (100-134637-SUB A) (41)



5010-108

1 JFL:amd
(6)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637-SUB A

NY 694-S* Personal Checking Account,
Chemical Bank, New York Trust
Company, 67 Broad Street, New York,
New York

\$ - 4,000.00

Maintained by NYC - FBI

Safe Deposit Boxes Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Company, 69th Street
and Third Avenue, New York, New
York

\$523,000.00

Total as of 11/30/67 \$631,282.98

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: December 5, 1967

- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

This is to advise you of the safe return of CG 5824-S* and his wife, CG 6653-S, from Solo Mission 24 to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

You will recall that CG 5824-S* and his wife departed on Solo Mission 24 on 10/19/67. They returned to New York City on 12/4/67. CG 5824-S* is completely exhausted and in very poor physical condition and has not, as yet, been able to furnish a summary of his mission.

During his 46-day mission, CG 5824-S* was a member of the delegation from the Communist Party, USA, which participated in the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the "Great October Revolution" in Moscow. Informant also visited Prague, Czechoslovakia, where he contacted Czech officials relative to Communist Party, USA, business. While on this mission, CG 5824-S* participated in meetings with numerous leaders of the world communist movement, including Mikhail Suslov, Boris Ponomarev, and Mikhail Solomentsev, Secretaries of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Mikhail K. Polonik, Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) official who heads the Solo Operation for the Soviets; Le Duan, First Secretary, Working Peoples Party (Communist Party) of North Vietnam; General Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese Defense Minister; and numerous other communist delegations.

Informant expects to remain in New York City for several days to confer with Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA. New York will expedite debriefing of informant commensurate with informant's physical condition and security precautions to protect his contacts with Bureau Agents.

LE 100-428091

DEC 2 WGS:cst
(5)

REC-25

100-428091-6612

CONTINUED - OVER

EX 101

6 DEC 8 1967

67 DEC 12 1967

COPY SENT TO MR. TOLSON

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

ACTION:

For information. As soon as specific details are available, you will be advised and information of interest will be promptly disseminated to top officials of the Government.

WEL
WCS
WCS
K
WCS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *HC*

DATE: December 5, 1967

FROM : C. F. Downing *CFD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 12/5/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

5-R. Putnam *2*

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:ccb
(7) ccb
W

REC-25 *100-428091-6613*
EX 101 _____

DEC 8 1967

— 7, 14

67 DEC 12 1967

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

II SUMMARY Date 12/6/67

The attached summarizes highlights of information obtained by CG 5824-S* on Solo mission to the Soviet Union, 10/19/67 to 12/4/67. This information includes: Efforts will be made to hold an international meeting of "communist and workers parties." The Communist Party, Soviet Union, successfully utilized the 50th anniversary celebration to mobilize the international communist movement. The breach in the Sino-Soviet dispute remains wide. Vietnamese leaders in the Soviet Union showed no slackening of morale or will to fight. A KGB officer wants Solo apparatus used for only confidential, urgent, and illegal matters. Communist Party, Soviet Union, subsidy of Communist Party, USA, for 1968 is to be determined.

Upon receipt of complete details, dissemination will expeditiously be made to top Government officials under a "~~Top Secret~~" classification.

WLS:bjr

6614

FBI NEW YORK 3

235AM URGENT 12-6-67 WMS

TO DIRECTOR 100-428091

VIA TELETYPE

DEC 6 1967

ENCIPHERED

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM NEW YORK 100-134637

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
SOLO, IS-6

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Bishop	✓
Mr. Casper	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. Conrad	✓
Mr. Felt	✓
Mr. Gale	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Miss Holmes	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

RENYTEL TWELVE FIVE LAST.

ON DECEMBER FIVE LAST CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR DASH
ASTERICK FURNISHED FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS FROM TWENTY-FOURTH
SOLO MISSION WHICH BEGAN OCTOBER NINETEEN LAST AND ENDED DECEMBER
FOUR LAST.

ONE. PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL MEETING OF COMMUNIST
AND WORKERS PARTIES. AS LATER ANNOUNCED IN PRESS, MEETING OF
PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR SUCH INTERNATIONAL MEETING WILL BE
HELD IN BUDAPEST, HUNGARY DURING FEBRUARY NEXT. ACCORDING
TO MIKHAIL A. SUSLOV, MEMBER OF POLITICAL BUREAU (PB) AND
SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC), COMMUNIST PARTY OF
SOVIET UNION (CPSU), SUCH MEETING ITSELF WILL NOT TAKE PLACE
DURING NINETEEN SIXTY-EIGHT. THERE WILL FIRST BE SERIES OF
THREE OR FOUR PREPARATORY COMMISSION MEETINGS, THE SECOND PERHAPS
TAKING PLACE IN WARSAW, POLAND, WITH PARTICIPATION OPEN TO
ANY CP WHICH DESIRES TO ATTEND. CPSU HOPES IN THIS MANNER
THAT PRESSURE FOR SUCH MEETING WILL ARISE THROUGHOUT WORLD
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT RATHER THAN FROM CPSU ALONE, ALTHOUGH CPSU
WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR MEETING WHETHER OTHER PARTIES RESPOND

OR NOT. XEROX

67 DEC 12 1967

END PAGE ONE DEC 1967

PAGE TWO

TWO. CELEBRATION OF FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF OCTOBER
REVOLUTION MOSCOW, USSR; SOURCE ATTENDED CELEBRATION AS
OFFICIAL DELEGATE OF CPUSA TOGETHER WITH ^{CPUSA} SPUSA LEADERS GUS
HALL, HENRY WINSTON, JAMES JACKSON AND ALBERT LIMA. IN
OPINION OF SOURCE, CPSU SUCCESSFULLY UTILIZED CELEBRATION
TO MOBILIZE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN EFFORT TO UNIFY WORLD COMMUNISM
BEHIND POLICIES OF SOVIET UNION AND IN ATTACK ON "US
IMPERIALISM." GREATER EMPHASIS THAN EVER BEFORE WAS PLACED
ON MILITARY PREPAREDNESS OF USSR NOT ONLY TO CONVINCE BIG
POWERS SUCH AS US BUT ALSO TO IMPRESS SMALLER NATIONS AND
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS THAT USSR IS PREPARED TO ACT
AS ALLY OF "OPPRESSED PEOPLES" WILLING TO ^{STAND} ~~STAND~~ UP TO
"US IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM."

THREE. SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. SOURCE WAS BROUGHT UP TO
DATE ON STATUS OF CHINESE-SOVIET RELATIONS. BREACH BETWEEN
THESE TWO POWERS REMAINS WIDE AND THERE APPEARS NO
^FFORESEEABLE END SO LONG AS CURRENT LEADERSHIPS REMAIN IN
POWER. SOURCE WAS FURNISHED DOCUMENTS DETAILING SOVIET
VERSION OF CHINESE SPLITTING ACTIVITIES IN WORLD COMMUNIST
MOVEMENT AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AS WELL AS
CHINESE IMPEDIMENTS TO SOVIET AID TO VIETNAM.
END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

FOUR. VIETNAM. SOURCE MET WITH LEADERS OF DEMOCRATIC
(DRV)
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH
(NLF SV)
VIETNAM, INCLUDING LE DUAN, FIRST SECRETARY OF WORKING
PEOPLES PARTY OF VIETNAM; VO NGUYEN GIAP, DEFENSE MINISTER
OF DRV; AND DANG TRAN THI, MEMBER OF PRESIDUM OF CC,
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
NLF SV. VIETNAMESE LEADERS SHOWED NO SLACKENING OF MORALE
OR WILL TO FIGHT AND STATED THAT USSR IS NOW SUPPLYING THEM
WITH NEW WEAPONS NOT YET USED IN VIETNAM. THEY ASKED
INCREASED EFFORTS BY CPUSA IN DEMANDING CESSATION OF BOMBING OF
NORTH VIETNAM AND WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS.

FIVE. SOLO APPRATUS. MIKHAIL S. POLONIK, KGB OFFICER IN
CHARGE OF SOLO APPRATUS STATED MAIN GOAL IS TO CONSERVE
APPRATUS. WANT APPRATUS USED FOR ONLY MOST CONFIDENTIAL AND
URGENT MATTERS AND NOT FOR ROUTINE OR MATTER NOT ILLEGAL.

SIX. CPSU SUBSIDY OF CPUSA FOR NINETEEN SIXTY-EIGHT.
SOURCE PRESENTLY REQUEST FOR ANNUAL SUBSIDY IN AMOUNT SIMILAR
TO REQUESTS OF PAST YEARS DURING WHICH CPSU HAS FURNISHED CPUSA
ONE MILLION DOLLARS. CPSU ADVISED THAT ANSWER COULD NOT BE
FURNISHED BEFORE END OF DECEMBER OR EARLY JANUARY NEXT.

DEBRIEFING OF SOURCE CONTINUING COMMENSURATE WITH
SOURCE'S HEALTH AND AVAILABILITY SINCE HE ANTICIPATES
DISCUSSIONS WITH GUS HALL DECEMBER SIX INSTANT.

MEMO
WILL FOLLOW.
AIR-MAIL
AM COPY TO CHICAGO.

END

DHH FBI WASH DC

CWB-FTO-DHH

cc- Mr. Butnam

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 12/3/67

Solo. is the code word which refers to the liaison operation performed by our informants for the Communist Party, USA, with other communist parties of the world. Attached refers to delivery of second half of Soviet subsidy for the Communist Party, USA, for 1967. Delivery of this \$500,000 brings the total received by the Communist Party, USA, from the Soviets since September, 1958 to \$5,217,745.19.

Information regarding receipt of these funds is not to be disseminated in order to protect this most sensitive operation.

JHK:cop

CB/AT

WCS/ant

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

VIA TELETYPE

DEC 2 1967

ENCIPHERED

2/7 ,/6 &

NY 4

1115 PM URGENT 12-2-67 WAH

TO DIRECTOR (100-428091)

FROM NEW YORK (100-134637) 1P

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - Communist
IS-6

ON DECEMBER TWO, ¹⁹⁶⁷ ONE NINE SIX SEVEN AS PREVIOUSLY
ARRANGED, NY SIX NINE FOUR DASH S ASTERISK MET
HIS SOVIET CONTACT NIKOLAI TALANOV AT THE WESTBURY
LONG ISLAND RENDEZVOUS. AT THIS MEETING TRANSFERRED
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS TO THE SOURCE.
END

\$

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REC'D
DEC 4 8 13 AM '67
EX-104

100-428091-6615

6 DEC 8 1967

REC'D
DEC 4 3 07 PM '67

67 DEC 12 1967

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637)

12/8/67

REC 7

Director, FBI (100-428091) - 6616

1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet 12/5/67.

Based upon the necessity of maintaining the cover office for the Solo Operation in the Sheraton Whitehall Building, authority is granted to make the \$25 payment as requested.

1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)


NOTE:

In the Solo Operation, a cover office is maintained in the Sheraton Whitehall Building in New York City. This cover is vital to the success and continued security of the Operation and has proved to be a definite asset. To maintain appearances, we must operate as any other tenant in the building and contribute to the Christmas Fund of the building employees. To do otherwise would cause undue interest in the activities of this office which would be detrimental to our Operation.

RCP:cst

(6)

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____



67 DEC 12 1967

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE 10 ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 12/5/67

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReNYlet 12/7/66, requesting authorization for the NYO to contribute \$25.00 to the Sheraton Whitehall Building Employees' Christmas Fund, and Bulet 12/14/66 granting such authority.

Since, as reflected in the referenced correspondence, it is necessary to maintain good relations with the Sheraton Whitehall Corporation, it is requested that the Bureau authorize the payment of \$25.00 by the NYO to the 1967 Sheraton Whitehall Building Employees' Christmas Fund.

1-904, 9+8
2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (41)

ACB:msb
(3)

REC 7

100-428091-6616

DEC 8 1967



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 12/6/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS-C

On 12/5/67, there was received at a NYC mail drop an envelope postmarked Toronto, Canada, containing a message in Spanish, the translation of which is as follows:

"Telegram

"National Committee, Communist Party, United States
 New York

"The Central Committee, Venezuelan Communist Party, enthusiastically endorses the 45th anniversary of the 'Worker,' invaluable instrument in the struggle of the North American people against the international capitalistic monopoly, against racial segregation, for the rights of workers, and for the liberty of other people. We desire to extend our best wishes to all the personnel of the paper.

"Central Committee,
 Venezuelan Communist Party"

It is believed that the above message was transmitted by the Venezuelan CP to the CP of Canada.

1- 904, 9+0
 3 - Bureau (RM)
 1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)
 1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
 1 - New York (41)

ACB:msb
 (7)

REC 7

100-428091-6617

EX-102

a DEC 8 1967

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

67 DEC 12 1967

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE 10 ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 11/29/67

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReCGlet dated October 2, 1967, and CGlet dated October 26, 1967, concerning efforts to locate a suitable replacement and leg man for CG 5824-S* and the development of additional informants for insertion in the Solo apparatus.

Due to his continuing illness, no positive action has yet been taken to interview [redacted]. Because of the vital importance of this interview to the success of the Chicago program, continuing consideration is being given to alternative plans and approaches. Results of this study of the [redacted] approach will be furnished to the Bureau by separate communication.

In view of the absence of CG 5824-S* on the current Solo Mission, the list of CP, USA leaders from the New York District, provided by the New York Office, has not yet been reviewed by him. Providing time and the informant's health permit, this may be accomplished during the coming month. However, it is noted that debriefing from the current Solo Mission will take precedence and customarily is a lengthy process.

The development of [redacted] is continuing with the objective of his acceptance by [redacted] in the role of leg man. Although transferred to the [redacted] of the Illinois District, CP, USA, the [redacted] as CG 5824-S* [redacted] is as yet unassigned. Therefore, during the past month [redacted] has been instructed to contact LOU DISKIN, member of the National Committee, CP, USA, to pursue his assignment in that section. [redacted] has not done so up to this time since the proper opportunity for a private discussion of this subject with DISKIN has not yet presented itself. This he will do at the earliest suitable time.

2-Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (RM)

1-Chicago

WAB:MDW
(4)



67 DEC 11 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

The Bureau has been previously informed concerning the young [redacted] who we believe has outstanding potential for development and eventual use in the Solo operation. By letter dated November 22, 1967, Chicago requested Bureau authority to guide and control the activities of this individual, [redacted] and to commence his development as a PSI.

b6
b7C
b7D

Upon receipt of Bureau approval, [redacted] activities will be so directed as to foster his potentialities for the Solo operation.

This program is being closely followed and the Bureau will be kept apprised.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: December 6, 1967

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

My memorandum of 11/6/67 set forth, in detail, an accounting of funds received by the Communist Party, USA, from the Soviet Union and Red China for October, 1967. The following is an accounting of these funds for November, 1967.

TOTAL FUNDS RECEIVED AND DISBURSED 9/58 TO 10/31/67

Total received from the Soviet Union.....	\$4,717,745.19
Total received from Red China (all on 2/10/60).....	50,000.00
Total received 9/58 to 10/31/67.....	4,767,745.19
Total disbursed 9/58 to 10/31/67.....	4,012,750.86
Balance of Fund 10/31/67.....	\$ 754,994.33

There were no receipts or disbursements during November, 1967.*

Balance of Fund 11/30/67.....\$ 754,994.33

In New York.....\$ 631,282.98

In Chicago.....123,711.35

100-428091- \$ 754,994.33

ACTION:

None. This memorandum is submitted for your information. An up-to-date accounting of Party funds received from the Soviets will be brought to your attention each month. Details of the accounting of these funds are not to be disseminated.

100-428091

WGS:cst
(5)

* On 12/2/67, \$500,000 was received from the Soviet Union bringing the grand total of funds received from the Soviet Union to \$5,217,745.19. The receipt of the \$500,000 will be reported in the memorandum prepared in January, 1968, relative to the accounting of these funds for December, 1967.

67 DEC 11 1967

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CD*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan *CD*

DATE: November 29, 1967

1 - Mr. M. F. Row
(6221 IB)
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

To recommend that Special Agents Walter A. Boyle and Robert A. Villemure be authorized to proceed to point of arrival into the United States of CG 5824-S*, as soon as it is known, to expedite debriefing of informant.

BACKGROUND:

CG 5824-S* departed on Solo Mission 24 to the Soviet Union 10/19/67. He is expected to return to the United States the first week of December, 1967. During his travels, informant was in the company of Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, and undoubtedly participated in numerous high-level discussions concerning the international communist movement, communist aid to North Vietnam, and other subjects of vital interest to top officials of our Government. In addition, informant was to negotiate a 1968 Soviet subsidy for the Communist Party, USA. In view of the importance of these matters, intensive debriefing of the informant should be initiated immediately upon his arrival to insure we have first access to the data in his possession.

Informant must spend some time briefing top leadership of the Party as soon as his presence in the United States is made known to the Party, and this could cause an unnecessary delay in obtaining intelligence data in his possession if we do not contact the informant first.

As in the past, Chicago has recommended, and we concur, that Special Agents Boyle and Villemure, contacting Agents, meet the informant in Boston, Massachusetts, to

Enclosure *sent 12-1-67*

100-428091

RCP:cst (6)

CONTINUED - OVER

17 DEC 12 1967

67 DEC 15 1967

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

extract the highlights of his trip as expeditiously as possible. Informant can be debriefed in a secure manner in Boston before he reports to the Party leadership in New York. Estimated cost involved is \$362.58.

OBSERVATION:

In view of the importance of the intelligence data informant should bring back, it is believed judicious to have the contacting Agents meet CG 5824-S*. Debriefing by two Agents is considered necessary in order to insure absolute completeness and accuracy of all information received. These two Agents are completely familiar with the names, places and events in the international communist movement and have, in the past, greatly facilitated the debriefing of informant. They will not depart for informant's point of entry until specific data is received concerning date of informant's arrival.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that attached airtel be sent to Chicago authorizing Special Agents Boyle and Villemure to proceed to the informant's point of arrival in the United States as soon as specific information in that regard is received.

W.C. Sullivan
OK, I can't understand why one agent can't do it. We always seem to have to operate in 2's like a "nick".
Detective [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE TO ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 12/5/67

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT:

SOLO

IS - C

(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)

[redacted] (Bufile 100-445691) has been selected for interview under this program because of his informant potential and especially because he has qualities which could make him eligible for SOLO utilization.

b6
b7C

[redacted] is Jewish. His wife, a divorcee with two children who was born in Canada, appears to have been a Christian. Well educated and a [redacted] major, he has been far from successful. He is now an employee of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship (NCASF).

[redacted] has a broad and varied subversive background including interest in Trotskyist matters, the CP - USA, leftist publications of several persuasions and activities with prominent militant civil rights groups. He attended the International Youth gathering in Moscow in 1967.

b6
b7C

In the Summer of 1967, [redacted] was criticized by GILL GREEN and lost an important Party assignment. [redacted] a cocky self-assured individual, as a review of his file indicates, has never been interviewed before. His criticism by GREEN and the resultant demotion may have left him embittered and hopefully apt for interview at this time.

The following background and subversive information is being set forth for the Bureau's consideration:

- 1- 904, 900
- 2- Bureau (RM)
- 1-New York (100-134637) (SOLO) (SUB-C)
- 1-New York

RJQ:jal
(4)

EX 109
REC 27 100-428091-6621

DEC 12 1967

67 DEC 15 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NY 100-134637

Background

[redacted] a white male, was born [redacted] at NY, NY. He was graduated from Westbury High School, Westbury, NY, in 1956, and from [redacted] in 1961. In 1962, he attended the Graduate School of [redacted] University, NYC, preparing for a masters degree in [redacted]. In 1963, he married [redacted] and they have three children.

b6
b7C

In 1966, he was employed as a case worker, NYC Welfare Department and about May, 1967, he became [redacted] National Council of American Soviet Friendship, a position he now holds. He resides at [redacted] NY.

Subversive Activities

In 1958, [redacted] attended a Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) Forum. In 1962, he was active in "Advance" and "Burning Issues" and in 1964 and 1965, he made several financial contributions to American Institute for Marxist Studies (AIMS). Also in 1965, he pledged \$15 to the Worker Banquet Committee.

b6
b7C

In 1966 and 1967, he attended meetings of the NY District CP Committee at which anti-Vietnam war demonstrations were discussed.

From December, 1966 through May, 1967, [redacted] was observed visiting CP - USA headquarters, 23 W. 26th St., NYC, on 28 occasions.

b6
b7C

In July, 1967, [redacted] spent three weeks in the Soviet Union reportedly to attend the International World Youth gathering in Leningrad.

In addition to his CP activities, [redacted] in 1961 while at [redacted] State University, was in a parade mourning the death of PATRICE LUMUMBA, admitted Young Socialist League membership there and was considered a troublemaker on campus.

NY 100-134637

While in the NY area (1965), he has been very active in the Vietnam War protest field. He was a member of the Long Island Peace Council in 1965, and was a coordinator of the Student March on Washington, 4/17/65. In 1966, he was an officer of the Long Island Committee to End the War in Vietnam and participated in several anti-war demonstrations in Hempstead, NY.

As noted above, [redacted] is currently employed as Student Director of the NCASF.

At a meeting of the NYSCP Board held on 5/2/67, JAMES TORMEY referred to [redacted] stating that [redacted] had been working with the Fort Hood Three Defense Committee and that GIL GREEN thought he was not doing enough work and, therefore, removed him. TORMEY stated that people involved must be heard before such decisions (the removal) are made, adding that as a result the CP may have lost [redacted]

b6
b7C

CG 5824-S* advised on 10/18/67, that [redacted] took over the duties of SARAH HARRIS who is now residing in the Soviet Union.

b6
b7C

Authority is hereby requested to contact and interview [redacted] within provisions set forth in the MOI, Section 87D, for the development of security informants. The Bureau will be promptly advised of the results.

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637)

12/12/67

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. M. J. Rozamus
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C
(REPLACEMENT AND NEUTRALIZATION PROGRAM)

Reurlet 12/5/67, which requests Bureau authority
to interview [REDACTED]

Information contained in Bureau files indicates
[REDACTED] is a graduate student at New York University.
Before authority to interview [REDACTED] can be granted,
Bureau desires to know his current student status.

b6
b7C
b7D

RCP:cst
(5)

NOTE:

New York has picked [REDACTED] as a possible
potential informant because of his qualities which would
make him eligible for utilization in the Solo Operation.
Prior to granting authority to interview him, we should
know whether or not he is a student.

b6
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b7D

Tolson _____
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Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAILED 2
DEC 11 1967
COMM-FBI

REC 27

EX 109

100-428091-6622

6 DEC 12 1967

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

67 DEC 15 1967

FBI

Date: 12/7/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the Chicago Office one copy, of an LHM entitled, "Prospects For International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties".

The information set forth in the enclosed LHM was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/4-5/67, to SAS WALTER A. BOYLE and ROBERT A. VILLEMURE.

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~Confidential~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source, who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C.

CG 5824-S* advised that the information set forth in the enclosed LHM was obtained by him during the course of his stay in Moscow, USSR, from 10/24/67 to 12/1/67, in

3-Bureau (100-428091) (Encls. 4) (RM)
 1-Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (Encl. 1) (AM RM)
 1-New York (100-134637) (41)

WAB:eac
 (6)

100-428091-6623
 12/13/67
 13th floor
 BY RCP/long

EX 107

6 DEC 13 1967

Approved: _____

67 DEC 15 1967 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

NY 100-134637

discussions with MIKHAIL A. SUSLOV, Member of the Presidium and a Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CCCPSU); BORIS N. PONOMAREV, a Secretary of the CCCPSU; and MIKHAIL S. SOLOMENTSEV, a Secretary of the CCCPSU.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C.

December 7, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Prospects For International Meeting
of Communist and Workers Parties

During December, 1967, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised as follows:

Members of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) recently commented concerning the views of the CPSU relative to current prospects for an international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties. After long consideration, the CPSU arrived at the decision that efforts must be intensified to bring about a meeting of all such Parties. However, in view of the delicate nature of this subject and the fact that a number of influential Communist Parties are either opposed to such a meeting or are lukewarm toward such a meeting, the CPSU will not rush this matter or press too obviously for it.

The CPSU, after first obtaining the consent of all the Parties who attended the "Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties" held in Moscow, USSR, in March, 1965, with the sole exception of the CP of Cuba; publicly issued on November 25, 1967, a call for an international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties to be held during February, 1968, at Budapest, Hungary. According to the CPSU leaders, they do not expect such an international meeting to be convened during 1968. It will be precoded by a series of perhaps three or four "consultative" or "preparatory" meetings to prepare the ground for the larger meeting.

It is the hope of the CPSU that this series of consultative meetings will be helpful in preparing the climate for an international meeting. Additional Parties may participate more willingly in these consultative meetings and thus pave

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

100-428091-6623

ENCLOSURE

Prospects For International Meeting
of Communist and Workers Parties

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the way to accept a full international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties. In this way the pressure for an international meeting will come from other Parties, there will be international responsibility for the convening of the meeting, and there will be less visible pressure from the CPSU. For this reason also, the CPSU suggested that the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party be the host for the first consultative meeting because other Parties are suspicious that the CPSU will want to dominate the international meeting for its own interests. In spite of these maneuvers for the sake of appearances, the CPSU is firmly committed to bringing about such a meeting because of their strong belief that it is essential to achieve some kind of unity within the world Communist movement.

While at the present time the prospects for such a meeting are better than they have ever been since the Moscow meeting of 1960, there will be many difficulties to overcome, even during the course of the preparatory stages. Some Parties oppose the holding of such a conference. For example, the Communist Party of Romania is trying to prevent such a meeting and information available to the CPSU is that the Romanians will not come to a large international meeting, but will attend a consultative meeting for the purpose of opposing the holding of the larger meeting.

Of course, the Communist Party of China will not attend. The Communist Party of Cuba may not participate either; a draft of the communique to be issued November 25, 1967, was sent to Fidel Castro, but no answer has yet been received. The question of whether the Vietnamese and North Koreans will participate in an international meeting is still to be determined and has yet to be discussed with them. Although the Communist Party of Great Britain agreed to the preparatory meeting, the leadership has adopted a "wait and see" attitude before making any decision relative to supporting an international meeting. The Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) will participate, and this is considered very important because the main criticism will be aimed chiefly at United States imperialism and the CPUSA "can throw better darts into the skin of US imperialism" and "knows best how to hurt this animal." There is a delicate question, not yet resolved, concerning whether

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Prospects For International Meeting
of Communist and Workers Parties

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

invitations should be extended to parallel Parties such as exists in Israel and India, but this decision will be left to the deliberations of the consultative meetings.

But there are shades of opinion among the opposition. Some Parties feel that instead of a meeting of Communist Parties, there should be a meeting of all revolutionary parties and groups. Another shade of opinion is that the consultative meeting should not really "prepare", that is, no documents should be prepared beforehand for the consideration of the international meeting. It is the view of the CPSU that at the coming consultative meeting an agenda for the international meeting should be defined, a preparatory commission should be set up, basic documents should be prepared, and suggestions should be made for the composition of commissions to study questions to be considered by the international meeting and to define problems and emphasis. In the view of the CPSU, it is actually impossible at a large international meeting itself to work out a document or documents.

Perhaps a few months after the consultative meeting in February, 1968, there will be a second consultative meeting, maybe in Warsaw, Poland. At this meeting they might add more people to the commissions set up at the first meeting. At each stage of this process, any Party who so desires may participate.

Insofar as the documents are concerned, it appears to the CPSU that it may not be possible to adopt such an all-embracing document as was adopted at the 1960 meeting. But the international meeting should have the basic aim of struggle against United States imperialism and the achievement of unity in the world Communist movement in order to achieve this aim. There may be separate documents adopted on peace, on national liberation movements, on Vietnam, etc. But the consensus at this time is that this international meeting should be composed of Communist and Workers Parties (not all revolutionary parties and groups) with the aim of consolidating the world Communist movement. If the Communists cannot reach agreement among themselves, then it certainly would not be wise to invite others. But if the Communists do agree, then this will certainly influence the world movement for liberation from imperialism and colonialism.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: December 8, 1967

FROM : J. A. Sizoo *JAS*

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
RESERVE FUNDS

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
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Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

sent 5/
SAC D. W. Howell, New York, called this morning and advised that Gus Hall had been in touch with CG 5824 and instructed that \$50,000 be made available to him, Hall, to replenish funds he has been using for party business. Hall also instructed that \$50,000 should be made available to Helen Winter for the operation of the national headquarters.

ACTION:

Howell was authorized to tell the informant to go ahead and abide by Hall's instructions.

JAS:jas
(4) *JAS*

P. File in
100-428091

EX 101

REC-69

100-428091-6624

6 DEC 13 1967

67 DEC 15 1967

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

12/13/67

Airtel

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

To: SACs, New York (100-134637)
Chicago (134-46 SUB-B)

From: Director, FBI (100-428091)

SOLO
IS - C

Reurairtel 12/8/67 which enclosed an LHM captioned "Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution, Moscow, USSR, November, 1967." Data for this memorandum was furnished SAs Walter A. Boyle and Robert A. Villemure of the Chicago Office by CG 5824-S*.

Page one, paragraph two, line eight, the second word now should be not. Line three of the second complete paragraph on page five of this memorandum refers to the Institute of World Labor Movement. Is this the Institute which the informant has referred to in the past as the Institute of International Workers Movement? Also, line eight of this paragraph uses the words United States when it appears from the context that the words Soviet Union should be used. In this same paragraph the Institute is referred to in the singular tense and later in the plural tense. For example, see line eight. You should immediately clarify these items and if necessary submit amended pages.

Your cover airtel stated that the memorandum is rambling in style as a consequence of the source's physical and mental condition. SAs Boyle and Villemure should be reminded that it is their responsibility to insure that the information furnished by the source is properly organized and that correct grammar is used in the memorandum prepared from the information furnished by the source.

RCP:ep1
(6)

NOTE: The above-mentioned memorandum has not been disseminated and classification is necessary prior to dissemination.

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

67 DEC 15 1967

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC-63

100-428091-662-5

6 DEC 13 1967

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 12/8/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for Chicago one copy, of an LHM entitled, "Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution, Moscow, USSR, November, 1967".

The information set forth in the enclosed LHM was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* to SAS WALTER A. BOYLE and ROBERT A. VILLEMURE.

Enclosed LHM is classified "~~Confidential~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source, who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international Communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C.

Upon his return from Solo mission 24, CG 5824-S* furnished the enclosed comments as reflecting his observations, opinions and judgments based upon his overall stay in the USSR. CG 5824-S* stated that these resulted from over one month of meetings with individual leaders of Communist Parties from throughout the world, and attendance at the various functions connected with the Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution as well as other functions. While somewhat rambling in style, a consequence

1-904 940 with LHM
 3-Bureau (100-428091) (Encls. 4) (RM)
 1-Chicago (134-46 Sub-B) (Encl. 1) (AM RM)
 1-New York (100-134637) (41) EX-103 100-428091-6626

WAB:cac
 (6)

Approved: _____
 Special Agent in Charge

54 JAN 16 1968

Sent _____ M Per _____

REC-10

DEC 14 1967

NY 100-134637

of the source's physical and mental exhaustion, he indicated that he considered these observations the meat of what he had to furnish as a result of this trip.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C.

December 8, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the
October Revolution, Moscow, USSR, November
1967

During December, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, expressed the following opinions relative to the recent celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution, which was held in Moscow, USSR, during early November, 1967.

For this celebration the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) brought together representatives of 95 Parties, some of which are Communist Parties and some of which are considered progressive but not Communist. Never before did the CPSU have that many Parties represented at their November Celebration. Among those gathered were some representatives from governments in the newly independent states and some that were not so new. At one of the Celebration functions there were representatives from the Government of India, a member of the opposition of Ceylon and the Finnish President sitting on the same stage.

If we want to speak objectively, we do know that this was a big event for the CPSU. They "proved" to the world that they can exist for 50 years and relate 50 years of progress despite the ravages of civil wars and World War II. Of course, one might say that perhaps Russia might have developed in any case, but that is hard to prove or disprove. On the basis of their history, they can "prove" that it never would have happened. They command the respect of many nations, even non-Communist nations and anti-Communist nations, and they claim the credit for the world development which has led to independence struggles and the achievement of independence for dozens of states that would never have been able to rid themselves of their colonial masters unless they could find some support as in the power of the Soviet Union.

When they state this, they also keep on emphasizing that they still believe in the policy of peaceful coexistence, for had they not believed in this policy, they say, they would

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

100-428091-6626
ENCLOSURE

Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of
the October Revolution, Moscow, USSR,
November, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

have been in one continuous war from the time of their existence. While it's true that they did go through some wars with foreign countries, as well as civil wars supported by other countries, and fought off foreign intervention, they nevertheless emphasized that their first act was the decree of peace (this they emphasized day in and day out) so that they could exist with non-Communist powers in the same world.

The demonstration of their military preparedness at the Celebration was aimed not merely to exaggerate their military preparations to convince the big powers of the world, particularly the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany, but also to convince these small states that whatever their preference may be for any kind of regime, they would probably prefer a Communist regime. They are not going to tell these smaller states what kind of regime to have. And they "prove" this. Just as they invited the heads and leaders of world Communist Parties, so also they invited many leaders of smaller states to come and participate in their celebration and give them the same forum of these big meetings and give them an audience throughout the Soviet Union, the same as they did other Communists, both leaders of states and Parties big and small.

Another reason for gathering these countries, as well as Parties, in the Soviet Union is to show off to them Soviet power and to convince them that while the Soviet Union stands for peace and wants to continue their domestic progress they are also prepared to act as the ally of any "oppressed nation or peoples" that is willing to stand up against United States imperialism and colonialism. While they themselves would not compromise their ideology, in fact claim credit for being the chief exponent of Communist ideology as represented in Marxist-Leninist theory, they are willing to tolerate those who are non-Communist and do not believe in their own particular ideology. As a result there was the situation where on the same stage they had Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sitting in the front seat and a few rows back there was the leader of the Communist Party of India, S. A. Dange. But more significant was the fact that they were able to prove to many of the representatives, such as the Arab and African states, that they can command international support. For who else can bring

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of
the October Revolution, Moscow, USSR,
November, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

together so many Parties and organizations that had a common cause to fight for? If some of these countries want support to develop their economy and independence against the neo-colonialists or imperialists generally, here is the world force to assist them.

So we can conclude by saying that they utilized the 50th Anniversary to mobilize the international Communist movement as well as the diverse liberation movements. They utilized their parliamentary instrument, the Supreme Soviet, as well as the power of their Central Committee, to give this gathering all the authority at their command. At the same time, they aim their shots. They did not scatter them. The emphasis, the concentration of fire, was on the United States. They gave a platform to anyone that wanted to attack the United States.

We know from the past that the CPSU and its leadership have been very much in favor of an international mobilization of Communists, but since the split with China they have been unable to bring about the kind of meeting that would adopt a common platform in keeping with Soviet policy, which would be interpreted at such a meeting as international policy. But this 50th Anniversary gathering did make it possible to rally Parties and governments run by Communists or Communist sympathizers for a new attempt or initiative to unite the Communist movement. The first consultative meeting to be held in Budapest, Hungary, in February, 1968, is only the beginning and, while a number of Parties are participating reluctantly, the CPSU did succeed in finally winning more tacit agreement by the Communist Party of Italy, which is considered a major Party, and other Parties that were up to now hesitant to some degree. They also succeeded in putting the label of "traitor" or "betrayer" on the Chinese leadership. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the CPSU speakers never say the Communist Party of China - they talk of the Chinese leaders, "the Mao clique," because they seem to feel or they know that a good part of the Communist Party in China, while officially still being led by Mao, is in opposition to the Mao policies. They also succeeded in putting the onus for the defeats of what they call "anti-imperialist progress and Communism" in Indonesia, as well as the continued war in Vietnam, upon the Chinese Mao leadership.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of
the October Revolution, Moscow, USSR,
November, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

All in all, we could say that the CPSU is nearer to an international meeting than it has been since the last meeting was held in Moscow in 1960. Even if this meeting finally organizes itself and rallies around one or two slogans on issues that represent events in the contemporary world, it will mean a big step forward for the Soviet leadership and the "cohesiveness" of the world Communist movement. As before, however, Soviet thinking is preoccupied with United States policy. Even though they are very much concerned about China, in that relationship also they are wondering what the United States will do in connection with China: "Is there some group in the United States that favors some move that could lead to an understanding with China?" They are concerned that such a move would be aimed at the USSR. While the Soviet Union still considers West Germany as the chief ally of the United States and the most dangerous enemy in Europe, they do not dismiss the possibility that the United States may find some accommodation with China. They constantly talk about this problem. During a number of discussions in Moscow in November, 1967, the American Communist Party leadership also seemed to encourage this type of thinking.

The uneasiness expressed by the Soviet leadership regarding United States policy is similar to the uneasiness of a good part of the world, especially in Europe, about United States policy. While the Communists use propaganda and can distort facts beyond imagination, taking advantage of what the Marxists call the license of the propagandist, the leadership of the Communist Parties generally reflects the mood of their people. We cannot dismiss the fact that because of the continuation of the war in Vietnam and the fear that this may expand into a big war, even on a world-wide scale, that many countries and people are becoming more anti-American and the United States is constantly losing in popularity. First of all, at the Moscow meeting, the leading American Communist, Gus Hall, was given a forum in which he attacked his country and government as the main enemy in the world, and with the Vietnamese delegation on the stage, he dramatically turned around and pledged support to the North Vietnamese and to others until such time as every American soldier and weapon is removed from foreign soil. In this respect, the United States finds itself in a very unpopular position in a good

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of
the October Revolution, Moscow, USSR,
November, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

part of Africa, Asia and, to be more specific at the present time, in the Middle East. While in the Middle East the Israel Government is condemned, they point their finger chiefly at the United States as being responsible for whatever is happening in that part of the world and call Israel only a vassal state of "United States imperialism".

The Moscow meetings became rallying centers for anti-imperialist activity, coordinating struggles in many forms against imperialism, but always identifying imperialism with the United States.

The Soviet Party has undertaken many steps to organize the international Communist movement with or without an international meeting. As we know the Institute of the International Labor Movement is supposed to be limited to a study of labor organization and aims in the world. This Institute is an arm of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It has top priority now among all the institutes in the Soviet Union. It is being given unlimited support, materially and politically, by the Soviet Party leadership in its ventures. To give this Institute a send-off and to underline its importance, the Kremlin itself was opened to it for the first meeting. To further emphasize the importance of it, they elected a presidium of many leaders from countries including some which are non-Communist. Mikhail A. Suslov, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CCCPSU) and a Secretary of the CCCPSU, made the introductory remarks dealing with the present situation and the need for the world labor movement to unite. A major address was given by Boris N. Ponomarev, a Secretary of the CCCPSU, which will appear in the next issue of the "Kommunist". This event was accorded all the fanfare normally associated with an important meeting, including coverage by motion pictures, radio, television, etc.

This shows that the Soviet Party is not depending on the good wishes of anyone else in regard to the organization of an international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, but is proceeding to establish a center of its own even though this center may be limited to some extent, not having the same

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Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of
the October Revolution, Moscow, USSR,
November, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

powers of an international organization. They will nevertheless bring together outstanding Communist leaders and labor leaders generally. Another move that the Soviet Union is making in this direction, toward increasing their influence generally and rallying non-Communists to their banner, is in their new approaches within the World Federation of Trade Unions (a characterization of which is attached hereto), which is made up chiefly of Communist controlled labor organizations. One of the first speeches in the last two weeks made by Aleksandr N. Shelepin, the new head of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions of the USSR, was an appeal for world-wide trade union cooperation, particularly with the World Confederation of Trade Unions. Some of the people who participated in this meeting said that this was a very rare thing. It was said that Shelepin spoke, it seemed, extemporaneously, but in exacting words, and that representatives from other Socialist states, heads of trade union organizations, followed in a similar vein. The purpose there also was to isolate the leadership of the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), particularly George Meaney, and the first issue will be to develop such united action around the Vietnamese war. The second issue will be economic, that is to fight United States corporations which have global connections, plants or interests in various countries. This would combine economic aims with nationalist feelings in a number of countries.

The Soviet Union and its leadership seem to be pursuing a dual policy: On the one hand, they are mobilizing the international forces of the rest of the Communist world movement and are also placing greater emphasis on their defenses and military problems, while at the same time they are still looking to the United States for some accommodation and cooperation. But while they state this desire for a United States - USSR detente, they qualify it by expressing the fear that the expanding war in Vietnam makes this virtually impossible, and thus they use this danger to justify greater emphasis on their first line of policy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of
the October Revolution, Moscow, USSR,
November, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX

WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications", revised and published as of December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., contains the following concerning World Federation of Trade Unions:

- "1. Cited as 'part of a solar system of international Communist-front organizations which have been established in recent years * * *.' 'American supporters include the left-wing unions within the Congress of Industrial Organizations.'
(Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1953 on the Congress of American Women, April 26, 1950; originally released October 23, 1949, p.1.)
- "2. Cited as 'Communist-dominated.'
(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p.93, also p.59.)"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: 12/8/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

5- R62 f

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for the Chicago Office one copy of an LHM entitled "US Study Institute, Moscow, USSR".

The information set forth in the enclosed LHM was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/5/67 to SAS WALTER A. BOYLE and ROBERT A. VILLEMURE.

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source, who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D. C.

- 1-904 *904 mit/secure*
- ③ - Bureau (Encl. 4) (RM)
- 1 - Chicago (100-46 Sub B) (Encl. 1) (RM)
- 1 - New York
- EX-103*
- 100-428091-662-7*

WAB:gam
(6)

REC-10

6 DEC 14 1967

State, CIA

12/12/67

ROR/ony

Approved: _____

Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

67 DEC 18 1967

NY 100-134637

The information in the enclosed LHM was obtained by CG 5824-S* in Moscow, USSR, during the period 10/24/67 - 12/1/67 in discussions with leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Prior to leaving Moscow, CG 5824-S* met with the head of the above mentioned institute as did GUS HALL, General Secretary of the Communist Party, United States of America.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~SECRET~~ Q
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.
December 8, 1967

United States Study Institute, Moscow, USSR

During December, 1967, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

In mid November, 1967, upon instructions from the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a new institute was organized in Moscow, USSR, which is to be known as the United States Study Institute. This special institute is intended to make an intensive study of the United States from every aspect. The studies made by the institute are to be turned over to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was stated that there are numerous institutes in the United States for the study of the Soviet Union, but until now there has been no comparable institute in the USSR specifically for the study of the United States. The head of this new institute is Yuri Arabatov, who, it is noted, speaks English.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group I~~

~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

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100-428091-6627
ENCLOSURE

ROUTE ENVELOPE

Date: 12/8/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith are three copies for the Bureau and one copy for Chicago of an informant's statement entitled, "Meeting with Representative of the Security Branch of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union Relating to the Communication Apparatus Between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, United States of America."

The information in the enclosed informant's statement was furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/4-6/67 to SAS WALTER A. BOYLE and ROBERT A. VILLEMURE.

- 1-904 940 with [unclear] EX-103
REC-10 100-428091-6628
- 3 - Bureau (Encls. 3) (RM)
1 - Chicago (13446 Sub B) (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - New York

WAB:gam
(6)

6 DEC 14 1967

Approved: _____

Sent _____

M

Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

67 DEC 18 1967

Memo to D.C. [unclear]
to [unclear]
WAB:gam

December 4-6, 1967

Meeting with Representative of the Security Branch of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union Relating to the Communication Apparatus Between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, United States of America

During the early part of November, 1967, a number of meetings were held with Mikhail Korneevich Polonik, who is a representative of the Security Branch of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and who has the responsibility for the operation of the clandestine communications apparatus between the CPSU and the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). This apparatus is also the vehicle for the transmission of CPSU funds to subsidize the activities of the CPUSA. The gist of these meetings is as follows:

Polonik was very friendly and expressed complete satisfaction with the operations being carried on by CPUSA representatives involved in this apparatus and was particularly complementary concerning Jack Brooks, who runs the American end of the apparatus on a day-to-day basis.

However, throughout the discussions, the impression was very definitely received that the Russians are constantly worried that some accident will occur during the course of their operations in the United States which will compromise this operation. Polonik constantly stressed the need for caution, but he stated this only in a general way with no specific references to matters which he considered risky beyond the following.

Polonik stated that they consider all personal meetings and drops dangerous and want these cut to the very minimum. In place of meets and drops, they want increased reliance, where possible, upon the use of the micro-transceiver means of communication. Use of the phone should be avoided absolutely. Since the transfer of funds from the CPSU to the CPUSA is the most risky undertaking, Polonik again insisted that the CPUSA should set up a laundry or gift shop which can

100-428091-6628

ENCLOSURE

be used for this fund's transfer. He was informed that efforts are currently being made to accomplish this but that the CPSU's instructions had been quite restrictive concerning the location of the shop, and this had hampered the efforts of the CPUSA to comply. This matter is being worked on at the present time. Furthermore, the CPUSA has to be just as cautious as the CPSU and must be sure about the person to handle this shop. Polonik replied that the CPUSA need not feel that these restrictions upon location were inviolate and therefore, the CPUSA could choose any other site they wished and present it to the CPSU for consideration. It is possible that the CPSU will accept it as a suitable location in spite of their formerly expressed restrictions.

Polonik stated that "The main goal is to conserve the apparatus." He indicated that by this he meant that the CPSU desires that the communications apparatus be used only for the most confidential or most urgent matters. They do not want the apparatus bogged down or exploited by using it to handle routine matters or things which are legal and could just as well be handled openly. As an example, he stated that the apparatus should not be used merely to request visas for individuals who would be travelling to the USSR, since this can be accomplished more easily and efficiently by having an open member of the CPUSA leadership assigned to handle this matter by openly going to the USSR Embassy in Washington, D. C. and picking up the visas. Other matters which are legal can be handled by representatives of open CPUSA agencies such as "The Worker" going to open Soviet agencies such as the Tass News Agency and conducting their business. This process should also be worked in reverse.

Polonik then referred to the fact that the transfer of the last portion of the CPSU subsidy to the CPUSA for the last part of 1967 was due to be delivered during the first days of December, 1967. He expressed some concern that the CPUSA representative then in Moscow, USSR, would be returning to the United States shortly before the transfer would take place. He stated that the Central Committee of the CPSU was afraid of the possibility that the American intelligence services might somehow become aware that this CPUSA representative was in Moscow. Should the transfer take place immediately after his return, then Polonik was afraid that the transfer might be discovered. Therefore, he counseled remaining in Moscow until a few days passed after the transfer of funds. He stated that the CPSU had full confidence that the transfer of funds could be handled on this one occasion by Jack Brooks alone. Since Polonik was satisfied, the matter was dropped at that.

On this occasion, there was also a brief discussion of the manner of the transfer of funds from the standpoint of the CPUSA. Polonik asked what happens to the funds after they are turned over to Jack Brooks. He was informed that Brooks then turned the funds over to him (the CPUSA representative then in Moscow) and he and Gus Hall would dispose of the funds. No further inquiry along this line was made by Polonik.

Polonik was informed of the fact that Jack Brooks had had a "little accident" from which he had now largely recovered. Polonik indicated that he had been informed of this fact already by Brooks. His first question at this point, however, was whether the police had been involved in the investigation of Brooks' accident. He was informed that there had been no police investigation. Then Polonik asked who had been doing the work of the apparatus while Brooks was hurt. He was informed that the CPUSA representative, then in Moscow, had come into New York City to handle some of the duties. Also, he had brought Ford (code name) more actively into the work of the apparatus. Polonik immediately stated that he should not have done this because the agreement had been made before that Ford would not be activated on a day-to-day basis until he had been to Moscow for his period of training and talks. Now three people are involved with knowledge of the apparatus instead of just two. Polonik insisted that Ford must come to Moscow for a period of two to three months, no less than eight weeks. Polonik was informed that the security of the apparatus had not been jeopardized and that Ford was not aware of the fund's operations nor of the contents of any of the messages, etc. because he was not privy to the code being used or any such confidential matters. As to Ford's travelling to Moscow, Polonik was told that the Russians had been informed previously that Ford had been kept underground and that he had a job which the Russians had agreed that he should continue to work at. Should he travel to Moscow for that period, he would lose his job. Polonik agreed that Ford should continue to work at his job. Polonik then reluctantly approved the use of Ford to the limited extent to which he had been used thus far. He cautioned, however, that Ford should not be used too much. He is not to be used on a day-to-day basis in the apparatus until he goes to Moscow for two to three months' training and talks.

Then Polonik once again asked whether the CPUSA is absolutely sure that the United States intelligence services are not on to Ford. He said, "After all, his father died over here, and they might be suspicious of him." He was told that the death of Ford's father had taken place a long time ago, and there was no question of the fact that Ford is now "clean." He had been kept under wraps for many years, had worked at a number of jobs, and was only being reactivated when the CPUSA was sure that he was not under any suspicion.

Polonik then stated that the CPSU is still interested in receiving information from Jack Brooks concerning the latest types of listening devices and anti-bugging devices available in the United States. He stated that the CPSU is not interested in any of the devices which are commercially available to anyone who just walks into a shop off the street, because they know that these are not the latest type devices. They are interested in the devices which are only available to police agencies because those are the most up-to-date and scientific devices. He noted that they are authorizing Brooks to spend 12 to 13 thousand dollars for this purpose.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *sls*

DATE: December 12, 1967

FROM : C. F. Downing *CFD*

SUBJECT: *(SOLO)*
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

CSB

secret
Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 12/12/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS
HS:ccb

(7) *ccb*

REC-10

100-428091-6629

EX-103

DEC 14 1967

67 DEC 18 1967

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
FBI

Date: 12/11/67

Transmit the following in

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
SUBJECT: SOLO
IS - C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "COMMUNIST PARTY OF SYRIA."

The information set forth in the enclosed LHM was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/6/67 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and ROBERT A. VILLEMURE.

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source, who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C.

3) - Bureau (Encls. 4) (RM)
1 - New York (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Chicago

WAB:mes

(5)

AGENT State & CIA
 REG. NO. _____
 DATE 12/18/67
 HOW FORN. 1/5
 BY RCP/MS

6 DEC 15 1967

Approved:

Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

67 DEC 21 1967

CG 134-46 Sub B

CG 5824-S* advised that a meeting was held on 11/16/67 between the delegations of the Communist Party (CP), USA and the CP of Syria, then in Moscow, USSR, for the celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the October Revolution. This meeting took place in a special room for such meetings on the second floor of the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union Hotel in Moscow. This meeting had taken more than a week to arrange because KHALID BAGDACHE, General Secretary of the CP of Syria, had not been very anxious to have such a meeting. Participating in the meeting for the CP, USA were GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA; HENRY WINSTON, Chairman, CP, USA; ALBERT J. LIMA, member of the National Executive Board, CP, USA; and CG 5824-S*. JAMES JACKSON, member of the Secretariat and National Executive Board of the CP, USA, was absent. BAGDACHE was the only representative from the CP of Syria identified by CG 5824-S* as participating in the meeting, although press accounts identified D. NAAME and Y. FEISAL, both members of the Political Bureau, CP of Syria, as being present in Moscow for the celebration. However, photographs taken of this meeting (which will be furnished to the Bureau at a later date) show only BAGDACHE and the American communists with the exception of CG 5824-S*. It was at this meeting that WINSTON presented to BAGDACHE \$300.00 for the CP of Syria which had been collected from "Jewish needle trades workers" during the course of the Middle East conflict in June, 1967. BAGDACHE accepted the \$300.00 with the statement that this was a token of great significance which demonstrated that the people of the United States really do care about the welfare of the Arabs. He stated that these funds will be used for the relief of Arab refugees. Throughout the course of this discussion, CG 5824-S* stated BAGDACHE steadfastly refused to have anything to say about Israel or the six day war in June, 1967.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C.
December 11, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMUNIST PARTY OF SYRIA

During December, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

It was learned that during the early part of November, 1967, a delegation from the Communist Party (CP) of Syria led by its General Secretary, Khalid Bagdache, was in Moscow, USSR, for the celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the October Revolution. The following comments were attributed to Bagdache, while in the USSR.

In view of the quasi-legal status of the CP of Syria, Bagdache was questioned whether communists may visit Syria. According to Bagdache, communist delegations can visit Syria provided they receive an invitation from the Baath Party, which is the ruling party of Syria. He stated that a delegation from the CP of Italy had visited Syria recently on the basis of an official invitation from the Baath Party, and a delegation from the CP of France has also received an invitation from the Baath Party and is expected to arrive in Syria soon. This is a result of the fact that the Baath Party is reaching out to make contacts with various communist and socialist parties throughout the world.

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declassification~~

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100-428091-6630

ENCLOSURE

COMMUNIST PARTY OF SYRIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

When communists do visit Syria, Bagdache stated, the Baaths do not want them to contact the local communists. But, as in the case of the Italian communists, although when the visiting communists ask to see the Syrian communists they are told that there is only one party in Syria and what might be called communists are just called progressives in Syria, the visitors are finally allowed to see representatives of the CP of Syria. Usually in the past, when various CPs are invited to send a delegation to Syria, the reply is to the effect that the CP will send representatives but it informs the Baath Party that it considers the communists of Syria as its comrades. As a result, the Baath Party does not really object and does allow them to meet with representatives of the CP of Syria.

In commenting on the political situation in Syria, Bagdache remarked that at the Moscow anniversary celebration, there were two members of the Baath Party and one Syrian communist, who is a government minister, on the Presidium of that celebration. According to Bagdache, the Baath Party is very weak among the working class but its power is based chiefly upon the army. Therefore, the Baath Party is afraid of communists in the army since communists in powerful positions there might bid to weaken the power of the Baath Party.

Bagdache suggested that if foreign communists wish to obtain an invitation to visit Syria, the request for an invitation should be made through the Syrian Embassy or through the Syrian Mission to the United Nations. Arrangements for visas and invitations are readily handled in this fashion.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 12/11/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS - C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "'PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM' ALSO KNOWN AS 'WORLD MARXIST REVIEW,' PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA."

The information set forth in the enclosed LHM was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/7/67 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and ROBERT A. VILLEMURE.

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source, who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C.

- 1-904 940 with Encl. 113
 3 - Bureau (Encls. 4) (RM)
 1 - New York (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
 1 - Chicago

WAB:mes
 (5)

AGENCY State & CIA
 FBI REC'D
 DATE 12/18/67
 BY RCP/jmg

REC 46/100-428091-6631

3 DEC 15 1967

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

67 DEC 22 1967

CG 134-46 Sub B

CG 5824-S* advised that he obtained the information in the enclosed LHM during conversations in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on 10/21-23/67 with JOHN BOYD, Communist Party (CP) of Canada representative to the "World Marxist Review" and who also represents the interests of the CP, USA on that magazine.

ALL INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-18-81 BY 816 016 016



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C.
December 11, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM"
ALSO KNOWN AS "WORLD MARXIST
REVIEW," PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA

During December, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

Sometime prior to October, 1967, there was a major reorganization of the staff of the magazine "Problems of Peace and Socialism," also known as "World Marxist Review," the official theoretical journal of the international communist movement headquartered in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Apparently this reorganization was precipitated by a fight which occurred between G. P. Frantsov, Editor in Chief, and Alexander Sobolev, Executive Secretary, of the "World Marxist Review." This dispute allegedly arose over some principled question when Frantsov countermanded some order given by Sobolev, or took issue with Sobolev over an editorial article written by Sobolev. Thereafter, Sobolev got angry and called Frantsov all kinds of names. Since this occurred during a period when Boris N. Ponomarev, a Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party (CP) of the Soviet Union was in Prague, Frantsov took the matter immediately to Ponomarev.

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~~Group 1~~

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100-428091-6631
ENCLOSURE

"PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM"
ALSO KNOWN AS "WORLD MARXIST
REVIEW," PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

As a result, Sobolev was fired from his position on the magazine. That night Sobolev went out on a drunk and simply disappeared for two days. Now Sobolev is working at the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow, USSR.

Replacing Sobolev in the position of Executive Secretary of the "World Marxist Review" is Pavel Naumov. He was scheduled to arrive in Prague with his family sometime during the latter part of October, 1967.

In addition, the following changes have also taken place on the staff of the "World Marxist Review;" (First Name Unknown) Kavalenko, who was in charge of funds at the "World Marxist Review" was also fired from his job and has been replaced by Gregory Ogonesov. The person in charge of capitalist countries on the "World Marxist Review" is now Valentine Peshansky.

One of the assistants to Ogonesov in the handling of funds at the "World Marxist Review" is (First Name Unknown) Gorin. The individual in charge of the British section at the magazine is a Professor (First Name Unknown) Metkovsky, who is an English speaking economist who has written a book on Canada. The British section handles English speaking countries of the British Commonwealth such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, in addition to Great Britain. Also working in the British section is Djavad Sharif, who was formerly the head of the Translation Department at the "World Marxist Review." An individual who formerly worked in the section was Gregory Besedine who, about a year ago, was made a Secretary to Timur Timofeyev, the Director of the Institute of the International Labor Movement in Moscow, USSR. Besedine has recently suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized in Moscow. The representative to the "World Marxist Review" from the CP of Canada is John Boyd, who resides at Lermontova 9/8, Prague, Czechoslovakia, Home Phone: 342-182. Boyd's office phone number at the "World Marxist Review" is 335-345.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 12/11/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS - C

R. Barton

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "INSTITUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOVEMENT, MOSCOW, USSR."

The information set forth in the enclosed LHM was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/5-6/67 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and ROBERT A. VILLEMURE.

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source, who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C.

- 1-904 740 with (encl. 113) REC 46/100-428091-6632
- ③ - Bureau (Encls: 4) (RM)
 1 - New York (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
 1 - Chicago

WAB:mes
 (5)

ACPCN *Allen, CIA*
 REC. NO. *1/10/68*
 DATE *1/10/68*
 NOW FORN. *1/10/68*
 BY *REC/10/68*

6 DEC 15 1967

Approved: *[Signature]* Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

67 JAN 11 1968



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C.

December 11, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~SECRET~~

INSTITUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOR MOVEMENT, MOSCOW, USSR

During December, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

The Institute of the International Labor Movement is located in what was formerly a school at Kolpachny Perulik 9-A, Moscow, USSR. It was recently learned that Mikhail A. Suslov, member of the Political Bureau and a Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party (CP) of the Soviet Union, gave instructions a short time ago so there would be no doubt concerning the importance of this institute. According to Suslov, all CP of the Soviet Union actives must understand that this institute is working very closely with the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union, and the people in the International Department, Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union, especially those dealing with problems related to capitalist countries, must consider themselves actively involved in this institute. The Director of the institute, Timur Timofeyev, submitted some new proposals to the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union, that the institute embark upon a big program of producing publications, and the Central Committee gave the institute first priority for the accomplishment of this program.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

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100-428091-6632
ENCLOSURE

INSTITUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOR MOVEMENT, MOSCOW, USSR

~~SECRET~~

The first major publication of the Institute of the International Labor Movement was a book entitled "The Great October and the World Revolutionary Process," subtitled "Fifty Years of Struggle of the Working Class, the Main Revolutionary Force of the Present Epoch." Although it is indicated that the book was published by the Political Literature Publishers, the book was actually compiled by the Institute of the International Labor Movement under the general editorship of Timofeyev. Among the contributors were M. A. Suslov; Waldeck Rochet, General Secretary of the CP of France; Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CP, USA; Tim Buck, National Chairman of the CP of Canada and Dolores Ibarruri, Chairman of the CP of Spain. This book has been extensively reviewed in the Soviet press in most favorable terms. It is understood that a first printing of 50,000 copies of this book has been sold out and that the order has been placed for the printing of another edition.

A reflection of the importance now attached to the Institute of the International Labor Movement by the CP of the Soviet Union leadership is the fact that Timofeyev, its Director, has now moved to a much larger apartment located at Apartment 245, 26 Kutusovskaya Prospect, Moscow, USSR. Within the same courtyard as this building, but not necessarily in the same building itself, there are housed numerous persons holding very high positions in the USSR, mostly from the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union, including Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union; Nikolai V. Mostovets, head of the North and South American Section, International Department, Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union; the son of Mikhail A. Suslov; and the son of Anastas I. Mikoyan, formerly president of the USSR.

~~SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 12/11/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for New York one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Communist Party of the Soviet Union Document Entitled, 'Subversive Activities of the Chinese Leadership in the National Liberation Movement.'"

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and ROBERT A. VILLEMURE on 12/4-5/67 from notes CG 5824-S* had made of the original document while it was in his custody.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement and thus adversely affecting the national security.

A further reason for classification of this letterhead memorandum as "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" is because source advised

③-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

RAV:MDW
(5)

AGENCY State, CIA, DIA
REQ. NO. 1/5/68
DATE REC'D 1/5/68
HOW FORW. per [unclear]
BY W. [unclear]

6 DEC 15 1967

Approved: [Signature]

Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

67 JAN 11 1968

See to SAC, CG
WGS: [unclear]
12/27/67

[Handwritten signatures and initials: "Imperial", "M. [unclear]", "R. [unclear]", "C. [unclear]"]

[Handwritten mark: "Q"]

[Handwritten: "1-904940 with 1 and", "EX-113", "REC 46", "100-428091-663 3"]

[Handwritten signature]

CG 134-46 Sub B

that this document possibly could have been reviewed by at least 200-300 persons in various languages as it was circulated to all the visiting Communist and Workers Parties delegations. Source advised he was entrusted with the original document and was responsible for its return to the Central Committee, CP of the Soviet Union, and its review by the members of the CP, USA delegation to the 50th Anniversary celebration.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.

December 11, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
DOCUMENT ENTITLED, "SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN THE NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, in December, 1967, advised as follows:

During November, 1967, a document prepared by the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), considered highly confidential, entitled, "Subversive Activities of the Chinese Leadership in the National Liberation Movement," was circulated among the visiting delegations of the Communist and Workers Parties to the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution held in Moscow, USSR.

Set forth below are the contents of the document:

Developments, the last few years, bare the real aim of Chinese leaders in the world national liberation movement.

The nationalistic, ideological, and political platform of the MAO Tse-tung groups is based on the theory that contradictions between imperialism and the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have become the main contradiction in the present day world; that the peoples of those continents are "the most important force" dealing direct blows at imperialism; that they have "a special historic mission"; that the national liberation movements are "the pivot of our epoch." They have advanced the notorious "intermediate zone" thesis and began to

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100-428091-6633
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CPSU DOCUMENT ENTITLED, "SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP
IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

propagandize the "rely on your own strength" principle. All that was backed up by statements that peoples and nations are divided, not on a class basis, but according to colour, geographic position, degree of affluence and "a common history" and so on.

The Peking leaders have persistently propagated the subjectivist and adventurist concept of the revolutionary situation; they have tried to impose on Afro-Asian and Latin-American peoples' pernicious tactics founded on a dogmatic employment of armed partisan forms of struggle exclusively, disregarding the tremendous variety of conditions on these continents. In substance, the Chinese leaders have taken a negative attitude towards the revolutionary-democratic regimes in power in some newly-independent countries toward their striving to lead other countries along the road of progressive social development.

This is opposed to the general line of the Communist Movement formulated in the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 statements. The Chinese were trying then to disorient the forces of national liberation and to isolate the USSR and other socialist countries from the international world communist movement.

What was at the bottom of this erroneous and harmful theory and line which barred the struggle for national independence? Not just dogmatism or lack of understanding of Marxism-Leninism, or just "ultra revolutionary radicalism," but the drive for neo-nationalistic objectives concealed behind these masks.

To obtain these objectives, the Chinese leaders spread discord between the national liberation leaders, the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and the world communist movement. The objective of the MAO Tse-tung group is to gain hegemony over the world revolutionary process by pinning special hopes on the national liberation movement; seeks the support in Afro-Asian and Latin-American countries taking into account their special social and political features.

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CPSU DOCUMENT ENTITLED, "SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP
IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Peking leaders failed to win over the young national states as these forces could not be guided by the pernicious Chinese directives.

Failure of the MAO Tse-tung group can be explained by the fact that its doctrine of the national liberation movement has nothing in common with the real interests of the peoples of that zone of the world. It disregards the most vital and topical problems facing them. The call to unleash an armed struggle everywhere even in countries where national-democratic forces have already come to power, aroused a wary attitude, particularly in countries that have won national independence and are confronted, above all, by the need to solve problems of economic and social development. But this is exactly the sphere where Peking has neither proposed nor can propose a serious constructive program that could win the support of the peoples of the former colonies or semi-colonies.

The leaders and main political parties of the national liberation movement did not let themselves be led astray by Peking's theory of "people's war" which calls on the "World Village," as Peking leaders regard the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to rise up in armed struggle against the "world city" (that is Europe and North America), or by the call to "coloured" peoples to unite against all "whites."

Most government and Party leaders realized the dangerous designs of the Chinese leadership that lay behind all that--the aim of tearing the national liberation movement away from the world working class and the socialist countries and turning it into a tool of Peking's great power policy. The political leaders of the "third world" very quickly caught on to the substance of the Chinese "thesis" aimed at depriving them of support from the socialist countries and of their bonds with the international working class, thereby, making them completely dependent on Peking.

Experience has shown that the Chinese leaders, when they see it's to their advantage, display with regard to enemy

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CPSU DOCUMENT ENTITLED, "SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP
IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

forces, flexibility, caution, and willingness to compromise that border on opportunism and undermine internationalist solidarity.

Chinese leaders pretend to be against apartheid but press exposure shows that the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) secretly trades with the racist regimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

This commerce continues to the present day through third countries and cover agents such as the Japanese and CHIANG Kai-shek's men. Peking exposed claims they have completely stopped this trade with the racists a long time ago (1960); figures show, however, as they were published by the Government of South Africa, that trade between the two countries increased nearly tenfold from 1961 to 1963. After that, the South African Government stopped publishing statistics on trade with the CPR because of "state consideration."

A number of international events in which Peking leaders had a hand reduced their prestige in the eyes of the leaders of the young national states of Asia and Africa. The tragic events in Indonesia, following the attempted coup of September 30, 1965, are an example. Both the leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (CP) and President Sukarno, himself, were under Chinese influence in recent years. Largely, under pressure from Peking, Sukarno began to oppose the idea of peaceful co-existence, retreated from the spirit of Bandung and embarked on a road of adventure and gambles. The reactionary forces took advantage of this situation. Defeat in Indonesia, a blow at the whole progressive camp, and the CP of Indonesia, shows what happens from following Peking's trouble-making directives.

Peking's provocational stand at the time of the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1965 is another example. This was an attempted blow at the policy of non-alignment. It showed the world that the USSR played a constructive role and had a realistic approach.

Peking worked for a summit meeting of Afro-Asian countries and tried to bar the USSR from it. When these states

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ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP
IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

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disagreed, the Chinese had no qualms to torpedo the "convocation of a second Bandung" in Algiers.

The Vietnam problem was a touchstone hastening clarification of the anti-revolutionary essence of the MAO Tse-tung group. United States imperialism's escalation, after Peking's repeated refusal to cooperate and coordinate actions with the other socialist states, was encouraged. After Peking's scorned attitude towards the peace initiative by seventeen non-aligned states who wanted to end the Vietnam tragedy, it became clear to these states that Peking wants to prolong the war to take advantage of its own foreign policy and to step up the anti-Soviet campaign.

"Cultural revolution" and events connected with it further exposed the MAO group and caused a considerable decline in the prestige of the CPR in the eyes of the "third world." The so-called cultural revolution also helped to discredit the ideas of socialism, particularly among the people of the young national states. After the MAO group failed to win the national liberation forces to their side, Peking shifted accent on the fight against the leaders of the liberation movement who upheld the real interests of their peoples. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America the Maoists are setting themselves up as an opposition to the true champions of freedom, in particular, against the communists. In Latin-America, ruffraff, Trotskyists, and factionalists are on the Peking payroll. These groups attacked the CPSU and the Latin-American CPs. These factionalists are, in actuality, the henchmen of the imperialists and the local reactionaries.

In the African country of Lesotho, the Chinese have taken patronage over the right-wing nationalists, Basutoland Congress Party, which opposes the local CP. In the South African Republic they backed the racist Pan American Congress, which opposes the African National Congress, in which the South African communists have a strong influence.

The Peking leaders are stepping up their subversive activities. They do not stop at bribery, blackmail, or crude violence in an attempt to obtain their objectives. In the United Arab Republic (UAR), for instance, the CPR Embassy turned

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ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP
IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

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out to be involved in activities directed towards the overthrow of the Nasser government in connection with which the Ambassador of the UAR in Peking submitted a special note of protest in February, 1966. In the Summer of 1965, a group of "communists" whose conspiratorial activities were reported to be guided from Peking were arrested in the UAR. The stand of the Chinese leaders was also mirrored by the hostile activities of Chinese emigres against the Revolutionary Council of Burma as well as by the armed struggle that has been conducted for many years by the CP of Burma in alliance with reactionary separatist groups instigated by the United States Intelligence Service through Thailand.

In the past few years the MAO Tse-tung group has been seeking to use Chinese national residents in Southeast Asian countries as obedient tools for forcing their hegemony on the peoples of those countries. After forming local hungweiping detachments consisting of the children of Chinese emigres, the Maoists last year instigated anti-government actions in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore, Nepal, and some other countries. These actions have been particularly vicious in Burma where the Ne Win Government was forced to take drastic actions including the imposition of curfew in the number of districts in Rangoon.

The demands for special rights for inhabitants of Chinese nationality, which would be tantamount in effect to extra territoriality, are neo-colonists in character and insulting to the people of Southeast Asia. The MAO group's chauvinistic activities and hostile actions against the independent states of that region are no help in the unification of those countries and the strengthening of the anti-imperialist unity of the Asian peoples.

Chinese representatives brazenly meddle in the domestic affairs of other young national states arousing universal dissatisfaction. In Tanzania, they tried to bribe local officials dealing with military questions to insist that the liberation movements on the African continent should receive Chinese arms exclusively. The purpose was to create the impression that the CPR is the only country giving effective aid to the national liberation forces in Africa.

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CPSU DOCUMENT ENTITLED, "SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP
IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

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In Cambodia, the Chinese did not balk at bribing local officials in an attempt to discredit the Soviet machinery supplied by foreign trade organizations of the USSR. In Morocco, representatives of the Chinese Embassy invited a group of local students to a reception to persuade them that King Hasa II "made a mistake by agreeing to visit the Soviet Union, because Morocco cannot hope to get aid from a country which cooperates with American imperialism." It is reported that from a number of other Afro-Asian countries as well that responsible Chinese officials persistently urge the leaders of these countries to refuse Soviet aid. The Chinese leaders tried to take advantage of the recent Middle East events to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the countries that were victims of Israeli aggression. The filthy propaganda campaign of Peking defamed the USSR. The Chinese press hinted that there is "a Soviet-American deal" for the "betrayal of Arab interests" and so on. They also circulated stories that Soviet experts in the UAR were just Israeli spies choosing the bomb targets for the Israeli Air Force. The Peking drive to sow discord between the Arab peoples and the Soviet Union failed. The Arabs know who are helping them and who their friends are.

Peking's policy is to aggravate the international situation. They do not care about the welfare of the people. The MAO group wants to fan the flames of war; in the Middle East they urge the Arabs to ignore the United Nations Security Council on a cease-fire. CHOU En-lai (Premier, CPR) in a message to the Arab states, urged them "to continue the war at any price" and "not to agree with any peaceful settlement of the conflict."

The Middle East policy of the Chinese leadership is nothing new; Peking is always connected with extremist elements that sow seeds of hatred and enmity in that region. It has close contacts including military contacts with the so-called Palestine liberation organization which is headed by Shukairi, one of the Arab nationalist leaders. This organization guided terrorist activity on the territory of Israel and added its poisonous chauvinistic provocation to the explosive situation in the Middle East--inspired by Peking.

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IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

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Instead of rallying and uniting the rival Parties and groups in the African liberation movement with the armed struggle against imperialism and colonialism, the Chinese sowed discord among the African leaders. In Southern Rhodesia they support the Zanu Party against the Zapu Party which has contact with the Soviet Union. The Chinese were willing to help Zapu but only if they renounced the USSR and condemned the Soviet revisionists.

In "Portuguese" Guinea, according to A. Cabral, leader of the African Independence Party which heads the national liberation struggle there, the Chinese demanded recognition of their political line as a pre-condition for further assistance. When they met with a firm refusal, they attempted to split Cabral's party.

In Angola, where the popular movement for the liberation of Angola led by Agostinho Neto is actively fighting the Portuguese colonialists, the Chinese leaders support splitters like Viriato Da Cruz and D. Savembi; moreover, the latter's government connection with the West is no secret.

Chinese activities contributed to the split of the Marxist-Leninist African Independence Party of Senegal which is working underground under very difficult conditions--fighting the neo-colonialist Senghor regime. In May, 1965, pro-Chinese splitters announced the foundation of what they called the Senegalese CP and in October, 1966, they set up another group, the so-called new organization of the African Independence Party. It is indicative that the Senghor Government which takes brutal repressive actions against active members of the African Independence Party is not doing anything to curb the pro-Chinese splitting organizations although it is informed about all their members.

Peking's splitting activities in the African Parties failed to produce the desired results, failed to win over the main political forces which are fighting imperialism in their countries. Only wretched renegades like the members of the SWANU of Southwest Africa consisting chiefly of college and university

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ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP
IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

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students in West European countries, who have long since lost their ties with their countries and have become paid agents of the MAO Tse-tung group, obediently follow the line of the Chinese leaders. Those African parties that pursue a policy corresponding to the national interests are offering more and more resistance to Chinese pressure. E. Monolane, a leader of the Frelimo Party of Mozambique, says he told the Chinese outright that his party did not want to be drawn into disputes with other socialist countries, that Frelimo had other aims; namely, to fight for the liberation of Mozambique and to co-operate with the countries that genuinely support this struggle.

The striving of the Chinese to gain control over the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement, one of the most important components of the broad national liberation front, as a whole, became more and more pronounced after 1962. The more failures the Maoists met with on other sectors of that front, the more they concentrated on splitting the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization (AASO). If this should fail, the Chinese plan on setting up a parallel organization in opposition to it in Peking.

Over the past four or five years, Chinese representatives tried to turn the solidarity movement into a platform for slandering the socialist world and for spreading anti-Soviet fabrications. Meeting with no success, the Peking representatives sought to paralyze the practical activity of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization by obstructing the work of the Permanent Secretariat, its main executive body. Towards this end the Chinese leaders circulated poisonous, filthy, racist and chauvinistic ideas in order to sow discord among the representatives of various races and nations. Here, too, however, the Chinese splitters failed. An absolute majority of the members of the solidarity organization rejected the Maoist ideas which are detrimental to the national liberation struggle and refused to follow the Chinese.

In view of the steadily declining prestige of the Chinese People's Republic, representatives of many Afro-Asian countries raised the question of choosing a different venue for the Fifth Solidarity Conference instead of Peking, as had

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CPSU DOCUMENT ENTITLED, "SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP
IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

been decided at the previous conference in Winneba (Ghana) in May, 1965. They proposed that this question be discussed at the Nicosia meeting of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council in February, 1967.

Realizing they would be isolated at the Nicosia meeting, the Peking leaders tried to prevent it and when this failed they decided to boycott it. They called the Nicosia meeting an "unlawful" and "big plot." China was the only Asian country that refused to attend. Instead of delegates, the Chinese sent two pseudo-journalists who tried to brainwash some of the participants during the meeting and even attempted, as was reported in the press, simply to bribe them. Despite all of their intrigue, however, the Peking splitters did not succeed in paralyzing the meeting. They also failed in their attempt to undermine the Nicosia meeting with the help of a small group of "representatives" from South-west Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho who did not represent anyone. The meeting assessed the speeches by the Peking yes men as acts of provocation and did not recognize their right to representation which they groundlessly claimed.

The proceedings and decisions of the Nicosia meeting demonstrated a high level of political maturity of its participants and the striving of the Afro-Asian peoples for cohesion and unity--this prime prerequisite for the success of the national liberation struggle. Of great importance was the unanimous decision that the Fifth Solidarity Conference could not be held in Peking.

In reply to the Nicosia decisions, the Peking splitters stated that they were "withdrawing from the solidarity organization and forming a new organization." That is a logical outcome of the whole of their fruitless and shameful efforts to undermine the unity of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement. Meeting with defeat, they set up a splitter center in the solidarity movement. The aim of this center is not to combat imperialism but to fight the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, to wage a struggle against the true fighters for national liberation who refuse to take their cue from the Peking leaders.

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The Chinese leaders have not given up hope of subordinating the national liberation movement to their selfish, narrow nationalistic ends. After meeting with defeat in the international working class and communist movement, they are still trying to gain a foothold in the countries of the "third world," to wrest away the national liberation forces from their natural allies, the socialist countries and the working class in the capitalist countries. Taking into account the great difficulties they have come up against in recent years in their relations with many young Asian and African states, the Peking leaders are employing more flexible tactics than before in some of them. They are laying emphasis on more intensive propaganda and are trying to expand economic relations with some of the young national states they would like to turn into "bridgeheads" from which to carry out their policy. One of the Chinese leaders' propaganda aims is to conceal from their own people and the rest of the world China's growing international isolation and the sharp decline in her prestige in the young national states.

The MAO group has been sinking a lot of effort and money into bolstering its political and economic influence in Cambodia in order to turn that country into "a bridgehead" from which to expand its activities in Southeast Asia. In Africa the Chinese have selected Tanzania, The Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, Guinea, and certain other countries as "bridgeheads." It is these countries that get a considerable part of the foreign economic aid rendered by China. This aid cannot satisfy the needs of the developing countries. It is mostly of a propagandist nature. Many of the factories built in these countries with Chinese assistance have turned out to be unprofitable and of low productivity while some are simply useless.

The facts show that Peking is hatching new plans to spread the "culture revolution" to Afro-Asian countries. It has been reported that the Chinese leaders intend to make radical changes in the personnel of the CPR diplomatic missions by sending hungweiping and similar individuals. Chinese propaganda has been stepped up in Afro-Asian countries extolling the "cultural revolution," "MAO's ideas," "Chinese experience," and sowing the pernicious seeds of brazen anti-Sovietism. They

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ACTIVITIES OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP
IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

are attempting to incite extremism and ultra-left elements in a number of these countries to anarchist actions undermining national security. While noting the recent failure of the Chinese leadership's plans to regain hegemony in the national liberation movement through their reckless anti-Soviet platform, one must not ignore harmful consequences of their splitting activities. Firstly, Peking's policy of turning the newly independent countries into an arena of its struggle against the socialist states prompts at least some of these countries to hold aloof from the socialist community, to avoid close contact and friendship with it. Secondly, definite harm is inflicted to the prestige of the ideas of socialism and to the prospects of their spread in the former colonies and semi-colonies. Thirdly, the Chinese leaders succeeded in inflicting some bourgeois and petty bourgeois leaders of nationalist parties with anti-Soviet sentiments. Fourthly, the activities of elements influenced by the extremist, reckless Maoist slogans have created difficulties in a number of young independent states in movements for liberation from colonial and pro-imperialist regimes.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

12/15/67

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
(Field Supervision Folder)
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurairtel 12/11/67 which enclosed a letterhead memorandum (LHM) captioned "Institute of the International Labor Movement, Moscow, USSR," and New York airtel 12/8/67 which enclosed an LHM captioned "Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution, Moscow, USSR, November, 1967."

Considerable confusion has resulted over material set out in referenced LHMs. From a review of this material, it appears that CG 5824-S* is referring to the same Institute although different names are used. In the LHM submitted 12/8/67, page five contains almost the same information as that submitted on 12/11/67. Yet, the former calls it the "Institute of the International Labor Movement" and the latter calls it "The Institute of the World Labor Movement." Buairtel 12/13/67 noted that it appeared this Institute was formerly referred to by the informant as the Institute of the International Workers Movement. Obviously, such conflicting information cannot be disseminated.


A review of the material submitted thus far by the personnel of your office on the results of Solo Mission 24 shows that the material is poorly organized, repetitious, replete with complex disjointed sentences, and not up to the caliber of that of previous missions. This is a most undesirable trend. You must insure that more care is taken in the preparation of this material.

RCP:cst
(5)

REC 46

6 DEC 15 1967

NOTE: Contacting Agents for CG 5824-S* Walter Boyle and Robert Villemure of Chicago were sent to New York to expeditiously debrief informant. Thus far, we have received nine LHMs which are as described above and contain no substantial intelligence information. There are misspelled words in these LHMs and it appears that insufficient care has been given to their preparation.



Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

DEC 19 1967

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE 1 ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CBH*

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

DATE: December 13, 1967

1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
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Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

This is to acquaint you with the comments of an official of the Soviet Security Branch relative to the Solo clandestine apparatus. (Solo is the code name for the extremely covert liaison apparatus between the Communist Party, USA, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.)

BACKGROUND:

CG 5824-S*, while in the Soviet Union on a Solo mission during November, 1967, had the occasion to confer with Mikhail K. Polonik, Security Branch, International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who has the responsibility for the Solo apparatus. Polonik made the following comments:

The Soviets, although completely satisfied with the Solo Operation, are constantly worried that some incident will occur which could compromise the Operation. The main goal must be the conservation of the apparatus. Therefore, the apparatus must be used only for "illegal" matters of the most confidential and urgent nature. All personal meets and drops are to be kept to an absolute minimum. In the place of meets and drops, increased use should be made of the micro-transceiver (small radio transmitting and receiving devices, equipped with recorders, which permit, without personal contact, the transmission and reception at a distance of up to 100 yards of an entire 200-word message in a matter of seconds).

100-428091

WGS:cst *cst*
(6)

EX-102
REC 67
CONTINUED - OVER

100-428091-6635
6 DEC 18 1967

67 DEC 19 1967

D O

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

The transfer of funds from the Soviets to the Communist Party, USA, is the most risky phase of the Solo Operation and the Party must set up some type of a business enterprise which can be used in transferring funds. The Soviets are not in favor of having NY 4309-S activated on a day-to-day basis in the Solo apparatus until such time as NY 4309-S has undergone extensive training in the Soviet Union. (NY 4309-S, a former Communist International agent, has been under development since 12/63 and is currently handling the radio phase of the Solo apparatus.)

The Soviets desire to obtain information concerning the latest type of listening and anti-bugging devices. The Soviets are not interested in any such devices available to the general public, but rather desire information on those scientific devices which are only available to police agencies. The Soviets authorized NY 694-S*, who operates the clandestine Solo communication apparatus, to expend up to \$13,000 for this purpose.

ACTION:

For information. You will be kept advised of all pertinent developments relating to this matter.

WHL
JWH
WVY
P
V
S
NM

ROUTE ON ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 12/12/67

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
 FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)
 SUBJECT: SOLO
 IS - C

B. P. [Signature] (lost)

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "REMARKS BY LE CHANG, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR FROM THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, NOVEMBER, 1967."

The information set forth in the enclosed LHM was orally furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/4-7/67 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and ROBERT A. VILLEMURE.

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source, who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C.

- 1-904, 9 PD with [unclear]
 3 - Bureau (Encls. 4) (RM)
 1 - New York (100-134637) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
 1 - Chicago

WAB:mes
 (5)

REC 8 100-428091-6636
 EX 101
 DEC 18 1967

Approved: *[Signature]*
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

67 DEC 22 1967

Handwritten notes:
 100-428091-6636
 12/21/67
 WAB:mes
 (5)
 1-904, 9 PD with [unclear]
 3 - Bureau (Encls. 4) (RM)
 1 - New York (100-134637) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
 1 - Chicago

CG 134-46 Sub B

CG 5824-S* advised that the information in the enclosed LHM was obtained by him in an interview with LE CHANG on 11/25/67 which took place at the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Moscow, USSR. Efforts to arrange an interview with the North Vietnamese for the entire Communist Party (CP), USA delegation had been unavailing for sometime in spite of the efforts of the CP of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to assist in setting it up. Finally, the CPSU advised that VO NGUYEN GIAP, Defense Minister of the DRV, and LE DUAN, First Secretary of the Central Committee, Working Peoples Party of Vietnam (WPPV), were away from Moscow observing some new Soviet weapons being sent to Vietnam by the USSR. The CPSU stated that as soon as GIAP and LE DUAN would return to Moscow they would be leaving immediately for Hanoi and would have no time for a meeting with the CP, USA delegation. Subsequently, ALBERT J. LIMA, member of the National Executive Board, CP, USA, appeared with a reel of film and newspaper clippings concerning the anti-war and anti-draft demonstrations in Oakland, California, which he said had to be given to the North Vietnamese right away. However, nothing was done about this until after all the CP, USA delegates had left Moscow with the exception of CG 5824-S*. The following morning the North Vietnamese agreed to see CG 5824-S* and he delivered the film and clippings to them. This meeting was attended by LE CHANG and two other unnamed Vietnamese and by CG 5824-S*, who was accompanied by YEVGENY DENISOV, a translator from the International Department, Central Committee, CP, USA.

CG 5824-S* stated that he and the American communist delegates had met with GIAP and LE DUAN during the course of the celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow. However, that meeting had been brief and little of substance had transpired. CG 5824-S* also stated that at the time that Western newspapers were speculating upon the opinion of experts that General GIAP was personally directing a major battle then raging in South Vietnam, GIAP was then in Moscow.

During the course of this meeting, CG 5824-S* asked LE CHANG why the DRV will not invite American communists

CG 134-46 Sub B

to come to the DRV. He reminded LE CHANG that JAMES JACKSON had obtained a special permission from the United States State Department to go to North Vietnam, but that he had been waiting in vain for many months for an invitation from the DRV or the WPPV. This question was largely ignored by LE CHANG, who finally replied only that he would raise the question with Hanoi. No answer was ever forthcoming.

For his part, LE CHANG asked concerning JAMES KENNEDY, about whom they had received word from the CP, USA through the CPSU. He asked if it is true that KENNEDY is an Agent of the FBI or the CIA. CG 5824-S* informed LE CHANG only that some CP, USA people have said so and that KENNEDY has been expelled from the CP, USA. LE CHANG gave no indication what the DRV intends or has done concerning KENNEDY.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C.
December 12, 1967

~~SECRET~~

REMARKS BY LE CHANG, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR
TO THE USSR FROM THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, NOVEMBER, 1967

During December, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During November, 1967, Le Chang, the Deputy Ambassador to the USSR from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), was heard to make the following remarks concerning the war in Vietnam.

Le Chang stated that although the headlines in some newspapers may give a different picture, there is no doubt that the Vietnamese troops are giving the American forces in Vietnam a convincing beating. In addition, the United States forces are in for a number of additional surprises.

According to Le Chang, the North Vietnamese are giving a good account of themselves in the battle against United States planes. The Vietnamese have mastered the techniques of firing the anti-aircraft missiles supplied to them by the USSR. Furthermore, everyone, whether military or civilian, learns how to aim a gun or rifle to shoot down United States planes. He emphasized that the Vietnamese are now receiving new types of weapons from the USSR and this will result in some new surprises for the Americans.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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6636

REMARKS BY LE CHANG, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR
TO THE USSR FROM THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, NOVEMBER, 1967

~~SECRET~~

Le Chang then described what he called the "Three Ready Movement" in North Vietnam, which is a movement made up of three million youths, boys and girls, in that country. In this movement they learned to do a number of things in combination: They have to be ready to learn how to agitate or carry on agitational propaganda. They must be ready to carry on production at all times and under all conditions. They must be ready to shoot while producing. As a result of this training of the armed force of the civilian population, they have had many successes. Even some women bring down United States planes with rifles. They have dispersed their industry and have moved a large part of the civilian population out of the areas where the bombing is the worst. The remaining population, especially the youth, work, protect their work with arms, and keep their morale high with agitational propaganda. They vie with one another for credit for shooting down United States planes or capturing prisoners.

Then Le Chang stated that the DRV tries to carry on propaganda among American troops. They shower leaflets on the United States troops urging them to surrender or to defect. One of the problems in this is that they have no idea how successful this propaganda effort is. The DRV would be very grateful if the CP, USA could give them some hints on how they are doing and on how to make this propaganda more successful. Le Chang has asked the CP, USA if they can send someone to help the North Vietnamese in this propaganda work against the United States troops. Although up to now the DRV has refused to honor requests from the CP, USA to send various individuals to the DRV, perhaps this could be arranged for this specific purpose.

The CP, USA has also been requested, according to Le Chang, to inform the DRV when there are communists in the United States Army fighting at the front lines. The CP, USA should tell these communists and those who oppose the war in Vietnam, that when they are in battle against the DRV and the Viet Cong they should shoot their weapons in the air instead of aiming at the Vietnamese troops. They

~~SECRET~~

REMARKS BY LE CHANG, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR
TO THE USSR FROM THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, NOVEMBER, 1967

~~SECRET~~

should be advised to surrender and to get others to surrender with them. If these soldiers are really communists, they could write down information of help to the Vietnamese, such as information on American troop strengths and weaknesses, and when breaking off contact leave these notes behind where the Vietnamese can find them. These notes could be sent to the Vietnamese so they will have such information to help the Vietnamese in fighting the American troops.

A request was also made by Le Chang for information from the United States press and also films. He specifically asked for any films shown on television showing battles in North Vietnam.

On the political front, Le Chang stated that the demands which should be made by the CP, USA are the following: 1) Demand the immediate withdrawal of all United States troops from Vietnam; 2) Demand the immediate stopping of the bombing of North and South Vietnam; and 3) Pay attention to the new political program of the National Liberation Front of Vietnam. This is very important because the new program has a number of differences from their previous program.

In the view of the DRV, the recent letter from the Saigon Government to DRV President Ho Chi-Minh was just an attempt by the Thieu-Ky clique to increase the prestige of the Saigon Government. Le Chang stated that this move will not help the United States or the South Vietnamese in any fashion. They have been rebuffed and this can only increase the prestige of the National Liberation Front of Vietnam. In Le Chang's opinion, no one believed this initiative of the Saigon authorities because it was merely an effort to outflank the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam by communicating directly with the DRV.

~~SECRET~~